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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 668380 |
Time | |
Date | 200508 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : cwa.airport |
State Reference | IA |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | SF 340B |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight ground : maintenance |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | other personnel |
ASRS Report | 668380 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other other : 1 |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
This problem is just the most recent in my experience of a number of weight and balance issues which we managed to resolve in 'the nick of time' (if only barely). Our airline's newly-instituted load control system does not allow flts to push back until the flight crew has solid final numbers -- and in fact; it actually alerts the crew; the individual load planner; and the dispatcher working the flight whenever the situation is 'critical' either for weight; for cg location; or both. Notwithstanding what the system 'allows;' crews do leave gates without the right numbers -- based on my observations and experience (limited as they admittedly are); this happens at least once a shift or two or three times a day (our operational day runs 24 hours). In this situation; the assistant dispatcher came to my desk to tell me that I had a flight that was 93 pounds overweight. She said she'd tried to get hold of the crew; but to no avail. I crossed examined her briefly -- I wanted to be sure the flight was only heavy; and not also out of trim; either forward or aft. She assured me it was a straightforward weight problem; otherwise the cg was within the envelope. She also mentioned that the confusion with the numbers had to do with last minute changes in the number of children on board; and that I should make sure the flight crew understood that they would need to double check that in their review of the load manifest. I was able to raise the flight crew by radio; and a brief conversation with them made it clear to me they were thoroughly aware of what had happened; and that they were prepared to make whatever adjustments might be called for prior to takeoff (often; at busier airports; the taxi out burn takes care of this quite handily). This sort of incident does seem to point to a failure to maintain adequate operation control; however -- if flts aren't supposed to get out of the gate until they have correct load manifest data and are in fact scooting off without it; as a system then; we're not cutting it.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN SF340 DISPATCHER IS CONCERNED THAT A NEW LOAD CONTROL SYSTEM DOES NOT ALLOW DISPATCHERS ADEQUATE OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND ACFT MAY FLY OUT OF LIMITS.
Narrative: THIS PROBLEM IS JUST THE MOST RECENT IN MY EXPERIENCE OF A NUMBER OF WT AND BALANCE ISSUES WHICH WE MANAGED TO RESOLVE IN 'THE NICK OF TIME' (IF ONLY BARELY). OUR AIRLINE'S NEWLY-INSTITUTED LOAD CONTROL SYSTEM DOES NOT ALLOW FLTS TO PUSH BACK UNTIL THE FLT CREW HAS SOLID FINAL NUMBERS -- AND IN FACT; IT ACTUALLY ALERTS THE CREW; THE INDIVIDUAL LOAD PLANNER; AND THE DISPATCHER WORKING THE FLT WHENEVER THE SIT IS 'CRITICAL' EITHER FOR WT; FOR CG LOCATION; OR BOTH. NOTWITHSTANDING WHAT THE SYSTEM 'ALLOWS;' CREWS DO LEAVE GATES WITHOUT THE RIGHT NUMBERS -- BASED ON MY OBSERVATIONS AND EXPERIENCE (LIMITED AS THEY ADMITTEDLY ARE); THIS HAPPENS AT LEAST ONCE A SHIFT OR TWO OR THREE TIMES A DAY (OUR OPERATIONAL DAY RUNS 24 HOURS). IN THIS SIT; THE ASSISTANT DISPATCHER CAME TO MY DESK TO TELL ME THAT I HAD A FLT THAT WAS 93 LBS OVERWEIGHT. SHE SAID SHE'D TRIED TO GET HOLD OF THE CREW; BUT TO NO AVAIL. I CROSSED EXAMINED HER BRIEFLY -- I WANTED TO BE SURE THE FLT WAS ONLY HEAVY; AND NOT ALSO OUT OF TRIM; EITHER FORWARD OR AFT. SHE ASSURED ME IT WAS A STRAIGHTFORWARD WT PROBLEM; OTHERWISE THE CG WAS WITHIN THE ENVELOPE. SHE ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE CONFUSION WITH THE NUMBERS HAD TO DO WITH LAST MINUTE CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN ON BOARD; AND THAT I SHOULD MAKE SURE THE FLT CREW UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY WOULD NEED TO DOUBLE CHECK THAT IN THEIR REVIEW OF THE LOAD MANIFEST. I WAS ABLE TO RAISE THE FLT CREW BY RADIO; AND A BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH THEM MADE IT CLEAR TO ME THEY WERE THOROUGHLY AWARE OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED; AND THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO MAKE WHATEVER ADJUSTMENTS MIGHT BE CALLED FOR PRIOR TO TKOF (OFTEN; AT BUSIER ARPTS; THE TAXI OUT BURN TAKES CARE OF THIS QUITE HANDILY). THIS SORT OF INCIDENT DOES SEEM TO POINT TO A FAILURE TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE OPERATION CONTROL; HOWEVER -- IF FLTS AREN'T SUPPOSED TO GET OUT OF THE GATE UNTIL THEY HAVE CORRECT LOAD MANIFEST DATA AND ARE IN FACT SCOOTING OFF WITHOUT IT; AS A SYSTEM THEN; WE'RE NOT CUTTING IT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.