Narrative:

I was the sic in this event and the PNF. I am a 'contract pilot' and this was the 5TH flight I had flown for this company and the 3RD flight I had made with this captain/PIC; who is highly experienced in type and manages the aircraft for the owners. The airport is uncontrolled; unattended; with a 4654 ft runway with MIRL and avasi-left. The (only) approach is GPS runway 35. Category C minimums are 2840 ft -3 (1541 ft AGL) due to high terrain. The ASOS report taken 5 mins prior to our approach was: wind 350 degrees at 6 KTS; visibility 6 mi; light rain; mist; few at 200 ft; overcast at 2800 ft; temperature 01 degrees; dewpoint M01 degrees; altimeter 29.73. 2 mi from the FAF; I activated the runway lights to 'high' on the CTAF. Our indicated airspeed was 195 KIAS and I advised the PIC 'we need to get configured' to which the PIC answered; 'we're alright.' we were configured with gear down and approach flaps by the FAF. Landing flaps were selected at the FAF and I became busy making radio calls; completing the landing checklist and making the appropriate callouts. Arriving at the MDA; we were still IMC with no ground contact. Approximately 2 mi from the missed approach; we began to have ground contact through hole in the overcast of approximately 1/2 mi. The PIC immediately reduced power and began a dive through the hole. At that time the runway was not in sight -- only residential buildings and roads. I reported 'I do not have the runway in sight.' the PIC replied; 'I know where we are; been here thousands of times.' we continued descent to 600 ft AGL and I began to see the runway at about 25 degrees to our left and 1 1/2 mi. At that point; I believed we were in a good position to make a straight-in approach to runway 35 and expected the PIC to turn left to align the aircraft with runway 35. Instead; the PIC began a slight right turn to set up for a left downwind to runway 17. I saw a fog bank in our flight path and called; 'we will be going into a fog bank ahead -- I suggest we turn left for a left downwind to runway 35.' the PIC banked to the left and began a shallow descent. I called '270 ft radar altitude; we need to climb or go around!' at this point we were crossing the end of the runway at a 90 degree angle. I reported again; ' we are 200 ft radar -- we are too low!' his reply was; 'we're ok; I know where we are.' I continued to call radar altitudes and considered taking control of the airplane. I decided not to do so because I thought that we could get into a struggle for control and that the safest course of action would be to continue to make callouts and not allow the aircraft to hit the ground. The lowest radar altitude I observed and called was 160 ft. The visibility for the left downwind for runway 35 was approximately 2 mi and we had ceiling to work with; so I commented 'we have ceiling and can climb.' the PIC responded with a slight climb to approximately 300 ft RA. On the downwind leg for runway 35; I noticed we were in too close to the runway; primarily as a consequence of our low altitude. While maneuvering; I observed airspeed variations between 150 KTS and 129 KTS (vref was 132 KTS). I continued to make altitude/airspeed callouts and references to the stall margin indicator. .Since our downwind was too close; we overshot the turn to final approach. The egpws bank angle warning sounded several times as the PIC maneuvered to final approach. At one point the stall margin indicator was at the top of the yellow and I called 'we need speed; we are slow!' vref speed only gives adequate stall margin for 15 degree bank angles and we needed at least vref +10 KTS due to the bank angles attained. The PIC was focused on the runway and the airspeed varied significantly with numerous power changes. We landed and the passenger deplaned. They appeared either unaware or unconcerned about the 'air show' performance we had just concluded. This was probably the worst example of airmanship I have ever had the misfortune of being a part of. As I look back upon what I could have done differently; I continue to believe that trying to take control of the aircraft would have put us in greater jeopardy than trying to help the PIC accomplish what he seemed so determined to do. I am new to this flight operation with little experience in this aircraft and the PIC manages the aircraft including the pilots who fly it. This scenario created a classic example of a sic put in a difficult position. I have scheduled a meeting with the PIC to talk about this incident. If this is an example of the way he intends to operate aircraft; then I will no longer do contract to flying with this company. I hope that the PIC/manager will acknowledge the unnecessarily risky conduct of the operation and agree to develop SOP's that clearly state the manner in which flts will be conducted in future. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter is a retired air carrier pilot and stated again that this is the worst flight he has ever worked on. At the meeting with the captain about this event; the reporter told that captain that he could have written the accident report for that flight. All of the elements of a serious accident were present. The reporter is no longer working for this company.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FO RPTS A FLT ON WHICH AN LJ55 CAPT RADICALLY MANEUVERED IMC AT A VERY LOW ALT FOLLOWING A GPS APCH ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE A LNDG POS.

