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Attributes | |
ACN | 656781 |
Time | |
Date | 200505 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mdw.airport |
State Reference | IL |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : parked ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 173 flight time total : 16124 flight time type : 2025 |
ASRS Report | 656781 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Aircraft Company |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
In our short haul operations; we are operating our aircraft at or close to the operating gross weight limits much of the time. Specifically; we frequently land just under maximum landing weight. In an effort to reduce high brake temperatures and enhance quick-turn times; air carrier stations will 'chock' the main wheels of the aircraft (upon request of the flight crew) and coordination release of the aircraft parking brake. SOP requires direct communication between the flight crew and the ground crew to ensure this procedure is carried out correctly so that there will be no unplanned or unexpected movement of the aircraft. This can be either accomplished by voice communications over the mechanic headset; visually with hand signals; or face-to-face. In any case; direct contact is required between the flight crew and the ground crew and is essential to 1) to verify that the main wheels have been chocked prior to parking brake release and 2) to verify that the parking brake has been set prior to pulling the chocks from the main wheels. In operation; it has been my experience that certain ground stations clearly have difficulty following the SOP. This may be due lack of knowledge or training; poor communications; short staffing; or just plain ignoring the SOP altogether. In any case; this negative trend must be acknowledged and addressed immediately before a serious accident occurs. My most recent experience with such a lack of SOP adherence was at mdw. After arriving behind schedule at mdw for a short turn; we called operations on the radio and arranged to have the aircraft chocks. After block-in; no one called or otherwise notified us that the aircraft had been chocked. I went outside to perform the walk-around. I visually confirmed with the first officer that we had been chocked and to release the parking brake. After going to operations to talk to dispatch; and finished with the walk-around; I was walking up the jet bridge stairs and noticed the ground crew removing the chocks from the main wheels. Upon entering the cockpit; I saw that the parking brake will still released. I asked the first officer if anyone had contacted him about removing the chocks; and she said 'no.' realizing that the aircraft was free to roll; I immediately re-set the parking brake! Before push-back; I had a detailed discussion with the ground crew on the headset; advising them of the importance of communicating with the flight crew directly; before pulling the wheel chocks to ensure that the parking brake has been re-set. I have seen several variations and short-cuts to the SOP used in den; las; and now mdw. Having talked with other capts about this issue; I know for a fact that this problem exists at other stations around the system; and the problem has yet to be properly addressed. Maybe a solution would be to hire more full time; fully trained; long term dedicated employees who would be more clearly focused on their work; and pay stricter attention to SOP and safety.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A320 CAPT RPTS FAILURE OF GND PERSONNEL TO FOLLOW SOP REGARDING CHOCKING AND UNCHOCKING ACFT AT THE GATE.
Narrative: IN OUR SHORT HAUL OPS; WE ARE OPERATING OUR ACFT AT OR CLOSE TO THE OPERATING GROSS WEIGHT LIMITS MUCH OF THE TIME. SPECIFICALLY; WE FREQUENTLY LAND JUST UNDER MAX LNDG WT. IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE HIGH BRAKE TEMPS AND ENHANCE QUICK-TURN TIMES; ACR STATIONS WILL 'CHOCK' THE MAIN WHEELS OF THE ACFT (UPON REQUEST OF THE FLT CREW) AND COORD RELEASE OF THE ACFT PARKING BRAKE. SOP REQUIRES DIRECT COM BETWEEN THE FLT CREW AND THE GND CREW TO ENSURE THIS PROC IS CARRIED OUT CORRECTLY SO THAT THERE WILL BE NO UNPLANNED OR UNEXPECTED MOVEMENT OF THE ACFT. THIS CAN BE EITHER ACCOMPLISHED BY VOICE COMS OVER THE MECHANIC HEADSET; VISUALLY WITH HAND SIGNALS; OR FACE-TO-FACE. IN ANY CASE; DIRECT CONTACT IS REQUIRED BETWEEN THE FLT CREW AND THE GND CREW AND IS ESSENTIAL TO 1) TO VERIFY THAT THE MAIN WHEELS HAVE BEEN CHOCKED PRIOR TO PARKING BRAKE RELEASE AND 2) TO VERIFY THAT THE PARKING BRAKE HAS BEEN SET PRIOR TO PULLING THE CHOCKS FROM THE MAIN WHEELS. IN OP; IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE THAT CERTAIN GND STATIONS CLEARLY HAVE DIFFICULTY FOLLOWING THE SOP. THIS MAY BE DUE LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR TRAINING; POOR COMS; SHORT STAFFING; OR JUST PLAIN IGNORING THE SOP ALTOGETHER. IN ANY CASE; THIS NEGATIVE TREND MUST BE ACKNOWLEDGED AND ADDRESSED IMMEDIATELY BEFORE A SERIOUS ACCIDENT OCCURS. MY MOST RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH SUCH A LACK OF SOP ADHERENCE WAS AT MDW. AFTER ARRIVING BEHIND SCHEDULE AT MDW FOR A SHORT TURN; WE CALLED OPERATIONS ON THE RADIO AND ARRANGED TO HAVE THE ACFT CHOCKS. AFTER BLOCK-IN; NO ONE CALLED OR OTHERWISE NOTIFIED US THAT THE ACFT HAD BEEN CHOCKED. I WENT OUTSIDE TO PERFORM THE WALK-AROUND. I VISUALLY CONFIRMED WITH THE FO THAT WE HAD BEEN CHOCKED AND TO RELEASE THE PARKING BRAKE. AFTER GOING TO OPS TO TALK TO DISPATCH; AND FINISHED WITH THE WALK-AROUND; I WAS WALKING UP THE JET BRIDGE STAIRS AND NOTICED THE GND CREW REMOVING THE CHOCKS FROM THE MAIN WHEELS. UPON ENTERING THE COCKPIT; I SAW THAT THE PARKING BRAKE WILL STILL RELEASED. I ASKED THE FO IF ANYONE HAD CONTACTED HIM ABOUT REMOVING THE CHOCKS; AND SHE SAID 'NO.' REALIZING THAT THE ACFT WAS FREE TO ROLL; I IMMEDIATELY RE-SET THE PARKING BRAKE! BEFORE PUSH-BACK; I HAD A DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH THE GND CREW ON THE HEADSET; ADVISING THEM OF THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATING WITH THE FLT CREW DIRECTLY; BEFORE PULLING THE WHEEL CHOCKS TO ENSURE THAT THE PARKING BRAKE HAS BEEN RE-SET. I HAVE SEEN SEVERAL VARIATIONS AND SHORT-CUTS TO THE SOP USED IN DEN; LAS; AND NOW MDW. HAVING TALKED WITH OTHER CAPTS ABOUT THIS ISSUE; I KNOW FOR A FACT THAT THIS PROB EXISTS AT OTHER STATIONS AROUND THE SYSTEM; AND THE PROB HAS YET TO BE PROPERLY ADDRESSED. MAYBE A SOLUTION WOULD BE TO HIRE MORE FULL TIME; FULLY TRAINED; LONG TERM DEDICATED EMPLOYEES WHO WOULD BE MORE CLEARLY FOCUSED ON THEIR WORK; AND PAY STRICTER ATTENTION TO SOP AND SAFETY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.