Narrative:

On a visual approach at brw; we intercepted the glidepath as backup to our visual approach. Once established inside the final fix; we took note that the ILS glideslope is actually higher than the VASI indicators. The approach was otherwise uneventful. If we (or anybody) fly the VASI indicators in; you will be low on the GS. It is a well known thing at brw and it needs to be addressed. Next; after we touched down on late rollout; 2 tires popped for whatever reason. Three tires had slide indications (locked tires) on the aircraft. The 4TH tire was ok. It seemed like; and undoubtedly was; that the antiskid had malfunctioned. There was an FAA inspector on board and he obviously had no idea how the aircraft or approach worked. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that at normal GS intercept distance; the VASI is approximately 1 DOT low. Flying the GS on a normal 3 degree profile results in the VASI/GS becoming coincidental at about 200 ft. The FAA inspector wanted to know why they did not fly the VASI all the way down. The crew explained that in a large jet; flying the GS to a lower altitude then transitioning to VASI is SOP. The problem for pilots here is flying low leads to a lower altitude on short final and the possibility of landing short. Reporter stated that pilots familiar with brw are aware of the problem and he believes; but could not say for positive; that the FAA also knows.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B727-100 FLT CREW RPTED THAT THE VASI AND ILS RWY 6 BOTH HAVE A 30 DEG GS; BUT FLYING THE VASI ON GS WILL RESULT IN AN APCH PATH BELOW THE ILS GS.

Narrative: ON A VISUAL APCH AT BRW; WE INTERCEPTED THE GLIDEPATH AS BACKUP TO OUR VISUAL APCH. ONCE ESTABLISHED INSIDE THE FINAL FIX; WE TOOK NOTE THAT THE ILS GLIDESLOPE IS ACTUALLY HIGHER THAN THE VASI INDICATORS. THE APCH WAS OTHERWISE UNEVENTFUL. IF WE (OR ANYBODY) FLY THE VASI INDICATORS IN; YOU WILL BE LOW ON THE GS. IT IS A WELL KNOWN THING AT BRW AND IT NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED. NEXT; AFTER WE TOUCHED DOWN ON LATE ROLLOUT; 2 TIRES POPPED FOR WHATEVER REASON. THREE TIRES HAD SLIDE INDICATIONS (LOCKED TIRES) ON THE ACFT. THE 4TH TIRE WAS OK. IT SEEMED LIKE; AND UNDOUBTEDLY WAS; THAT THE ANTISKID HAD MALFUNCTIONED. THERE WAS AN FAA INSPECTOR ON BOARD AND HE OBVIOUSLY HAD NO IDEA HOW THE ACFT OR APCH WORKED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT AT NORMAL GS INTERCEPT DISTANCE; THE VASI IS APPROX 1 DOT LOW. FLYING THE GS ON A NORMAL 3 DEG PROFILE RESULTS IN THE VASI/GS BECOMING COINCIDENTAL AT ABOUT 200 FT. THE FAA INSPECTOR WANTED TO KNOW WHY THEY DID NOT FLY THE VASI ALL THE WAY DOWN. THE CREW EXPLAINED THAT IN A LARGE JET; FLYING THE GS TO A LOWER ALT THEN TRANSITIONING TO VASI IS SOP. THE PROB FOR PLTS HERE IS FLYING LOW LEADS TO A LOWER ALT ON SHORT FINAL AND THE POSSIBILITY OF LNDG SHORT. RPTR STATED THAT PLTS FAMILIAR WITH BRW ARE AWARE OF THE PROB AND HE BELIEVES; BUT COULD NOT SAY FOR POSITIVE; THAT THE FAA ALSO KNOWS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.