Narrative: I WAS THE SIC IN THIS EVENT AND THE PNF. I AM A 'CONTRACT PLT' AND THIS WAS THE 5TH FLT I HAD FLOWN FOR THIS COMPANY AND THE 3RD FLT I HAD MADE WITH THIS CAPT/PIC; WHO IS HIGHLY EXPERIENCED IN TYPE AND MANAGES THE ACFT FOR THE OWNERS. THE ARPT IS UNCTLED; UNATTENDED; WITH A 4654 FT RWY WITH MIRL AND AVASI-L. THE (ONLY) APCH IS GPS RWY 35. CATEGORY C MINIMUMS ARE 2840 FT -3 (1541 FT AGL) DUE TO HIGH TERRAIN. THE ASOS RPT TAKEN 5 MINS PRIOR TO OUR APCH WAS: WIND 350 DEGS AT 6 KTS; VISIBILITY 6 MI; LIGHT RAIN; MIST; FEW AT 200 FT; OVCST AT 2800 FT; TEMP 01 DEGS; DEWPOINT M01 DEGS; ALTIMETER 29.73. 2 MI FROM THE FAF; I ACTIVATED THE RWY LIGHTS TO 'HIGH' ON THE CTAF. OUR INDICATED AIRSPD WAS 195 KIAS AND I ADVISED THE PIC 'WE NEED TO GET CONFIGURED' TO WHICH THE PIC ANSWERED; 'WE'RE ALRIGHT.' WE WERE CONFIGURED WITH GEAR DOWN AND APCH FLAPS BY THE FAF. LNDG FLAPS WERE SELECTED AT THE FAF AND I BECAME BUSY MAKING RADIO CALLS; COMPLETING THE LNDG CHKLIST AND MAKING THE APPROPRIATE CALLOUTS. ARRIVING AT THE MDA; WE WERE STILL IMC WITH NO GND CONTACT. APPROX 2 MI FROM THE MISSED APCH; WE BEGAN TO HAVE GND CONTACT THROUGH HOLE IN THE OVCST OF APPROX 1/2 MI. THE PIC IMMEDIATELY REDUCED PWR AND BEGAN A DIVE THROUGH THE HOLE. AT THAT TIME THE RWY WAS NOT IN SIGHT -- ONLY RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS AND ROADS. I RPTED 'I DO NOT HAVE THE RWY IN SIGHT.' THE PIC REPLIED; 'I KNOW WHERE WE ARE; BEEN HERE THOUSANDS OF TIMES.' WE CONTINUED DSCNT TO 600 FT AGL AND I BEGAN TO SEE THE RWY AT ABOUT 25 DEGS TO OUR L AND 1 1/2 MI. AT THAT POINT; I BELIEVED WE WERE IN A GOOD POS TO MAKE A STRAIGHT-IN APCH TO RWY 35 AND EXPECTED THE PIC TO TURN L TO ALIGN THE ACFT WITH RWY 35. INSTEAD; THE PIC BEGAN A SLIGHT R TURN TO SET UP FOR A L DOWNWIND TO RWY 17. I SAW A FOG BANK IN OUR FLT PATH AND CALLED; 'WE WILL BE GOING INTO A FOG BANK AHEAD -- I SUGGEST WE TURN L FOR A L DOWNWIND TO RWY 35.' THE PIC BANKED TO THE L AND BEGAN A SHALLOW DSCNT. I CALLED '270 FT RADAR ALT; WE NEED TO CLB OR GO AROUND!' AT THIS POINT WE WERE XING THE END OF THE RWY AT A 90 DEG ANGLE. I RPTED AGAIN; ' WE ARE 200 FT RADAR -- WE ARE TOO LOW!' HIS REPLY WAS; 'WE'RE OK; I KNOW WHERE WE ARE.' I CONTINUED TO CALL RADAR ALTS AND CONSIDERED TAKING CTL OF THE AIRPLANE. I DECIDED NOT TO DO SO BECAUSE I THOUGHT THAT WE COULD GET INTO A STRUGGLE FOR CTL AND THAT THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE TO CONTINUE TO MAKE CALLOUTS AND NOT ALLOW THE ACFT TO HIT THE GND. THE LOWEST RADAR ALT I OBSERVED AND CALLED WAS 160 FT. THE VISIBILITY FOR THE L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 35 WAS APPROX 