Narrative:

When starting the right engine in atl for flight to aus; egt flashed and approached; but did not exceed the limit of 475 degrees. We discussed the difficulty of judging when to abort the start during these sits in summer and their frequent occurrence on the MD88. We flew to aus. In aus; the outside air temperature was 86 degrees F and we had a tailwind of approximately 13-15 KTS during engine start. The right engine did the same thing during start; but even though the rate of egt rise was decreasing as the limit was approached; egt made it to 480 degrees before coming right back down to normal within 2-3 seconds; and first officer did not abort the start. I was monitoring and saw what happened; but neither of us verbalized the event. We continued flight to cvg. En route to cvg; we realized we had made a mistake. In analyzing a reason for my decision; I thought knowing that the maintenance limits have wider tolerances than our operations manual; and that overtemp analyses also include a duration component; I was sure that with this minor exceedence; the engine was fine. I realized later that obviously this was not my call to make; and that I had made an incorrect decision. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated both crew members agonized over the decision to depart after the engine temperature exceeded the limit by 5 degrees. The report was entered in the logbook at termination of the flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD88 DURING THE R ENG START THE EGT EXCEEDED THE START LIMIT BY 5 DEGS. CREW FAILED TO HAVE ENG CHKED AND DEPARTED.

Narrative: WHEN STARTING THE R ENG IN ATL FOR FLT TO AUS; EGT FLASHED AND APCHED; BUT DID NOT EXCEED THE LIMIT OF 475 DEGS. WE DISCUSSED THE DIFFICULTY OF JUDGING WHEN TO ABORT THE START DURING THESE SITS IN SUMMER AND THEIR FREQUENT OCCURRENCE ON THE MD88. WE FLEW TO AUS. IN AUS; THE OUTSIDE AIR TEMP WAS 86 DEGS F AND WE HAD A TAILWIND OF APPROX 13-15 KTS DURING ENG START. THE R ENG DID THE SAME THING DURING START; BUT EVEN THOUGH THE RATE OF EGT RISE WAS DECREASING AS THE LIMIT WAS APCHED; EGT MADE IT TO 480 DEGS BEFORE COMING RIGHT BACK DOWN TO NORMAL WITHIN 2-3 SECONDS; AND FO DID NOT ABORT THE START. I WAS MONITORING AND SAW WHAT HAPPENED; BUT NEITHER OF US VERBALIZED THE EVENT. WE CONTINUED FLT TO CVG. ENRTE TO CVG; WE REALIZED WE HAD MADE A MISTAKE. IN ANALYZING A REASON FOR MY DECISION; I THOUGHT KNOWING THAT THE MAINT LIMITS HAVE WIDER TOLERANCES THAN OUR OPS MANUAL; AND THAT OVERTEMP ANALYSES ALSO INCLUDE A DURATION COMPONENT; I WAS SURE THAT WITH THIS MINOR EXCEEDENCE; THE ENG WAS FINE. I REALIZED LATER THAT OBVIOUSLY THIS WAS NOT MY CALL TO MAKE; AND THAT I HAD MADE AN INCORRECT DECISION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED BOTH CREW MEMBERS AGONIZED OVER THE DECISION TO DEPART AFTER THE ENG TEMP EXCEEDED THE LIMIT BY 5 DEGS. THE RPT WAS ENTERED IN THE LOGBOOK AT TERMINATION OF THE FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.