Narrative:

In sep/05; jax had 2 operrors for departing 2 aircraft from/on a closed runway. The jax airport maintenance exacerbated this problem by placing the runway closure (large) yellow X's in the over-run areas (standard local procedure) instead of prominently displayed on or near the runway numbers. To complicate and make matters even more dangerous; jax ATCT management is now mandating that the ATC controllers show the wy as 'closed' at the time issued on the NOTAM. This means that regardless of any activity by airport operations; maintenance vehicles; runway closure signage; etc; that the runway is unusable; ie; closed. This sets up a whole list of other causal factors that will increase the number of runway incursions and closed runway operrors at jax. Case in point; on nov/mon/05 we had 3 controllers working in the tower at XA00. Both runways were being shown open and the tower was using both runways. At XA05; a controller came up to the tower to give a break to the controller that had been working the longest. The relieving controller got to the tower cabin attendant and asked why we were departing on runway 13. The relieving controller inquired if we had been advised that runway 13 was NOTAM'ed closed at XA00. We stated that we had not; local controller canceled a takeoff clearance and we called the supervisor immediately. The supervisor stated that the 'runway was NOTAM'ed closed;' but that 'airport operations was not going to be working on it today.' supervisor instructed us to use the runway and called gainesville FSS to ensure that the NOTAM was removed. All it takes is 1 person to not pass the NOTAM information to the tower; and the controllers will be having runway incursions all day. This is what happens when you do not treat runway closures; or any type of hazard to aviation; on a real-time basis. Proposed solutions: 1) remove the local jax tower runway closure procedure immediately. 2) ensure better real-time coordination and communication between jax airport operations and jax ATCT. 3) work with jax airport operations to promote better placement of runway closure signage. 4) except for aircraft accidents; eliminate on-the-spot runway closures. No NOTAM; no prior (timely) coordination; no closure. (I know that the airport owns the runways; but they are our partners in safety and they should assist us in our goal of zero tolerance for runway incursions.) 5) hold jax airport operations and jax airways facilities accountable for timely coordination of contractor companies working at the airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: JAX CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING RWY CLOSURE PROCS AND THE COORD PRACTICES BTWN ATC AND THE ARPT.

Narrative: IN SEP/05; JAX HAD 2 OPERRORS FOR DEPARTING 2 ACFT FROM/ON A CLOSED RWY. THE JAX ARPT MAINT EXACERBATED THIS PROB BY PLACING THE RWY CLOSURE (LARGE) YELLOW X'S IN THE OVER-RUN AREAS (STANDARD LCL PROC) INSTEAD OF PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED ON OR NEAR THE RWY NUMBERS. TO COMPLICATE AND MAKE MATTERS EVEN MORE DANGEROUS; JAX ATCT MGMNT IS NOW MANDATING THAT THE ATC CTLRS SHOW THE WY AS 'CLOSED' AT THE TIME ISSUED ON THE NOTAM. THIS MEANS THAT REGARDLESS OF ANY ACTIVITY BY ARPT OPS; MAINT VEHICLES; RWY CLOSURE SIGNAGE; ETC; THAT THE RWY IS UNUSABLE; IE; CLOSED. THIS SETS UP A WHOLE LIST OF OTHER CAUSAL FACTORS THAT WILL INCREASE THE NUMBER OF RWY INCURSIONS AND CLOSED RWY OPERRORS AT JAX. CASE IN POINT; ON NOV/MON/05 WE HAD 3 CTLRS WORKING IN THE TWR AT XA00. BOTH RWYS WERE BEING SHOWN OPEN AND THE TWR WAS USING BOTH RWYS. AT XA05; A CTLR CAME UP TO THE TWR TO GIVE A BREAK TO THE CTLR THAT HAD BEEN WORKING THE LONGEST. THE RELIEVING CTLR GOT TO THE TWR CAB AND ASKED WHY WE WERE DEPARTING ON RWY 13. THE RELIEVING CTLR INQUIRED IF WE HAD BEEN ADVISED THAT RWY 13 WAS NOTAM'ED CLOSED AT XA00. WE STATED THAT WE HAD NOT; LCL CTLR CANCELED A TKOF CLRNC AND WE CALLED THE SUPVR IMMEDIATELY. THE SUPVR STATED THAT THE 'RWY WAS NOTAM'ED CLOSED;' BUT THAT 'ARPT OPS WAS NOT GOING TO BE WORKING ON IT TODAY.' SUPVR INSTRUCTED US TO USE THE RWY AND CALLED GAINESVILLE FSS TO ENSURE THAT THE NOTAM WAS REMOVED. ALL IT TAKES IS 1 PERSON TO NOT PASS THE NOTAM INFO TO THE TWR; AND THE CTLRS WILL BE HAVING RWY INCURSIONS ALL DAY. THIS IS WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU DO NOT TREAT RWY CLOSURES; OR ANY TYPE OF HAZARD TO AVIATION; ON A REAL-TIME BASIS. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: 1) REMOVE THE LCL JAX TWR RWY CLOSURE PROC IMMEDIATELY. 2) ENSURE BETTER REAL-TIME COORD AND COM BTWN JAX ARPT OPS AND JAX ATCT. 3) WORK WITH JAX ARPT OPS TO PROMOTE BETTER PLACEMENT OF RWY CLOSURE SIGNAGE. 4) EXCEPT FOR ACFT ACCIDENTS; ELIMINATE ON-THE-SPOT RWY CLOSURES. NO NOTAM; NO PRIOR (TIMELY) COORD; NO CLOSURE. (I KNOW THAT THE ARPT OWNS THE RWYS; BUT THEY ARE OUR PARTNERS IN SAFETY AND THEY SHOULD ASSIST US IN OUR GOAL OF ZERO TOLERANCE FOR RWY INCURSIONS.) 5) HOLD JAX ARPT OPS AND JAX AIRWAYS FACILITIES ACCOUNTABLE FOR TIMELY COORD OF CONTRACTOR COMPANIES WORKING AT THE ARPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.