2 MI AND WE HAD CEILING TO WORK WITH; SO I COMMENTED 'WE HAVE CEILING AND CAN CLB.' THE PIC RESPONDED WITH A SLIGHT CLB TO APPROX 300 FT RA. ON THE DOWNWIND LEG FOR RWY 35; I NOTICED WE WERE IN TOO CLOSE TO THE RWY; PRIMARILY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF OUR LOW ALT. WHILE MANEUVERING; I OBSERVED AIRSPD VARIATIONS BTWN 150 KTS AND 129 KTS (VREF WAS 132 KTS). I CONTINUED TO MAKE ALT/AIRSPD CALLOUTS AND REFS TO THE STALL MARGIN INDICATOR. .SINCE OUR DOWNWIND WAS TOO CLOSE; WE OVERSHOT THE TURN TO FINAL APCH. THE EGPWS BANK ANGLE WARNING SOUNDED SEVERAL TIMES AS THE PIC MANEUVERED TO FINAL APCH. AT ONE POINT THE STALL MARGIN INDICATOR WAS AT THE TOP OF THE YELLOW AND I CALLED 'WE NEED SPD; WE ARE SLOW!' VREF SPD ONLY GIVES ADEQUATE STALL MARGIN FOR 15 DEG BANK ANGLES AND WE NEEDED AT LEAST VREF +10 KTS DUE TO THE BANK ANGLES ATTAINED. THE PIC WAS FOCUSED ON THE RWY AND THE AIRSPD VARIED SIGNIFICANTLY WITH NUMEROUS PWR CHANGES. WE LANDED AND THE PAX DEPLANED. THEY APPEARED EITHER UNAWARE OR UNCONCERNED ABOUT THE 'AIR SHOW' PERFORMANCE WE HAD JUST CONCLUDED. THIS WAS PROBABLY THE WORST EXAMPLE OF AIRMANSHIP I HAVE EVER HAD THE MISFORTUNE OF BEING A PART OF. AS I LOOK BACK UPON WHAT I COULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY; I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT TRYING TO TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT WOULD HAVE PUT US IN GREATER JEOPARDY THAN TRYING TO HELP THE PIC ACCOMPLISH WHAT HE SEEMED SO DETERMINED TO DO. I AM NEW TO THIS FLT OP WITH LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN THIS ACFT AND THE PIC MANAGES THE ACFT INCLUDING THE PLTS WHO FLY IT. THIS SCENARIO CREATED A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF A SIC PUT IN A DIFFICULT POS. I HAVE SCHEDULED A MEETING WITH THE PIC TO TALK ABOUT THIS INCIDENT. IF THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE WAY HE INTENDS TO OPERATE ACFT; THEN I WILL NO LONGER DO CONTRACT TO FLYING WITH THIS COMPANY. I HOPE THAT THE PIC/MGR WILL ACKNOWLEDGE THE UNNECESSARILY RISKY CONDUCT OF THE OP AND AGREE TO DEVELOP SOP'S THAT CLRLY STATE THE MANNER IN WHICH FLTS WILL BE CONDUCTED IN FUTURE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR IS A RETIRED ACR PLT AND STATED AGAIN THAT THIS IS THE WORST FLT HE HAS EVER WORKED ON. AT THE MEETING WITH THE CAPT ABOUT THIS EVENT; THE RPTR TOLD THAT CAPT THAT HE COULD HAVE WRITTEN THE ACCIDENT RPT FOR THAT FLT. ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF A SERIOUS ACCIDENT WERE PRESENT. THE RPTR IS NO LONGER WORKING FOR THIS COMPANY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.