Narrative:

We were being vectored to the ILS runway 36R at hsv. There was a significant area of WX to the west of hsv. Current conditions were reported to us by hsv approach 320 degrees at 17 KTS; 16 scattered; 44 broken; 2 1/2 mi rain. At 3000 ft and on a 050 degree heading; we were cleared for the ILS runway 36R approach. We were painting a level 3 area of precipitation over the final; hsv approach said they showed it as a level 2 area. We contacted tower outside the marker at 180 KTS; and with our flaps at 20 degrees we began our descent. At about 2500 ft MSL; the airspeed increased to 205 KTS. Our trend vector showed a 40 KT increase. Our pitch went from 3 degrees to about 7 degrees and we were now 1 DOT above the GS. I disconnected the autoplt; reduced the power; and increased the pitch to avoid exceeding the flap 20 degree speed. I announced to the first officer that I was discontinuing the approach and I was going to turn out to the southeast to better WX. During this the tower was giving us our clearance to land and the current WX on the field. As soon as the first officer had a chance to tell the tower our intentions; I had already begun our turn off the approach. I also climbed through our previous altitude of 3000 ft; which was also the missed approach altitude. I climbed as high as 3500 ft. I believed I gained most of the altitude due to the increasing performance windshear. I had most of the power back and a pitch down attitude. I did not want to be too aggressive in pitching over or reducing the power to idle in the current conditions and that close to the ground. The tower controller seemed upset that we turned off the approach and gained altitude without telling him first. The first officer reported that we were turning to the southeast as soon as he had a chance. I understand his position; but I feel if I would've continued the approach; while we had a chance to request a turn out to the southeast; we would've flown into worsening WX; and put our flight into a worse situation. I should not have accepted the approach clearance. I put too much faith in approach control radar. From what my radar was showing; it was worse. The current conditions on the field had a lot to do with my decision as well. The WX was actually south of the field; so this didn't tell the whole story. However; next time I will tell the controller our intentions rather than acting and waiting to communicate with the controller.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PRIOR TO NOTIFYING ATC; A CRJ100 CREW EXECUTED A MISSED APCH FOLLOWING A WINDSHEAR INDICATION AND APCHING DETERIORATING WX.

Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED TO THE ILS RWY 36R AT HSV. THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT AREA OF WX TO THE W OF HSV. CURRENT CONDITIONS WERE RPTED TO US BY HSV APCH 320 DEGS AT 17 KTS; 16 SCATTERED; 44 BROKEN; 2 1/2 MI RAIN. AT 3000 FT AND ON A 050 DEG HDG; WE WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 36R APCH. WE WERE PAINTING A LEVEL 3 AREA OF PRECIP OVER THE FINAL; HSV APCH SAID THEY SHOWED IT AS A LEVEL 2 AREA. WE CONTACTED TWR OUTSIDE THE MARKER AT 180 KTS; AND WITH OUR FLAPS AT 20 DEGS WE BEGAN OUR DSCNT. AT ABOUT 2500 FT MSL; THE AIRSPD INCREASED TO 205 KTS. OUR TREND VECTOR SHOWED A 40 KT INCREASE. OUR PITCH WENT FROM 3 DEGS TO ABOUT 7 DEGS AND WE WERE NOW 1 DOT ABOVE THE GS. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT; REDUCED THE PWR; AND INCREASED THE PITCH TO AVOID EXCEEDING THE FLAP 20 DEG SPD. I ANNOUNCED TO THE FO THAT I WAS DISCONTINUING THE APCH AND I WAS GOING TO TURN OUT TO THE SE TO BETTER WX. DURING THIS THE TWR WAS GIVING US OUR CLRNC TO LAND AND THE CURRENT WX ON THE FIELD. AS SOON AS THE FO HAD A CHANCE TO TELL THE TWR OUR INTENTIONS; I HAD ALREADY BEGUN OUR TURN OFF THE APCH. I ALSO CLBED THROUGH OUR PREVIOUS ALT OF 3000 FT; WHICH WAS ALSO THE MISSED APCH ALT. I CLBED AS HIGH AS 3500 FT. I BELIEVED I GAINED MOST OF THE ALT DUE TO THE INCREASING PERFORMANCE WINDSHEAR. I HAD MOST OF THE PWR BACK AND A PITCH DOWN ATTITUDE. I DID NOT WANT TO BE TOO AGGRESSIVE IN PITCHING OVER OR REDUCING THE PWR TO IDLE IN THE CURRENT CONDITIONS AND THAT CLOSE TO THE GND. THE TWR CTLR SEEMED UPSET THAT WE TURNED OFF THE APCH AND GAINED ALT WITHOUT TELLING HIM FIRST. THE FO RPTED THAT WE WERE TURNING TO THE SE AS SOON AS HE HAD A CHANCE. I UNDERSTAND HIS POS; BUT I FEEL IF I WOULD'VE CONTINUED THE APCH; WHILE WE HAD A CHANCE TO REQUEST A TURN OUT TO THE SE; WE WOULD'VE FLOWN INTO WORSENING WX; AND PUT OUR FLT INTO A WORSE SIT. I SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED THE APCH CLRNC. I PUT TOO MUCH FAITH IN APCH CTL RADAR. FROM WHAT MY RADAR WAS SHOWING; IT WAS WORSE. THE CURRENT CONDITIONS ON THE FIELD HAD A LOT TO DO WITH MY DECISION AS WELL. THE WX WAS ACTUALLY S OF THE FIELD; SO THIS DIDN'T TELL THE WHOLE STORY. HOWEVER; NEXT TIME I WILL TELL THE CTLR OUR INTENTIONS RATHER THAN ACTING AND WAITING TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE CTLR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.