Narrative:

This report concerns a part 121 flight from cae to iad. We were late departing because of a passenger boarding problem. When the ramp informed us that we had more bags than expected; we determined that we would not be able to use reduced thrust for takeoff; but we could still use full power. What we failed to look at was how our maximum takeoff weight was limited by en route fuel burn. Because of this; we departed below the structural and performance restr maximum takeoff weight; but above the maximum takeoff weight restr by planned landing weight. This discrepancy was discovered en route when we noticed the estimated fuel on board at landing would put us above our maximum landing weight. We entered a holding pattern until we burned enough fuel to land under the maximum landing weight. When looking at the paperwork; we departed 300 pounds overweight. Upon further inspection; we determined that; in his haste; the first officer entered the adjusted weight unit for 25 passenger in zone 2 instead of the 24 we actually had on board. This error accounted for 200 pounds of the 300 pounds we were overweight. The 100 pounds we were actually overweight by was the amount of fuel above the minimum that was in our tanks at takeoff. The #1 factor involved was time. The flight was late; so we were doing our jobs quicker to try and reduce the delay as much as possible. Because of this haste to depart; the first officer made the mistake. In my haste to depart; I did not adequately check his work; and thus signed off on a faulty weight and balance form. After the flight; I conducted an after action review with my first officer to discuss what went wrong and how we could prevent it from happening again. We determined that our haste to depart was the root cause and we implemented some spot checks to reduce the chances of it happening again. The spot checks included things like doublechking the numbers with the FMS and increased oversight on my part. We also discussed the importance of taking the time to do a job right; especially when in a rush. Supplemental information from acn 675281: we did not land overweight because we entered a holding pattern and had to divert to orf.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PRESSURED BY A DELAYED DEP; FLT CREW OF CARJ TAKE OFF AT A TKOF GROSS WT IN EXCESS OF THAT RESTR BY MAX LNDG WT.

Narrative: THIS RPT CONCERNS A PART 121 FLT FROM CAE TO IAD. WE WERE LATE DEPARTING BECAUSE OF A PAX BOARDING PROB. WHEN THE RAMP INFORMED US THAT WE HAD MORE BAGS THAN EXPECTED; WE DETERMINED THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO USE REDUCED THRUST FOR TKOF; BUT WE COULD STILL USE FULL PWR. WHAT WE FAILED TO LOOK AT WAS HOW OUR MAX TKOF WT WAS LIMITED BY ENRTE FUEL BURN. BECAUSE OF THIS; WE DEPARTED BELOW THE STRUCTURAL AND PERFORMANCE RESTR MAX TKOF WT; BUT ABOVE THE MAX TKOF WT RESTR BY PLANNED LNDG WT. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS DISCOVERED ENRTE WHEN WE NOTICED THE ESTIMATED FUEL ON BOARD AT LNDG WOULD PUT US ABOVE OUR MAX LNDG WT. WE ENTERED A HOLDING PATTERN UNTIL WE BURNED ENOUGH FUEL TO LAND UNDER THE MAX LNDG WT. WHEN LOOKING AT THE PAPERWORK; WE DEPARTED 300 LBS OVERWT. UPON FURTHER INSPECTION; WE DETERMINED THAT; IN HIS HASTE; THE FO ENTERED THE ADJUSTED WT UNIT FOR 25 PAX IN ZONE 2 INSTEAD OF THE 24 WE ACTUALLY HAD ON BOARD. THIS ERROR ACCOUNTED FOR 200 LBS OF THE 300 LBS WE WERE OVERWT. THE 100 LBS WE WERE ACTUALLY OVERWT BY WAS THE AMOUNT OF FUEL ABOVE THE MINIMUM THAT WAS IN OUR TANKS AT TKOF. THE #1 FACTOR INVOLVED WAS TIME. THE FLT WAS LATE; SO WE WERE DOING OUR JOBS QUICKER TO TRY AND REDUCE THE DELAY AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. BECAUSE OF THIS HASTE TO DEPART; THE FO MADE THE MISTAKE. IN MY HASTE TO DEPART; I DID NOT ADEQUATELY CHK HIS WORK; AND THUS SIGNED OFF ON A FAULTY WT AND BAL FORM. AFTER THE FLT; I CONDUCTED AN AFTER ACTION REVIEW WITH MY FO TO DISCUSS WHAT WENT WRONG AND HOW WE COULD PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN. WE DETERMINED THAT OUR HASTE TO DEPART WAS THE ROOT CAUSE AND WE IMPLEMENTED SOME SPOT CHKS TO REDUCE THE CHANCES OF IT HAPPENING AGAIN. THE SPOT CHKS INCLUDED THINGS LIKE DOUBLECHKING THE NUMBERS WITH THE FMS AND INCREASED OVERSIGHT ON MY PART. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKING THE TIME TO DO A JOB RIGHT; ESPECIALLY WHEN IN A RUSH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 675281: WE DID NOT LAND OVERWT BECAUSE WE ENTERED A HOLDING PATTERN AND HAD TO DIVERT TO ORF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.