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Attributes | |
ACN | 670690 |
Time | |
Date | 200509 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
ASRS Report | 670690 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
ASRS Report | 670696 |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground critical non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure other anomaly |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | aircraft : evacuated flight crew : declared emergency |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Maintenance Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance |
Narrative:
After parking at the gate with the left engine still running (waiting for the gate power to be connected); the agent was having a problem getting the jetbridge into position. The passenger by this time were all lined up at the forward cabin door waiting for the agent to open it for deplaning. My sliding window was open in case the agent having trouble with the jetbridge needed to communicate with me. The guideman had previously indicated that the chocks were installed. Realizing that it might be a while before the ground crew could connect power to the aircraft; I elected to start the APU and shut down the left engine. The first officer made a PA to the passenger explaining the delay and thanking them for their patience. About this time; the ground crew brought a tug into position and hooked up the tow bar. One of the crew came over to my window and said they needed to pull the airplane forward about 10 ft and asked me to release the parking brakes. The first officer made another PA to the passenger telling them that we would be pulling forward about 10 ft under tow and to; 'hang on to a seat back for safety while they pulled us forward.' the agent by this time had a facilities maintenance tech helping her with the jetbridge; but it was still retracted away from the aircraft. I told them that the ground crew was going to pull us forward a bit. As the tow began; I felt a thump and a slight shudder in the aircraft and my attention was immediately focused on the tug driver. He wanted to confirm that the brakes were off (I believe he mistook the resistance to towing forward to our having the brakes parked) and we gave the brakes released sign and shook my head; 'yes!' he once again attempted to pull the aircraft forward. Several things happened at once at this point. Another ground crewman ran up on the left side of the aircraft below my window and yelled at the tug driver to 'stop! Stop!' he then turned to me and gave me the 'set the parking brake' hand signal followed almost immediately by the release the parking brake hand signal while he verbally said to me; 'release the parking brakes.' at that point; the tug driver pushed the aircraft backward slightly and the 2ND crewman below my window said; 'parking brakes parked;' and then gave me the hand signal. The cockpit chime rang 4 times and I picked up the handset. At least two flight attendants were on the line. Our #1 flight attendant said excitedly; 'we've hit a fuel truck; it's almost tipped over and fuel is spilling everywhere.' and then added; 'are we going to evacuate?' I told her to 'stand by.' about this time the fuel fumes had reached the cockpit and still on the interphone; the flight attendant said; 'the fuel fumes are really bad back here;' and once again asked about the evacuation. I made the decision to evacuate and told the flight attendants on the phone to prepare to evacuate; but to give me a few seconds in order to begin running the evacuation checklist. I yelled to the agent on the gate and to the ground crew on the ramp that we were going to evacuate from the front and rear doors and to watch for the slides and get ready to help. I then picked up the hand microphone and commanded the evacuation; after which the first officer and I completed the checklist. Arff was called for the fuel spill and by the time we were done with the checklist and I had made my sweep through the cabin and evacuated down the slide; all the passenger had already been ushered up the jetbridge steps and into the terminal. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: when reporter was asked what he thought was a contributing factor he stated; 'you get what you pay for.' he further stated that while discussing with the ground crew how the incident developed for them; he was told this was the fourth ground incident for this contract company this year. The flight crew and ground crew were not rushed because they couldn't progress until the jetbridge was completely up to the aircraft. When the decision was made to tow the aircraft forward to another spot; the fuel truck was already under the right wing. The truck was a pumper type truck and wascontacted several times before the ground crew realized what had happened. The right slat had a hole in it and the aircraft was out of service for several weeks. The reporter restated that the evacuation was necessary because they were very concerned about a fire erupting and becoming deadly because of the amount of fumes.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN MD80 TOW CREW PULLED THE ACFT INTO A FUEL TRUCK; CAUSING FUEL FUMES TO ENTER THE ACFT AND FORCING A PAX EVACUATION.
