Narrative:

The first incident occurred departing out of mia around XA00. We were on a repos flight to pbi for maintenance and it was the PIC's turn to fly. As we taxied out; all checklists were completed and he briefed a normal departure. However; when we were cleared for takeoff and upon reaching vr; the PIC did not rotate to the normal 12-15 degrees pitch up. Instead; he leveled off in ground effect and proceeded to accelerate to above 180 KTS. I never looked at the radio altimeter; but I would estimate our ht between 5 and 10 ft above the runway. He then called for flaps up at +/-190 KTS and at about 1500 ft from the end of the runway pitched up to 25 degrees and climbed to our assigned altitude. After reflection and conversation with other crew members; I decided to report this incident because he did not follow SOP's. He briefed one thing and did another. You also have the perception that this incident leaves behind; especially at an international airport with many bystanders. When we got to pbi; the PIC was not receptive to talking about this incident. The next day; we had swapped aircraft and were scheduled to repos empty to myef. The PIC chose to fly the first leg which was empty. This time he briefed a normal departure and completed a normal departure. But as we approached myef; the PIC mentioned that he was in a hurry to get to hou to catch his airline to chicago (he had to take a cabin attendant to iah from hou for his flight). During the process of completing the arrival checklists; I glanced at the airspeed and realized that we were 10-15 KTS over vmo and had no aural warning. I asked him to watch his speed. I don't recall what was exactly said; but he mentioned that he had pulled the circuit breaker and was in a hurry to get to hou to catch his airline and he would not slow below vmo. When he finally did; we were 15 mi from myef; at 7000 ft and cleared for the visual approach to runway 12. The PIC started a rapid descent while banking steeply to align the aircraft with the runway. When I asked him what he was doing; he stated something about having some fun. At this point; I had a good guess as to what he was going to do and realized I was just along for the ride. He then proceeded to go very low -- my best guess is that we were only 40-50 ft above the tree tops on the extended centerline of the runway. There is a small hill about +/- 1/4 mi from the approach end of runway 12; we were below that. After we landed; he made a remark about how cool it was to be doing 200 KTS 20 ft off the tree tops. Being in international waters and having 2 live legs left; I opted not to say anything at this point. However; I was very concerned but I figured I only had 2 more legs with him. In reflection; I am not sure what I could have done to change this PIC's actions other than refuse to fly with him. On the last leg into hou; he purposely exceeded vmo and pulled the aural warning circuit breaker again. Again; he was not receptive to slowing -- he stated he was in a hurry to catch his airline. One of the passenger happened to be an ex-military pilot. I mentioned to PIC that this passenger was a pilot and he probably knows what vmo looks like on the airspeed indicator. He did not respond and continued above vmo. When we arrived in hou; this PIC was out of the aircraft before the passenger and he left in a taxi before they did.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE40 FO RPTS CAPT FAILED TO FOLLOW PERFORMANCE SOP'S AND EXCEEDED MAX OPERATING SPD ON REPEATED BASIS.

