Narrative:

Note: time in type = 86 hours in beech 35; 135 total hours complex. Flying instrument currency approachs at night with safety pilot. Requested multiple local approachs with tower at ZZZ1 before departure. Intended VOR approach into ZZZ2; VOR 26 ZZZ3; and ILS 25 ZZZ4 with low approachs at ZZZ2 and ZZZ3 with return to approach control. Completed ZZZ1 departure toward ZZZ5 VOR. Cleared for VOR ZZZ2 approach. Some confusion with approach controller resulted in handoff to ZZZ2 tower without instructions for return. Canceled IFR with ZZZ2 tower and requested right turn out. Contacted approach with request for ZZZ3 and ZZZ4 approachs. Cleared direct ZZZ6 and then for the ZZZ3 approach after handoff to approach. Completed VOR 26 ZZZ3 and returned to ZZZ7 for vectors to ILS 25 ZZZ4. Activated 'gear' well out on the approach approximately just before being turned to a base leg. The pitch and airspeed changes were different from a typical gear extension but I couldn't figure out why. I accommodated unusual pitch and airspeed excursions with trim and power setting changes after struggling for a brief moment. I was given a turn and descent shortly thereafter; and my mind moved on to other tasks without returning to a proper analysis of why the plane had behaved the way it did. I attributed the strange sensations to perhaps a bit of vertigo that had swiftly passed. Between struggling with odd pitch and airspeed fluctuations; completing the assigned turn; and joining the final approach course; I ended up well above the GS; but managed to get established and stabilized on localizer and on GS just before the FAF. As I descended to land; I went to deploy flaps and saw that they were already extended. I concluded that I must have bumped the flap switch in the dark at some point and that this probably accounted for the unusual pitch fluctuations I had struggled with earlier. I simply did not make the obvious connections. During gumps check; I said out loud; 'gas on fullest; gear -- we extended that way out there; mixture full rich manifold pressure back; propeller full forward. Good to go.' I did not make my normal visual verification of green panel lamp and nose gear indicator in the foot well. Unfortunately; I had not just bumped the flap switch. In the dark; I had inadvertently activated the flaps instead of the gear. Though operative; the in-cockpit warning system simply were not noticed until just before the scraping started. Airplane came to rest just east of taxiway C. Scrapes extended for about 1000 ft (estimated). Both occupants exited aircraft in normal fashion without assistance through the main door. Door did not stick. Both occupants were outside aircraft before first assistance arrived. Assisted by airport operator; fire department and crane. Minor fuel leakage was contained with absorbent. Straps were used to lift aircraft. Gear was manually extended using the hand crank. Aircraft was pushed from the runway on undamaged gear. Primary contributing factor: limited PIC IFR and night skills resulted in minimal residual attention/capacity for problem solving. PIC ineffective CRM and poor PIC communication with safety pilot. Similar position and operating motion for flap and gear switch combined with lack of visual cues in dark cockpit. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that this event occurred on his third approach of the evening and that he was somewhat behind the aircraft while flying under the hood; at night; and on an instrument approach. He stated that he has little experience in all 3 of these flight facets and that's why he flew that night. His safety pilot was simply being observant of traffic and although the reporter stated that lowering the gear 'felt funny;' the safety pilot made no response to his comment. The control wheel on this aircraft articulates from the center of the instrument panel and swings from side-to-side; allowing pilots in either left or right seat to utilize a single control. The reporter does not feel that the flap handle and landing gear handle were critically poorly designed in this case. He did say the switches are approximately 8 inches apart on the same instrument panel geometric plane. Reporter believed a different panel design would not have allowed his error to be so easily overlooked. But at the same time he does not blame panel design for causing his error.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A P35 LANDED GEAR UP AFTER THE PLT LOWERED THE FLAPS TO FULL INSTEAD OF LOWERING THE LNDG GEAR.

