Narrative:

We were cleared into position and hold on runway 22R at bos. I had an operating experience first officer with 21 hours in the aircraft. As we were doing the 'boxed items' on the before takeoff checklist; I heard the controller say something; but I was preoccupied just for a second; and asked my first officer if the controller said 'cleared for takeoff' for us. He said 'yes; we're good to go;' and so we started the takeoff roll. As we rotated; I saw a B737 cross the departure end of runway 22R (we were airborne with probably 4000 ft remaining until the end). I knew someone had messed up; and was holding my breath as to who. The controller said; as we were climbing through 800 ft; 'hey guys; do you have a pen handy?' I wrote the number down and then worried myself sick for the next 3 hours 20 mins. Supplemental information from acn 679392: tower called and told us to 'taxi into position and hold runway 22R.' I read back the entire clearance correctly back to them. As the captain steered the airplane on to the runway; I did my 'boxed item;' a completion of the before takeoff checklist; and wrongly assumed we were cleared for takeoff. This assumption was most likely a result of my previous association of boxed items with a clear for takeoff clearance. As for the details of the verbal transaction between the captain and myself; I honestly cannot remember the specific details and don't wish to give any false information about the incident at hand. The result was my having of the controls and executing a takeoff without a clearance. I believe that there were several contributing factors to this incident. In all fairness to the captain; I should have been more alert and not allowed myself to get distraction by things less critical. My inexperience; lack of recent real world experience; and the learning of the ACARS are all key factors. As a whole; the captain and I should have had better communication in this critical phase of flight. On the issue of human performance; I will only speak for myself and say that I've only been home twice in the last 3.5 months. This is not the reason for the incident; but I do believe it has played a role. I have learned to be more alert and now know more than ever before that if you are not sure -- ask!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL65 FLT CREW EXPERIENCED COM CONFUSION; DEPARTED BOS RWY 22R WITHOUT ATC CLRNC AND OBSERVED TFC XING DEP END OF RWY.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 22R AT BOS. I HAD AN OPERATING EXPERIENCE FO WITH 21 HRS IN THE ACFT. AS WE WERE DOING THE 'BOXED ITEMS' ON THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST; I HEARD THE CTLR SAY SOMETHING; BUT I WAS PREOCCUPIED JUST FOR A SECOND; AND ASKED MY FO IF THE CTLR SAID 'CLRED FOR TKOF' FOR US. HE SAID 'YES; WE'RE GOOD TO GO;' AND SO WE STARTED THE TKOF ROLL. AS WE ROTATED; I SAW A B737 CROSS THE DEP END OF RWY 22R (WE WERE AIRBORNE WITH PROBABLY 4000 FT REMAINING UNTIL THE END). I KNEW SOMEONE HAD MESSED UP; AND WAS HOLDING MY BREATH AS TO WHO. THE CTLR SAID; AS WE WERE CLBING THROUGH 800 FT; 'HEY GUYS; DO YOU HAVE A PEN HANDY?' I WROTE THE NUMBER DOWN AND THEN WORRIED MYSELF SICK FOR THE NEXT 3 HRS 20 MINS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 679392: TWR CALLED AND TOLD US TO 'TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 22R.' I READ BACK THE ENTIRE CLRNC CORRECTLY BACK TO THEM. AS THE CAPT STEERED THE AIRPLANE ON TO THE RWY; I DID MY 'BOXED ITEM;' A COMPLETION OF THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST; AND WRONGLY ASSUMED WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. THIS ASSUMPTION WAS MOST LIKELY A RESULT OF MY PREVIOUS ASSOCIATION OF BOXED ITEMS WITH A CLR FOR TKOF CLRNC. AS FOR THE DETAILS OF THE VERBAL TRANSACTION BTWN THE CAPT AND MYSELF; I HONESTLY CANNOT REMEMBER THE SPECIFIC DETAILS AND DON'T WISH TO GIVE ANY FALSE INFO ABOUT THE INCIDENT AT HAND. THE RESULT WAS MY HAVING OF THE CTLS AND EXECUTING A TKOF WITHOUT A CLRNC. I BELIEVE THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT. IN ALL FAIRNESS TO THE CAPT; I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ALERT AND NOT ALLOWED MYSELF TO GET DISTR BY THINGS LESS CRITICAL. MY INEXPERIENCE; LACK OF RECENT REAL WORLD EXPERIENCE; AND THE LEARNING OF THE ACARS ARE ALL KEY FACTORS. AS A WHOLE; THE CAPT AND I SHOULD HAVE HAD BETTER COM IN THIS CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE; I WILL ONLY SPEAK FOR MYSELF AND SAY THAT I'VE ONLY BEEN HOME TWICE IN THE LAST 3.5 MONTHS. THIS IS NOT THE REASON FOR THE INCIDENT; BUT I DO BELIEVE IT HAS PLAYED A ROLE. I HAVE LEARNED TO BE MORE ALERT AND NOW KNOW MORE THAN EVER BEFORE THAT IF YOU ARE NOT SURE -- ASK!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.