Narrative:

On a B727-200 aircraft; the smoke control system was used in accordance with the company flight manual to cool the cockpit while on the ground. The smoke control switch was inadvertently left in the 'on' position causing the aircraft to pressurize at a much slower rate once airborne. At approximately 14000 ft MSL; the cabin altitude warning horn sounded at 10000 ft cabin pressure altitude. The smoke control switch was immediately idented to be in the wrong position by the so and was corrected to the normal position. The cargo heat outflow valve was closed as a precaution. The cabin altitude immediately began to decrease from approximately 10300 ft at 500 FPM. Normal cabin pressure of 1000 ft was achieved by the electronic cabin pressure controller approximately 20 mins later. Factors affecting the quality of human performance. The PF; pilot monitoring; and so were all relatively new to their crew position. The PF and the pilot monitoring were officially being observed in a check ride environment. With the FAA observer on board; essentially all crew members were in a check ride environment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 FAILS TO PRESSURIZE NORMALLY DUE TO SMOKE CTL SWITCH LEFT IN OPEN POS.

Narrative: ON A B727-200 ACFT; THE SMOKE CTL SYS WAS USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMPANY FLT MANUAL TO COOL THE COCKPIT WHILE ON THE GND. THE SMOKE CTL SWITCH WAS INADVERTENTLY LEFT IN THE 'ON' POS CAUSING THE ACFT TO PRESSURIZE AT A MUCH SLOWER RATE ONCE AIRBORNE. AT APPROX 14000 FT MSL; THE CABIN ALT WARNING HORN SOUNDED AT 10000 FT CABIN PRESSURE ALT. THE SMOKE CTL SWITCH WAS IMMEDIATELY IDENTED TO BE IN THE WRONG POS BY THE SO AND WAS CORRECTED TO THE NORMAL POS. THE CARGO HEAT OUTFLOW VALVE WAS CLOSED AS A PRECAUTION. THE CABIN ALT IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO DECREASE FROM APPROX 10300 FT AT 500 FPM. NORMAL CABIN PRESSURE OF 1000 FT WAS ACHIEVED BY THE ELECTRONIC CABIN PRESSURE CONTROLLER APPROX 20 MINS LATER. FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE. THE PF; PLT MONITORING; AND SO WERE ALL RELATIVELY NEW TO THEIR CREW POS. THE PF AND THE PLT MONITORING WERE OFFICIALLY BEING OBSERVED IN A CHK RIDE ENVIRONMENT. WITH THE FAA OBSERVER ON BOARD; ESSENTIALLY ALL CREW MEMBERS WERE IN A CHK RIDE ENVIRONMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.