Narrative: NOTE: TIME IN TYPE = 86 HRS IN BEECH 35; 135 TOTAL HRS COMPLEX. FLYING INST CURRENCY APCHS AT NIGHT WITH SAFETY PLT. REQUESTED MULTIPLE LCL APCHS WITH TWR AT ZZZ1 BEFORE DEP. INTENDED VOR APCH INTO ZZZ2; VOR 26 ZZZ3; AND ILS 25 ZZZ4 WITH LOW APCHS AT ZZZ2 AND ZZZ3 WITH RETURN TO APCH CTL. COMPLETED ZZZ1 DEP TOWARD ZZZ5 VOR. CLRED FOR VOR ZZZ2 APCH. SOME CONFUSION WITH APCH CTLR RESULTED IN HDOF TO ZZZ2 TWR WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FOR RETURN. CANCELED IFR WITH ZZZ2 TWR AND REQUESTED R TURN OUT. CONTACTED APCH WITH REQUEST FOR ZZZ3 AND ZZZ4 APCHS. CLRED DIRECT ZZZ6 AND THEN FOR THE ZZZ3 APCH AFTER HDOF TO APCH. COMPLETED VOR 26 ZZZ3 AND RETURNED TO ZZZ7 FOR VECTORS TO ILS 25 ZZZ4. ACTIVATED 'GEAR' WELL OUT ON THE APCH APPROX JUST BEFORE BEING TURNED TO A BASE LEG. THE PITCH AND AIRSPD CHANGES WERE DIFFERENT FROM A TYPICAL GEAR EXTENSION BUT I COULDN'T FIGURE OUT WHY. I ACCOMMODATED UNUSUAL PITCH AND AIRSPD EXCURSIONS WITH TRIM AND PWR SETTING CHANGES AFTER STRUGGLING FOR A BRIEF MOMENT. I WAS GIVEN A TURN AND DSCNT SHORTLY THEREAFTER; AND MY MIND MOVED ON TO OTHER TASKS WITHOUT RETURNING TO A PROPER ANALYSIS OF WHY THE PLANE HAD BEHAVED THE WAY IT DID. I ATTRIBUTED THE STRANGE SENSATIONS TO PERHAPS A BIT OF VERTIGO THAT HAD SWIFTLY PASSED. BTWN STRUGGLING WITH ODD PITCH AND AIRSPD FLUCTUATIONS; COMPLETING THE ASSIGNED TURN; AND JOINING THE FINAL APCH COURSE; I ENDED UP WELL ABOVE THE GS; BUT MANAGED TO GET ESTABLISHED AND STABILIZED ON LOC AND ON GS JUST BEFORE THE FAF. AS I DSNDED TO LAND; I WENT TO DEPLOY FLAPS AND SAW THAT THEY WERE ALREADY EXTENDED. I CONCLUDED THAT I MUST HAVE BUMPED THE FLAP SWITCH IN THE DARK AT SOME POINT AND THAT THIS PROBABLY ACCOUNTED FOR THE UNUSUAL PITCH FLUCTUATIONS I HAD STRUGGLED WITH EARLIER. I SIMPLY DID NOT MAKE THE OBVIOUS CONNECTIONS. DURING GUMPS CHK; I SAID OUT LOUD; 'GAS ON FULLEST; GEAR -- WE EXTENDED THAT WAY OUT THERE; MIXTURE FULL RICH MANIFOLD PRESSURE BACK; PROP FULL FORWARD. GOOD TO GO.' I DID NOT MAKE MY NORMAL VISUAL VERIFICATION OF GREEN PANEL LAMP AND NOSE GEAR INDICATOR IN THE FOOT WELL. UNFORTUNATELY; I HAD NOT JUST BUMPED THE FLAP SWITCH. IN THE DARK; I HAD INADVERTENTLY ACTIVATED THE FLAPS INSTEAD OF THE GEAR. THOUGH OPERATIVE; THE IN-COCKPIT WARNING SYS SIMPLY WERE NOT NOTICED UNTIL JUST BEFORE THE SCRAPING STARTED. AIRPLANE CAME TO REST JUST E OF TXWY C. SCRAPES EXTENDED FOR ABOUT 1000 FT (ESTIMATED). BOTH OCCUPANTS EXITED ACFT IN NORMAL FASHION WITHOUT ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE MAIN DOOR. DOOR DID NOT STICK. BOTH OCCUPANTS WERE OUTSIDE ACFT BEFORE FIRST ASSISTANCE ARRIVED. ASSISTED BY ARPT OPERATOR; FIRE DEPT AND CRANE. MINOR FUEL LEAKAGE WAS CONTAINED WITH ABSORBENT. STRAPS WERE USED TO LIFT ACFT. GEAR WAS MANUALLY EXTENDED USING THE HAND CRANK. ACFT WAS PUSHED FROM THE RWY ON UNDAMAGED GEAR. PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTOR: LIMITED PIC IFR AND NIGHT SKILLS RESULTED IN MINIMAL RESIDUAL ATTN/CAPACITY FOR PROB SOLVING. PIC INEFFECTIVE CRM AND POOR PIC COM WITH SAFETY PLT. SIMILAR POS AND OPERATING MOTION FOR FLAP AND GEAR SWITCH COMBINED WITH LACK OF VISUAL CUES IN DARK COCKPIT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THIS EVENT OCCURRED ON HIS THIRD APCH OF THE EVENING AND THAT HE WAS SOMEWHAT BEHIND THE ACFT WHILE FLYING UNDER THE HOOD; AT NIGHT; AND ON AN INST APCH. HE STATED THAT HE HAS LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN ALL 3 OF THESE FLT FACETS AND THAT'S WHY HE FLEW THAT NIGHT. HIS SAFETY PLT WAS SIMPLY BEING OBSERVANT OF TFC AND ALTHOUGH THE RPTR STATED THAT LOWERING THE GEAR 'FELT FUNNY;' THE SAFETY PLT MADE NO RESPONSE TO HIS COMMENT. THE CTL WHEEL ON THIS ACFT ARTICULATES FROM THE CTR OF THE INST PANEL AND SWINGS FROM SIDE-TO-SIDE; ALLOWING PLTS IN EITHER L OR R SEAT TO UTILIZE A SINGLE CTL. THE RPTR DOES NOT FEEL THAT THE FLAP HANDLE AND LNDG GEAR HANDLE WERE CRITICALLY POORLY DESIGNED IN THIS CASE. HE DID SAY THE SWITCHES ARE APPROX 8 INCHES APART ON THE SAME INST PANEL GEOMETRIC PLANE. RPTR BELIEVED A DIFFERENT PANEL DESIGN WOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED HIS ERROR TO BE SO EASILY OVERLOOKED. BUT AT THE SAME TIME HE DOES NOT BLAME PANEL DESIGN FOR CAUSING HIS ERROR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.