Narrative:

There is an open MEL for door indication. Avionics troubleshot it to the lower door sensor being out of limits for the gap. I was told that there were several adjustments to the gap and over time we would have to space out and in the sensor. This indicated that there was other problems causing the gap to change. I was told that there was a noticeable amount of play in the bell crank to crank assembly and that might cause the indifference to the gap at the sensor. The gap is to be set at .080. I was asked to add what information I had to the write-up by my direct supervisor and leave the problem on MEL. I took what information I received from the avionics technician and researched what he had told me before I added information. I stated that we needed a certain amount of time to further troubleshoot and repair the problem and that a noticeable amount of play was in the bell crank assembly. The lower sensor is mounted to a locking pin at the lower aft corner of the door. This locking pin is attached to a crank assembly to a rod which attaches to the bell crank assembly in question. This lock pin engages into the door more than an inch. I did not think that .080 or less engagement of the lock pin would in any way compromise the action or security of what the lock pin accomplishes for the door operation. Therefore; I believe that the MEL was still applicable and; therefore; I just added information to pinpoint troubleshooting for the next mechanic that would be working on the problem. I was notified by my station manager this morning that the lead on shift read what I added to the log page and based on that information decided to ground the aircraft. I do not know if the lead on shift shift actually went out to the aircraft and took apart the console and inspected the crank assembly and decided that the aircraft was unairworthy based on findings or not. I do not know what the basis for his decision was. Once again; based on the information given to me and the experience I have with this system; I did not feel in any way that the airworthiness of the aircraft was jeopardized.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-200 HAD A DEFERRED ITEM ON THE ELECTRONICS COMPARTMENT DOOR INDICATION. 2 TECHNICIANS FOUND EXCESSIVE PLAY IN THE DOOR CRANK ASSEMBLY. UPDATED DEFERRED ITEM WITH FINDINGS. LEAD TECHNICIAN GNDED ACFT.

Narrative: THERE IS AN OPEN MEL FOR DOOR INDICATION. AVIONICS TROUBLESHOT IT TO THE LOWER DOOR SENSOR BEING OUT OF LIMITS FOR THE GAP. I WAS TOLD THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL ADJUSTMENTS TO THE GAP AND OVER TIME WE WOULD HAVE TO SPACE OUT AND IN THE SENSOR. THIS INDICATED THAT THERE WAS OTHER PROBS CAUSING THE GAP TO CHANGE. I WAS TOLD THAT THERE WAS A NOTICEABLE AMOUNT OF PLAY IN THE BELL CRANK TO CRANK ASSEMBLY AND THAT MIGHT CAUSE THE INDIFFERENCE TO THE GAP AT THE SENSOR. THE GAP IS TO BE SET AT .080. I WAS ASKED TO ADD WHAT INFO I HAD TO THE WRITE-UP BY MY DIRECT SUPVR AND LEAVE THE PROB ON MEL. I TOOK WHAT INFO I RECEIVED FROM THE AVIONICS TECHNICIAN AND RESEARCHED WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME BEFORE I ADDED INFO. I STATED THAT WE NEEDED A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TIME TO FURTHER TROUBLESHOOT AND REPAIR THE PROB AND THAT A NOTICEABLE AMOUNT OF PLAY WAS IN THE BELL CRANK ASSEMBLY. THE LOWER SENSOR IS MOUNTED TO A LOCKING PIN AT THE LOWER AFT CORNER OF THE DOOR. THIS LOCKING PIN IS ATTACHED TO A CRANK ASSEMBLY TO A ROD WHICH ATTACHES TO THE BELL CRANK ASSEMBLY IN QUESTION. THIS LOCK PIN ENGAGES INTO THE DOOR MORE THAN AN INCH. I DID NOT THINK THAT .080 OR LESS ENGAGEMENT OF THE LOCK PIN WOULD IN ANY WAY COMPROMISE THE ACTION OR SECURITY OF WHAT THE LOCK PIN ACCOMPLISHES FOR THE DOOR OP. THEREFORE; I BELIEVE THAT THE MEL WAS STILL APPLICABLE AND; THEREFORE; I JUST ADDED INFO TO PINPOINT TROUBLESHOOTING FOR THE NEXT MECH THAT WOULD BE WORKING ON THE PROB. I WAS NOTIFIED BY MY STATION MGR THIS MORNING THAT THE LEAD ON SHIFT READ WHAT I ADDED TO THE LOG PAGE AND BASED ON THAT INFO DECIDED TO GND THE ACFT. I DO NOT KNOW IF THE LEAD ON SHIFT SHIFT ACTUALLY WENT OUT TO THE ACFT AND TOOK APART THE CONSOLE AND INSPECTED THE CRANK ASSEMBLY AND DECIDED THAT THE ACFT WAS UNAIRWORTHY BASED ON FINDINGS OR NOT. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE BASIS FOR HIS DECISION WAS. ONCE AGAIN; BASED ON THE INFO GIVEN TO ME AND THE EXPERIENCE I HAVE WITH THIS SYS; I DID NOT FEEL IN ANY WAY THAT THE AIRWORTHINESS OF THE ACFT WAS JEOPARDIZED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.