Narrative:

We were cleared for and flew the teb 5 departure having taken off from runway 24. After takeoff; we flew the runway heading to 1500 ft and then waited until DME 4.5 from teb VOR to begin our turn to 280 degrees. The controller gave us a scolding over the radio; as we apparently did not comply with the departure procedure. Both my first officer and I were in agreement that we did exactly what the procedure called for and could not figure out at that time what it was that we did not follow the procedure. Unfortunately; I allowed this to distract me; which violated our sterile cockpit rule below 10000 ft; as we had not yet reached 10000 ft while all of this was going on. My first officer had the presence of mind to recognize it and bring it to my attention. We then waited until cruise to do some research. It is also important to note that we were using the commercial chart version of the teb 5. It wasn't until we looked at the govt version that it clicked what we had done wrong. We both had it in our heads that the turn to 280 wasn't to be done until reaching DME 4.5 from teb VOR. We went back to the commercial chart; after having read the procedure in the govt chart; and it was right there in plain sight and we realized that we had misinterpreted the procedure. It is also important to note that a notice had been sent out in regards to this departure procedure reiterating how it was to be done. We even have this posted in our office at home base. However; I haven't done a teb trip in a while and was distraction by too many other things during preflight (ie: customer service concerns; fueling; etc) to remember to look at that posting. The fact that this notice had been sent out tells me that this is nothing new; and that this procedure had been misinterpreted before. In fact; it probably has been misinterpreted just as we had done it; many times before now. That doesn't excuse anyone who has messed it up; but it does bring up some concerns. Somehow; there is something in the presentation of the procedure that causes pilots to misunderstand the procedure. That being the case; maybe a bigger picture should be looked at as to why this happens. Some of the factors to consider would be: a) is the procedure too complicated for such a busy; high-pressure environment? And could it be simplified? B) is the posting of the notice effective enough to correct the problems that teb is having with this departure? C) is there a better way to present the departure procedure text so that misinterpretation doesn't continue to be a problem? D) is teb too busy? East) should it be encouraged that places like flight school X and flight school Y include this specific departure procedure in their training? F) how can crews and flight departments improve their CRM or SOP's to better handle complex departures? Also to finish the story; despite not executing the procedure correctly and being scolded; at no time did we receive a TA or a RA from our TCAS (which is the most current TCASII). The controller however did inform us that the 'larger jet off our left side was not happy.' that would imply to me that he may have received a TA or an RA; however; we did not; and the controller did not inform us that the other aircraft had received a TA or RA from his TCASII. What I have learned from this experience is that it is important to pay attention to the details of those procedures and review them prior to flight and then again just before takeoff. I have also learned that it is important to stay in a 'normal' routine so that solid patterns of action are followed each time; and if something distracts a crew and takes them out of the normal flow of events; to return to normal as much as possible to keep things as safe as possible.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DEV FROM THE TEB 5 DEP PROC OCCURS WHEN THE CREW MISINTERPRETS THE REQUIREMENTS DEPICTED FOR THE PROC.