37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
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Attributes | |
ACN | 656612 |
Time | |
Date | 200504 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A319 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff ground : maintenance ground : parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Qualification | technician : powerplant technician : airframe |
Experience | maintenance technician : 36 |
ASRS Report | 656612 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Qualification | technician : airframe technician : powerplant |
Experience | maintenance repairman : 28 |
ASRS Report | 656285 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper documentation maintenance problem : improper maintenance non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : ecam warning other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : diverted to another airport |
Consequence | other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : work cards contributing factor : manuals performance deficiency : scheduled maintenance performance deficiency : testing performance deficiency : training performance deficiency : unqualified personnel performance deficiency : inspection performance deficiency : installation performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Maintenance Human Performance Environmental Factor Aircraft Chart Or Publication |
Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance |
Narrative:
Myself and another mechanic were assigned nose gear torque link center hinge pin clearance work card. The work card was two-thirds completed when we were assigned. This was the first time either of us ever worked on this gear. On the first revenue flight; the aircraft returned with an unsafe gear light. The aircraft was looked at; flown on a revenue flight; and returned with the same unsafe light. It was a false indication. Some of the contributing factors were no training; only one signoff block for the entire task; no follow up inspection; and no test flight after coming out of a heavy check. This problem could not be detected on a gear swing in the hangar on jacks. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter indicated that he had 36 yrs experience as an aircraft and power plant tech and; prior to going to work with the current carrier; had 14 yrs military technician experience. With the current carrier had 11 yrs in overhaul work and spent 11 yrs in the hydraulic shop overhauling pumps and other hydraulic components. Rptedly when the carrier closed the shops and outsourced the work; the reporter was sent to line maintenance. The reporter indicated that three days of training was given to the shop technicians; then they were turned loose on the line airplanes. The reporter states the first job was the completion of a nose gear landing gear buildup inspection and check; the subject of this report. The reporter added the job had been two-thirds completed and when the reporter and his partner finished; they were required to sign for the complete job. The job card had no required gear swing test or flight test with no follow up inspection. The listed fault was a gear sensor bracket with a loose tab washer under the bracket mounting bolt. The reporter stated that a gear swing would most likely not duplicate the report as it needed vibration to shake the sensor bracket; but a test flight certainly would have given the warning.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN A319 ON FIRST FLT AFTER BEING RELEASED FROM A HVY CHK RETURNS TO THE FIELD WITH NOSE GEAR UNSAFE WARNING. THE LISTED FAULT WAS CAUSED BY A LOOSE SENSOR BRACKET.
Narrative: MYSELF AND ANOTHER MECHANIC WERE ASSIGNED NOSE GEAR TORQUE LINK CENTER HINGE PIN CLRNC WORK CARD. THE WORK CARD WAS TWO-THIRDS COMPLETED WHEN WE WERE ASSIGNED. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME EITHER OF US EVER WORKED ON THIS GEAR. ON THE FIRST REVENUE FLT; THE ACFT RETURNED WITH AN UNSAFE GEAR LIGHT. THE ACFT WAS LOOKED AT; FLOWN ON A REVENUE FLT; AND RETURNED WITH THE SAME UNSAFE LIGHT. IT WAS A FALSE INDICATION. SOME OF THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE NO TRAINING; ONLY ONE SIGNOFF BLOCK FOR THE ENTIRE TASK; NO FOLLOW UP INSPECTION; AND NO TEST FLT AFTER COMING OUT OF A HVY CHK. THIS PROB COULD NOT BE DETECTED ON A GEAR SWING IN THE HANGAR ON JACKS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR INDICATED THAT HE HAD 36 YRS EXPERIENCE AS AN ACFT AND POWER PLANT TECH AND; PRIOR TO GOING TO WORK WITH THE CURRENT CARRIER; HAD 14 YRS MIL TECHNICIAN EXPERIENCE. WITH THE CURRENT CARRIER HAD 11 YRS IN OVERHAUL WORK AND SPENT 11 YRS IN THE HYDRAULIC SHOP OVERHAULING PUMPS AND OTHER HYDRAULIC COMPONENTS. RPTEDLY WHEN THE CARRIER CLOSED THE SHOPS AND OUTSOURCED THE WORK; THE RPTR WAS SENT TO LINE MAINT. THE RPTR INDICATED THAT THREE DAYS OF TRAINING WAS GIVEN TO THE SHOP TECHNICIANS; THEN THEY WERE TURNED LOOSE ON THE LINE AIRPLANES. THE RPTR STATES THE FIRST JOB WAS THE COMPLETION OF A NOSE GEAR LNDG GEAR BUILDUP INSPECTION AND CHK; THE SUBJECT OF THIS RPT. THE RPTR ADDED THE JOB HAD BEEN TWO-THIRDS COMPLETED AND WHEN THE RPTR AND HIS PARTNER FINISHED; THEY WERE REQUIRED TO SIGN FOR THE COMPLETE JOB. THE JOB CARD HAD NO REQUIRED GEAR SWING TEST OR FLT TEST WITH NO FOLLOW UP INSPECTION. THE LISTED FAULT WAS A GEAR SENSOR BRACKET WITH A LOOSE TAB WASHER UNDER THE BRACKET MOUNTING BOLT. THE RPTR STATED THAT A GEAR SWING WOULD MOST LIKELY NOT DUPLICATE THE REPORT AS IT NEEDED VIBRATION TO SHAKE THE SENSOR BRACKET; BUT A TEST FLT CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE WARNING.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.