Narrative:

On a training flight in a baron 58; I was the PF from the right seat of the aircraft during a single engine practice approach. After stabilizing the aircraft inbound to runway 30L; the approach speed was still high. While the instructor pilot was running the approach checklist; I deployed the flaps to full. The ip noted that I had too high of an airspeed for full flaps. We left them in as I pitched to slow the airspeed below flap speed. During this time; the landing gear warning horn was unconsciously ignored by me. It had been sounding since we pulled a throttle back at the beginning of the engine out practice on a short right base leg. Apparently; the warning horn never stopped as I put in full flaps. As we slowed to a more reasonable approach speed; both of us concentrated on airspeed and the sight picture and the ip discontinued the reading of the checklist. During the flare; I left power in for a smoother touchdown. As the plane gradually sank during the long roundout; we began to hear metal contacting the runway. The ip thought he heard dragging flaps while I thought I heard the ticking of something like a propeller hitting. Without hesitation; I pitched up while adding go around power. The ip was saying; 'go; go; go!' on the climb out; we noticed both the gear handle up and the warning horn. We selected flaps up and the warning silenced. The plane flew exactly as if nothing had happened. There was no out-of-balance feeling from either engine. The pilot acting as ip for that approach (he was listed officially as PIC for the flight) decided that we must have only drug a flap. Based on that; we flew the extra short distance from ZZZ to ZZZ1; the home base for the plane. I flew the plane to a full stop using a no flap approach. It was when we stopped the engines when we discovered that we did indeed strike the 6 propeller blades. The damage was to the last 3 or 4 inches of the propeller tips. Also damaged was the left inboard flap and the entry step that protrudes low behind the right inboard flap. Human factors for this incident may include the complacency we each felt with the other experienced pilot on board; the short turn to final with the simulated loss of an engine during the turn; and the concept that we can push ourselves in a training situation where we might otherwise fly around to buy time to fix a problem and run an abnormal or emergency checklist in a real life situation. Supplemental information from acn 658000: both of us are professionally trained pilots who receive annual training on turbojet aircraft. Additionally; we flew several light aircraft quarterly as part of our job requirements. In this case; this was my first flight after being on leave. The last aircraft flown was a BE400 and the BE58 was last flown approximately 95 days prior to the event. For some reason; I became distraction with the airspeed and forgot basic procedures -- fly the airplane. Possibly the long time since my last flight; the PF's failure to coordination flap extension with the PNF; and the simulated engine failure added up to a bad situation. We coordination this flight prior to departure and again in-flight.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE58 EXECUTED A GAR FOLLOWING A GEAR UP SINGLE ENG APCH IN WHICH THE PROPS; FLAPS; AND STEPS MADE RWY CONTACT.

Narrative: ON A TRAINING FLT IN A BARON 58; I WAS THE PF FROM THE R SEAT OF THE ACFT DURING A SINGLE ENG PRACTICE APCH. AFTER STABILIZING THE ACFT INBOUND TO RWY 30L; THE APCH SPD WAS STILL HIGH. WHILE THE INSTRUCTOR PLT WAS RUNNING THE APCH CHKLIST; I DEPLOYED THE FLAPS TO FULL. THE IP NOTED THAT I HAD TOO HIGH OF AN AIRSPD FOR FULL FLAPS. WE LEFT THEM IN AS I PITCHED TO SLOW THE AIRSPD BELOW FLAP SPD. DURING THIS TIME; THE LNDG GEAR WARNING HORN WAS UNCONSCIOUSLY IGNORED BY ME. IT HAD BEEN SOUNDING SINCE WE PULLED A THROTTLE BACK AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ENG OUT PRACTICE ON A SHORT R BASE LEG. APPARENTLY; THE WARNING HORN NEVER STOPPED AS I PUT IN FULL FLAPS. AS WE SLOWED TO A MORE REASONABLE APCH SPD; BOTH OF US CONCENTRATED ON AIRSPD AND THE SIGHT PICTURE AND THE IP DISCONTINUED THE READING OF THE CHKLIST. DURING THE FLARE; I LEFT PWR IN FOR A SMOOTHER TOUCHDOWN. AS THE PLANE GRADUALLY SANK DURING THE LONG ROUNDOUT; WE BEGAN TO HEAR METAL CONTACTING THE RWY. THE IP THOUGHT HE HEARD DRAGGING FLAPS WHILE I THOUGHT I HEARD THE TICKING OF SOMETHING LIKE A PROP HITTING. WITHOUT HESITATION; I PITCHED UP WHILE ADDING GAR PWR. THE IP WAS SAYING; 'GO; GO; GO!' ON THE CLBOUT; WE NOTICED BOTH THE GEAR HANDLE UP AND THE WARNING HORN. WE SELECTED FLAPS UP AND THE WARNING SILENCED. THE PLANE FLEW EXACTLY AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED. THERE WAS NO OUT-OF-BAL FEELING FROM EITHER ENG. THE PLT ACTING AS IP FOR THAT APCH (HE WAS LISTED OFFICIALLY AS PIC FOR THE FLT) DECIDED THAT WE MUST HAVE ONLY DRUG A FLAP. BASED ON THAT; WE FLEW THE EXTRA SHORT DISTANCE FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1; THE HOME BASE FOR THE PLANE. I FLEW THE PLANE TO A FULL STOP USING A NO FLAP APCH. IT WAS WHEN WE STOPPED THE ENGS WHEN WE DISCOVERED THAT WE DID INDEED STRIKE THE 6 PROP BLADES. THE DAMAGE WAS TO THE LAST 3 OR 4 INCHES OF THE PROP TIPS. ALSO DAMAGED WAS THE L INBOARD FLAP AND THE ENTRY STEP THAT PROTRUDES LOW BEHIND THE R INBOARD FLAP. HUMAN FACTORS FOR THIS INCIDENT MAY INCLUDE THE COMPLACENCY WE EACH FELT WITH THE OTHER EXPERIENCED PLT ON BOARD; THE SHORT TURN TO FINAL WITH THE SIMULATED LOSS OF AN ENG DURING THE TURN; AND THE CONCEPT THAT WE CAN PUSH OURSELVES IN A TRAINING SIT WHERE WE MIGHT OTHERWISE FLY AROUND TO BUY TIME TO FIX A PROB AND RUN AN ABNORMAL OR EMER CHKLIST IN A REAL LIFE SIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 658000: BOTH OF US ARE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED PLTS WHO RECEIVE ANNUAL TRAINING ON TURBOJET ACFT. ADDITIONALLY; WE FLEW SEVERAL LIGHT ACFT QUARTERLY AS PART OF OUR JOB REQUIREMENTS. IN THIS CASE; THIS WAS MY FIRST FLT AFTER BEING ON LEAVE. THE LAST ACFT FLOWN WAS A BE400 AND THE BE58 WAS LAST FLOWN APPROX 95 DAYS PRIOR TO THE EVENT. FOR SOME REASON; I BECAME DISTR WITH THE AIRSPD AND FORGOT BASIC PROCS -- FLY THE AIRPLANE. POSSIBLY THE LONG TIME SINCE MY LAST FLT; THE PF'S FAILURE TO COORD FLAP EXTENSION WITH THE PNF; AND THE SIMULATED ENG FAILURE ADDED UP TO A BAD SIT. WE COORD THIS FLT PRIOR TO DEP AND AGAIN INFLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.