Narrative:

So there we were; me an IOE transition captain and my IOE instructor; having briefed the GPS runway 35L to sdf; having been cleared to intercept the GPS final; and having begun configuring the airplane. We heard approach control talking with an aircraft that I understood to be considerably ahead of us cleared for a visual to runway 35L. I saw an airplane far up toward the airport and also saw one target on TCAS out there; and it appeared to be no factor to us. The controller called out traffic and I said; 'I have that traffic;' and my instructor called back that we had the traffic. Just as I began to descend; another airplane appeared to be overshooting the east runway so severely as to intrude onto our final. I called for flaps 40 degrees; and began slowing to final approach speed. The controller seemed to be mystified at our questions about the overshooting traffic and sounded as if we shouldn't be asking about that; he said that 'was' our traffic to follow. This was not what we thought we were cleared to follow. The controller asked if we could sidestep to runway 35R; and we said yes. He cleared us so we landed on the east runway and taxied across the airport to ramp. This is yet another example of why night visuals are often not a good idea. Supplemental information from acn 657444: concerns over visual approachs with identing the proper aircraft continue to be an assumed acceptance when aircraft are reported 'in sight.' presently there is no absolute means to know for sure that an aircraft reported as 'in sight' is without any doubt the aircraft ATC is pointing out. Parallel runways may compound the scenario when there are multiple aircraft converging for the runways. It is with concern for safety that I file this report to hopefully point out an element of this style of approach that does compromise safety for the sake of relieving responsibility for separation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A300 FLT CREW EXPERIENCED CONFLICT AT SDF DURING VISUAL APCH PROC WHEN WRONG PRECEDING ACFT WAS SIGHTED AND FOLLOWED.

Narrative: SO THERE WE WERE; ME AN IOE TRANSITION CAPT AND MY IOE INSTRUCTOR; HAVING BRIEFED THE GPS RWY 35L TO SDF; HAVING BEEN CLRED TO INTERCEPT THE GPS FINAL; AND HAVING BEGUN CONFIGURING THE AIRPLANE. WE HEARD APCH CTL TALKING WITH AN ACFT THAT I UNDERSTOOD TO BE CONSIDERABLY AHEAD OF US CLRED FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 35L. I SAW AN AIRPLANE FAR UP TOWARD THE ARPT AND ALSO SAW ONE TARGET ON TCAS OUT THERE; AND IT APPEARED TO BE NO FACTOR TO US. THE CTLR CALLED OUT TFC AND I SAID; 'I HAVE THAT TFC;' AND MY INSTRUCTOR CALLED BACK THAT WE HAD THE TFC. JUST AS I BEGAN TO DSND; ANOTHER AIRPLANE APPEARED TO BE OVERSHOOTING THE E RWY SO SEVERELY AS TO INTRUDE ONTO OUR FINAL. I CALLED FOR FLAPS 40 DEGS; AND BEGAN SLOWING TO FINAL APCH SPD. THE CTLR SEEMED TO BE MYSTIFIED AT OUR QUESTIONS ABOUT THE OVERSHOOTING TFC AND SOUNDED AS IF WE SHOULDN'T BE ASKING ABOUT THAT; HE SAID THAT 'WAS' OUR TFC TO FOLLOW. THIS WAS NOT WHAT WE THOUGHT WE WERE CLRED TO FOLLOW. THE CTLR ASKED IF WE COULD SIDESTEP TO RWY 35R; AND WE SAID YES. HE CLRED US SO WE LANDED ON THE E RWY AND TAXIED ACROSS THE ARPT TO RAMP. THIS IS YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF WHY NIGHT VISUALS ARE OFTEN NOT A GOOD IDEA. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 657444: CONCERNS OVER VISUAL APCHS WITH IDENTING THE PROPER ACFT CONTINUE TO BE AN ASSUMED ACCEPTANCE WHEN ACFT ARE RPTED 'IN SIGHT.' PRESENTLY THERE IS NO ABSOLUTE MEANS TO KNOW FOR SURE THAT AN ACFT RPTED AS 'IN SIGHT' IS WITHOUT ANY DOUBT THE ACFT ATC IS POINTING OUT. PARALLEL RWYS MAY COMPOUND THE SCENARIO WHEN THERE ARE MULTIPLE ACFT CONVERGING FOR THE RWYS. IT IS WITH CONCERN FOR SAFETY THAT I FILE THIS RPT TO HOPEFULLY POINT OUT AN ELEMENT OF THIS STYLE OF APCH THAT DOES COMPROMISE SAFETY FOR THE SAKE OF RELIEVING RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEPARATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.