Narrative:

We were cleared to land on runway 4L. Upon rollout; we were instructed to stay with tower. The FBO was located on the south ramp at the base of the control tower. Prior to landing; we had reviewed the airport diagram for planning purposes and noted the weight restrs for taxiway east and taxiway left. We were instructed to hold short of runway 4L at taxiway G; which we had acknowledged and proceeded to do so. We surmised that the intention of the controller was to direct us to the FBO via taxiway east. Our approximately weight at the time was between 55000-56000 pounds. With this in mind; we questioned the controller of his intentions; noting the fact that we would be unable to accept taxiway east due to our weight. At that point; without any apparent forethought on the controller's part; he stated some gibberish along the lines of it would not be an issue since it was on the other side of the other runway. We proceeded to question his intentions inquiring if he would be taking us down the parallel runway; whereas he stated 'no; that would not be the case.' it became apparent that this was a busy time with the airport being overloaded with traffic in evacuate/evacuation mode; combined with the mentality of the 'local's way' of doing things. After holding short for a few arrs; we were instructed to cross runway 4L and runway 4R via taxiway G and proceed sbound on taxiway east; when for a third time we advised him that we were 'unable taxiway east.' at that point; we were instructed in a strong tone to 'expedite across runway 4L' which we initiated and read back with the statement that he would have to take us down the parallel runway. After we were past the hold short markings with an aircraft on short final and a brief pause; the controller changed his mind; after we believe realizing his mistake; and instructed us to 'just hold our position.' we acknowledged that we were already past the hold short point and were continuing across to clear the runway. At that point he instructed the aircraft on final to 'go around' even though we had cleared the runway in time. We held short of runway 4R and awaited further instructions. At that point; after juggling the go around aircraft back onto the downwind; we were instructed to taxi down runway 4R; make a right on taxiway B; and hold short of runway 4L. Then made some statement along the lines of 'I don't understand the problem; everyone else uses taxiway east without a problem.' I then asked to clarify if the airport notes on the airport diagram; if in fact they are correct or had there been a recent change that he was aware of. At that point it all came together for us when he said 'no; the information is correct; it was just that everyone else uses it; even seen B737's on it without question; so we just let everyone use it.' to sum it all up; I then said; 'regardless; technically; are taxiway east's weight restrs accurate?' to which he replied; 'yes.' we left it at that and departed without incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF GLF3 IS RELUCTANT TO TAXI ON WT RESTR TXWY AS CLRED BY BTR ATCT GND CTLR DURING EVAC EFFORT.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 4L. UPON ROLLOUT; WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO STAY WITH TWR. THE FBO WAS LOCATED ON THE S RAMP AT THE BASE OF THE CTL TWR. PRIOR TO LNDG; WE HAD REVIEWED THE ARPT DIAGRAM FOR PLANNING PURPOSES AND NOTED THE WT RESTRS FOR TXWY E AND TXWY L. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 4L AT TXWY G; WHICH WE HAD ACKNOWLEDGED AND PROCEEDED TO DO SO. WE SURMISED THAT THE INTENTION OF THE CTLR WAS TO DIRECT US TO THE FBO VIA TXWY E. OUR APPROX WT AT THE TIME WAS BTWN 55000-56000 LBS. WITH THIS IN MIND; WE QUESTIONED THE CTLR OF HIS INTENTIONS; NOTING THE FACT THAT WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO ACCEPT TXWY E DUE TO OUR WT. AT THAT POINT; WITHOUT ANY APPARENT FORETHOUGHT ON THE CTLR'S PART; HE STATED SOME GIBBERISH ALONG THE LINES OF IT WOULD NOT BE AN ISSUE SINCE IT WAS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE OTHER RWY. WE PROCEEDED TO QUESTION HIS INTENTIONS INQUIRING IF HE WOULD BE TAKING US DOWN THE PARALLEL RWY; WHEREAS HE STATED 'NO; THAT WOULD NOT BE THE CASE.' IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THIS WAS A BUSY TIME WITH THE ARPT BEING OVERLOADED WITH TFC IN EVAC MODE; COMBINED WITH THE MENTALITY OF THE 'LCL'S WAY' OF DOING THINGS. AFTER HOLDING SHORT FOR A FEW ARRS; WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CROSS RWY 4L AND RWY 4R VIA TXWY G AND PROCEED SBOUND ON TXWY E; WHEN FOR A THIRD TIME WE ADVISED HIM THAT WE WERE 'UNABLE TXWY E.' AT THAT POINT; WE WERE INSTRUCTED IN A STRONG TONE TO 'EXPEDITE ACROSS RWY 4L' WHICH WE INITIATED AND READ BACK WITH THE STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE US DOWN THE PARALLEL RWY. AFTER WE WERE PAST THE HOLD SHORT MARKINGS WITH AN ACFT ON SHORT FINAL AND A BRIEF PAUSE; THE CTLR CHANGED HIS MIND; AFTER WE BELIEVE REALIZING HIS MISTAKE; AND INSTRUCTED US TO 'JUST HOLD OUR POS.' WE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE WERE ALREADY PAST THE HOLD SHORT POINT AND WERE CONTINUING ACROSS TO CLR THE RWY. AT THAT POINT HE INSTRUCTED THE ACFT ON FINAL TO 'GO AROUND' EVEN THOUGH WE HAD CLRED THE RWY IN TIME. WE HELD SHORT OF RWY 4R AND AWAITED FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. AT THAT POINT; AFTER JUGGLING THE GAR ACFT BACK ONTO THE DOWNWIND; WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TAXI DOWN RWY 4R; MAKE A R ON TXWY B; AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 4L. THEN MADE SOME STATEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF 'I DON'T UNDERSTAND THE PROB; EVERYONE ELSE USES TXWY E WITHOUT A PROB.' I THEN ASKED TO CLARIFY IF THE ARPT NOTES ON THE ARPT DIAGRAM; IF IN FACT THEY ARE CORRECT OR HAD THERE BEEN A RECENT CHANGE THAT HE WAS AWARE OF. AT THAT POINT IT ALL CAME TOGETHER FOR US WHEN HE SAID 'NO; THE INFO IS CORRECT; IT WAS JUST THAT EVERYONE ELSE USES IT; EVEN SEEN B737'S ON IT WITHOUT QUESTION; SO WE JUST LET EVERYONE USE IT.' TO SUM IT ALL UP; I THEN SAID; 'REGARDLESS; TECHNICALLY; ARE TXWY E'S WT RESTRS ACCURATE?' TO WHICH HE REPLIED; 'YES.' WE LEFT IT AT THAT AND DEPARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.