Narrative: THE FIRST INCIDENT OCCURRED DEPARTING OUT OF MIA AROUND XA00. WE WERE ON A REPOS FLT TO PBI FOR MAINT AND IT WAS THE PIC'S TURN TO FLY. AS WE TAXIED OUT; ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED AND HE BRIEFED A NORMAL DEP. HOWEVER; WHEN WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND UPON REACHING VR; THE PIC DID NOT ROTATE TO THE NORMAL 12-15 DEGS PITCH UP. INSTEAD; HE LEVELED OFF IN GND EFFECT AND PROCEEDED TO ACCELERATE TO ABOVE 180 KTS. I NEVER LOOKED AT THE RADIO ALTIMETER; BUT I WOULD ESTIMATE OUR HT BTWN 5 AND 10 FT ABOVE THE RWY. HE THEN CALLED FOR FLAPS UP AT +/-190 KTS AND AT ABOUT 1500 FT FROM THE END OF THE RWY PITCHED UP TO 25 DEGS AND CLBED TO OUR ASSIGNED ALT. AFTER REFLECTION AND CONVERSATION WITH OTHER CREW MEMBERS; I DECIDED TO RPT THIS INCIDENT BECAUSE HE DID NOT FOLLOW SOP'S. HE BRIEFED ONE THING AND DID ANOTHER. YOU ALSO HAVE THE PERCEPTION THAT THIS INCIDENT LEAVES BEHIND; ESPECIALLY AT AN INTL ARPT WITH MANY BYSTANDERS. WHEN WE GOT TO PBI; THE PIC WAS NOT RECEPTIVE TO TALKING ABOUT THIS INCIDENT. THE NEXT DAY; WE HAD SWAPPED ACFT AND WERE SCHEDULED TO REPOS EMPTY TO MYEF. THE PIC CHOSE TO FLY THE FIRST LEG WHICH WAS EMPTY. THIS TIME HE BRIEFED A NORMAL DEP AND COMPLETED A NORMAL DEP. BUT AS WE APCHED MYEF; THE PIC MENTIONED THAT HE WAS IN A HURRY TO GET TO HOU TO CATCH HIS AIRLINE TO CHICAGO (HE HAD TO TAKE A CAB TO IAH FROM HOU FOR HIS FLT). DURING THE PROCESS OF COMPLETING THE ARR CHKLISTS; I GLANCED AT THE AIRSPD AND REALIZED THAT WE WERE 10-15 KTS OVER VMO AND HAD NO AURAL WARNING. I ASKED HIM TO WATCH HIS SPD. I DON'T RECALL WHAT WAS EXACTLY SAID; BUT HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD PULLED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER AND WAS IN A HURRY TO GET TO HOU TO CATCH HIS AIRLINE AND HE WOULD NOT SLOW BELOW VMO. WHEN HE FINALLY DID; WE WERE 15 MI FROM MYEF; AT 7000 FT AND CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 12. THE PIC STARTED A RAPID DSCNT WHILE BANKING STEEPLY TO ALIGN THE ACFT WITH THE RWY. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHAT HE WAS DOING; HE STATED SOMETHING ABOUT HAVING SOME FUN. AT THIS POINT; I HAD A GOOD GUESS AS TO WHAT HE WAS GOING TO DO AND REALIZED I WAS JUST ALONG FOR THE RIDE. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO GO VERY LOW -- MY BEST GUESS IS THAT WE WERE ONLY 40-50 FT ABOVE THE TREE TOPS ON THE EXTENDED CTRLINE OF THE RWY. THERE IS A SMALL HILL ABOUT +/- 1/4 MI FROM THE APCH END OF RWY 12; WE WERE BELOW THAT. AFTER WE LANDED; HE MADE A REMARK ABOUT HOW COOL IT WAS TO BE DOING 200 KTS 20 FT OFF THE TREE TOPS. BEING IN INTL WATERS AND HAVING 2 LIVE LEGS LEFT; I OPTED NOT TO SAY ANYTHING AT THIS POINT. HOWEVER; I WAS VERY CONCERNED BUT I FIGURED I ONLY HAD 2 MORE LEGS WITH HIM. IN REFLECTION; I AM NOT SURE WHAT I COULD HAVE DONE TO CHANGE THIS PIC'S ACTIONS OTHER THAN REFUSE TO FLY WITH HIM. ON THE LAST LEG INTO HOU; HE PURPOSELY EXCEEDED VMO AND PULLED THE AURAL WARNING CIRCUIT BREAKER AGAIN. AGAIN; HE WAS NOT RECEPTIVE TO SLOWING -- HE STATED HE WAS IN A HURRY TO CATCH HIS AIRLINE. ONE OF THE PAX HAPPENED TO BE AN EX-MIL PLT. I MENTIONED TO PIC THAT THIS PAX WAS A PLT AND HE PROBABLY KNOWS WHAT VMO LOOKS LIKE ON THE AIRSPD INDICATOR. HE DID NOT RESPOND AND CONTINUED ABOVE VMO. WHEN WE ARRIVED IN HOU; THIS PIC WAS OUT OF THE ACFT BEFORE THE PAX AND HE LEFT IN A TAXI BEFORE THEY DID.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.