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FOR AND FLEW THE TEB 5 DEP HAVING TAKEN OFF FROM RWY 24. AFTER TAKEOFF; WE FLEW THE RWY HDG TO 1500 FT AND THEN WAITED UNTIL DME 4.5 FROM TEB VOR TO BEGIN OUR TURN TO 280 DEGS. THE CTLR GAVE US A SCOLDING OVER THE RADIO; AS WE APPARENTLY DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE DEP PROC. BOTH MY FO AND I WERE IN AGREEMENT THAT WE DID EXACTLY WHAT THE PROC CALLED FOR AND COULD NOT FIGURE OUT AT THAT TIME WHAT IT WAS THAT WE DID NOT FOLLOW THE PROC. UNFORTUNATELY; I ALLOWED THIS TO DISTRACT ME; WHICH VIOLATED OUR STERILE COCKPIT RULE BELOW 10000 FT; AS WE HAD NOT YET REACHED 10000 FT WHILE ALL OF THIS WAS GOING ON. MY FO HAD THE PRESENCE OF MIND TO RECOGNIZE IT AND BRING IT TO MY ATTENTION. WE THEN WAITED UNTIL CRUISE TO DO SOME RESEARCH. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT WE WERE USING THE COMMERCIAL CHART VERSION OF THE TEB 5. IT WASN'T UNTIL WE LOOKED AT THE GOVT VERSION THAT IT CLICKED WHAT WE HAD DONE WRONG. WE BOTH HAD IT IN OUR HEADS THAT THE TURN TO 280 WASN'T TO BE DONE UNTIL REACHING DME 4.5 FROM TEB VOR. WE WENT BACK TO THE COMMERCIAL CHART; AFTER HAVING READ THE PROC IN THE GOVT CHART; AND IT WAS RIGHT THERE IN PLAIN SIGHT AND WE REALIZED THAT WE HAD MISINTERPRETED THE PROC. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT A NOTICE HAD BEEN SENT OUT IN REGARDS TO THIS DEP PROC REITERATING HOW IT WAS TO BE DONE. WE EVEN HAVE THIS POSTED IN OUR OFFICE AT HOME BASE. HOWEVER; I HAVEN'T DONE A TEB TRIP IN A WHILE AND WAS DISTR BY TOO MANY OTHER THINGS DURING PREFLT (IE: CUSTOMER SVC CONCERNS; FUELING; ETC) TO REMEMBER TO LOOK AT THAT POSTING. THE FACT THAT THIS NOTICE HAD BEEN SENT OUT TELLS ME THAT THIS IS NOTHING NEW; AND THAT THIS PROC HAD BEEN MISINTERPRETED BEFORE. IN FACT; IT PROBABLY HAS BEEN MISINTERPRETED JUST AS WE HAD DONE IT; MANY TIMES BEFORE NOW. THAT DOESN'T EXCUSE ANYONE WHO HAS MESSED IT UP; BUT IT DOES BRING UP SOME CONCERNS. SOMEHOW; THERE IS SOMETHING IN THE PRESENTATION OF THE PROC THAT CAUSES PLTS TO MISUNDERSTAND THE PROC. THAT BEING THE CASE; MAYBE A BIGGER PICTURE SHOULD BE LOOKED AT AS TO WHY THIS HAPPENS. SOME OF THE FACTORS TO CONSIDER WOULD BE: A) IS THE PROC TOO COMPLICATED FOR SUCH A BUSY; HIGH-PRESSURE ENVIRONMENT? AND COULD IT BE SIMPLIFIED? B) IS THE POSTING OF THE NOTICE EFFECTIVE ENOUGH TO CORRECT THE PROBS THAT TEB IS HAVING WITH THIS DEP? C) IS THERE A BETTER WAY TO PRESENT THE DEP PROC TEXT SO THAT MISINTERPRETATION DOESN'T CONTINUE TO BE A PROB? D) IS TEB TOO BUSY? E) SHOULD IT BE ENCOURAGED THAT PLACES LIKE FLT SCHOOL X AND FLT SCHOOL Y INCLUDE THIS SPECIFIC DEP PROC IN THEIR TRAINING? F) HOW CAN CREWS AND FLT DEPARTMENTS IMPROVE THEIR CRM OR SOP'S TO BETTER HANDLE COMPLEX DEPS? ALSO TO FINISH THE STORY; DESPITE NOT EXECUTING THE PROC CORRECTLY AND BEING SCOLDED; AT NO TIME DID WE RECEIVE A TA OR A RA FROM OUR TCAS (WHICH IS THE MOST CURRENT TCASII). THE CTLR HOWEVER DID INFORM US THAT THE 'LARGER JET OFF OUR L SIDE WAS NOT HAPPY.' THAT WOULD IMPLY TO ME THAT HE MAY HAVE RECEIVED A TA OR AN RA; HOWEVER; WE DID NOT; AND THE CTLR DID NOT INFORM US THAT THE OTHER ACFT HAD RECEIVED A TA OR RA FROM HIS TCASII. WHAT I HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS EXPERIENCE IS THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO PAY ATTENTION TO THE DETAILS OF THOSE PROCS AND REVIEW THEM PRIOR TO FLT AND THEN AGAIN JUST BEFORE TAKEOFF. I HAVE ALSO LEARNED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO STAY IN A 'NORMAL' ROUTINE SO THAT SOLID PATTERNS OF ACTION ARE FOLLOWED EACH TIME; AND IF SOMETHING DISTRACTS A CREW AND TAKES THEM OUT OF THE NORMAL FLOW OF EVENTS; TO RETURN TO NORMAL AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO KEEP THINGS AS SAFE AS POSSIBLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.