Narrative: AFTER PARKING AT THE GATE WITH THE L ENG STILL RUNNING (WAITING FOR THE GATE POWER TO BE CONNECTED); THE AGENT WAS HAVING A PROB GETTING THE JETBRIDGE INTO POSITION. THE PAX BY THIS TIME WERE ALL LINED UP AT THE FORWARD CABIN DOOR WAITING FOR THE AGENT TO OPEN IT FOR DEPLANING. MY SLIDING WINDOW WAS OPEN IN CASE THE AGENT HAVING TROUBLE WITH THE JETBRIDGE NEEDED TO COMMUNICATE WITH ME. THE GUIDEMAN HAD PREVIOUSLY INDICATED THAT THE CHOCKS WERE INSTALLED. REALIZING THAT IT MIGHT BE A WHILE BEFORE THE GND CREW COULD CONNECT POWER TO THE ACFT; I ELECTED TO START THE APU AND SHUT DOWN THE L ENG. THE FO MADE A PA TO THE PAX EXPLAINING THE DELAY AND THANKING THEM FOR THEIR PATIENCE. ABOUT THIS TIME; THE GND CREW BROUGHT A TUG INTO POSITION AND HOOKED UP THE TOW BAR. ONE OF THE CREW CAME OVER TO MY WINDOW AND SAID THEY NEEDED TO PULL THE AIRPLANE FORWARD ABOUT 10 FT AND ASKED ME TO RELEASE THE PARKING BRAKES. THE FO MADE ANOTHER PA TO THE PAX TELLING THEM THAT WE WOULD BE PULLING FORWARD ABOUT 10 FT UNDER TOW AND TO; 'HANG ON TO A SEAT BACK FOR SAFETY WHILE THEY PULLED US FORWARD.' THE AGENT BY THIS TIME HAD A FACILITIES MAINT TECH HELPING HER WITH THE JETBRIDGE; BUT IT WAS STILL RETRACTED AWAY FROM THE ACFT. I TOLD THEM THAT THE GND CREW WAS GOING TO PULL US FORWARD A BIT. AS THE TOW BEGAN; I FELT A THUMP AND A SLIGHT SHUDDER IN THE ACFT AND MY ATTENTION WAS IMMEDIATELY FOCUSED ON THE TUG DRIVER. HE WANTED TO CONFIRM THAT THE BRAKES WERE OFF (I BELIEVE HE MISTOOK THE RESISTANCE TO TOWING FORWARD TO OUR HAVING THE BRAKES PARKED) AND WE GAVE THE BRAKES RELEASED SIGN AND SHOOK MY HEAD; 'YES!' HE ONCE AGAIN ATTEMPTED TO PULL THE ACFT FORWARD. SEVERAL THINGS HAPPENED AT ONCE AT THIS POINT. ANOTHER GND CREWMAN RAN UP ON THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT BELOW MY WINDOW AND YELLED AT THE TUG DRIVER TO 'STOP! STOP!' HE THEN TURNED TO ME AND GAVE ME THE 'SET THE PARKING BRAKE' HAND SIGNAL FOLLOWED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY BY THE RELEASE THE PARKING BRAKE HAND SIGNAL WHILE HE VERBALLY SAID TO ME; 'RELEASE THE PARKING BRAKES.' AT THAT POINT; THE TUG DRIVER PUSHED THE ACFT BACKWARD SLIGHTLY AND THE 2ND CREWMAN BELOW MY WINDOW SAID; 'PARKING BRAKES PARKED;' AND THEN GAVE ME THE HAND SIGNAL. THE COCKPIT CHIME RANG 4 TIMES AND I PICKED UP THE HANDSET. AT LEAST TWO FLT ATTENDANTS WERE ON THE LINE. OUR #1 FLT ATTENDANT SAID EXCITEDLY; 'WE'VE HIT A FUEL TRUCK; IT'S ALMOST TIPPED OVER AND FUEL IS SPILLING EVERYWHERE.' AND THEN ADDED; 'ARE WE GOING TO EVACUATE?' I TOLD HER TO 'STAND BY.' ABOUT THIS TIME THE FUEL FUMES HAD REACHED THE COCKPIT AND STILL ON THE INTERPHONE; THE FLT ATTENDANT SAID; 'THE FUEL FUMES ARE REALLY BAD BACK HERE;' AND ONCE AGAIN ASKED ABOUT THE EVACUATION. I MADE THE DECISION TO EVACUATE AND TOLD THE FLT ATTENDANTS ON THE PHONE TO PREPARE TO EVACUATE; BUT TO GIVE ME A FEW SECONDS IN ORDER TO BEGIN RUNNING THE EVACUATION CHKLIST. I YELLED TO THE AGENT ON THE GATE AND TO THE GND CREW ON THE RAMP THAT WE WERE GOING TO EVACUATE FROM THE FRONT AND REAR DOORS AND TO WATCH FOR THE SLIDES AND GET READY TO HELP. I THEN PICKED UP THE HAND MIKE AND COMMANDED THE EVACUATION; AFTER WHICH THE FO AND I COMPLETED THE CHKLIST. ARFF WAS CALLED FOR THE FUEL SPILL AND BY THE TIME WE WERE DONE WITH THE CHKLIST AND I HAD MADE MY SWEEP THROUGH THE CABIN AND EVACUATED DOWN THE SLIDE; ALL THE PAX HAD ALREADY BEEN USHERED UP THE JETBRIDGE STEPS AND INTO THE TERMINAL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: WHEN RPTR WAS ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR HE STATED; 'YOU GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR.' HE FURTHER STATED THAT WHILE DISCUSSING WITH THE GND CREW HOW THE INCIDENT DEVELOPED FOR THEM; HE WAS TOLD THIS WAS THE FOURTH GND INCIDENT FOR THIS CONTRACT COMPANY THIS YEAR. THE FLT CREW AND GND CREW WERE NOT RUSHED BECAUSE THEY COULDN'T PROGRESS UNTIL THE JETBRIDGE WAS COMPLETELY UP TO THE ACFT. WHEN THE DECISION WAS MADE TO TOW THE ACFT FORWARD TO ANOTHER SPOT; THE FUEL TRUCK WAS ALREADY UNDER THE R WING. THE TRUCK WAS A PUMPER TYPE TRUCK AND WASCONTACTED SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE THE GND CREW REALIZED WHAT HAD HAPPENED. THE R SLAT HAD A HOLE IN IT AND THE ACFT WAS OUT OF SERVICE FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. THE RPTR RESTATED THAT THE EVACUATION WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE THEY WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT A FIRE ERUPTING AND BECOMING DEADLY BECAUSE OF THE AMOUNT OF FUMES.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.