Narrative:

I had endorsed a private pilot student for a solo cross country from clark county; in (jvy) to bloomington; in (bmg) and back to jvy. I had provided most of the primary training to this student; including his initial solo and all cross country training flts. He had already completed 1 solo cross country flight to columbus; in (bak) from jvy a few weeks earlier. The day of the flight brought clear skies with some haze. I reviewed the student's cross country planning and had discussed the problems the haze might pose to his navigation. We had previously done 1 dual out-and-back cross country to bmg from jvy; so he had seen the route of flight before (albeit 50-80 days prior). I suggested the use of the bmg VOR as an additional means of navigation; to compliment his pilotage and dead reckoning. The student departed jvy to bloomington as I was beginning a dual flight with another student. When I returned; the student I had endorsed for solo cross country flight was on the telephone with another instructor at my FBO. He was in-flight at 4500 ft MSL; lost; calling on his cell phone. The other instructor suggested he call indianapolis approach to ask for vectors; but my student advised no one responded to the frequency on the sectional chart. He believed he was circling over lake monroe (about 11 NM southeast of bmg). I instructed him to center the VOR needle and fly toward the heading the needle centered 'to' at; which he advised was 330 degrees (which made sense being over lake monroe). He then said 'I see the airport; it's right there; I'm gonna go land; I'll call once on the ground.' approximately 10-15 mins passed before he called back; with voices in the backgnd; and he advised me he had landed at godman field; fort knox; ky (ftk) and was with military personnel. I told my student to have someone call the school on the landline; as his cell phone was breaking up badly. I shortly received a call from the civilian airport manager of godman field; who explained to me my student was extremely nervous and embarrassed; but he was otherwise just fine and that they would release him on his way back to jvy. I asked if I could fly in with another pilot in another airplane to recover him and he said that would be fine; that he would relay our information to godman tower. Upon taking off from jvy with another instructor; I called louisville approach and requested VFR flight following to godman and that we had permission to land a civilian aircraft at the military airfield. We landed at godman and parked beside my student's C172; and were met by the airport manager and another ex-army employee at the field. They were extremely friendly; greeted us; and brought the other instructor and myself inside the dispatch office. I met my student (who was still very nervous) and went to speak with the airport manager about the situation. He told me godman gets a few lost VFR pilots each yr; and since my student came in NORDO (thinking he was landing at bmg not ftk and not knowing otherwise until seeing apache helicopters) they treated it as an emergency situation and as such there would be no repercussions (my student had also avoided the restr area). They did need copies of his aircraft documents and some information from us before they could let us go. They took information from my student prior to my arrival; and I presented my military identify to the military police who recorded the information. The entire process took less than 5 mins. The airport manager tried very hard to put me at ease; and said he wanted us to file a VFR flight plan before departing (which we did with dispatchers at godman). We departed as a flight of 2 from godman; leaving their airspace to the west before turning north; remaining far clear of godman's class D airspace and the restr area over fort knox on our return trip to jvy; using VFR flight following from louisville approach. Upon landing at jvy; I debriefed my student on his flight; and specifically wanted to know how he ended up about 80 NM south of bloomington at fort knox. He advised he became disoriented by the haze near his second chkpoint; and in thinking his heading was far off; spun the heading indicator off the correct setting and to an incorrect setting. This made the attempts theother instructor and I made over the telephone useless; as it is difficult to track to a VOR if you aren't actually flying the heading you believe you are on. I also reviewed magnetic compass navigation with him during debrief; and how to properly xchk the magnetic compass with the heading indicator to check accuracy. Also discussed were lost procedures; using VOR triangulation and tracking; utilizing radar services for vectors; and most importantly; the importance of following the planned magnetic heading for the time computed with the ground speed during initial cross country planning. From my best estimate; he was no more than 6 mins from lake monroe when he became confused and spun the heading indicator; rendering its information unhelpful. As an instructor; this incident gave me pause as to the way I teach cross country planning and navigation to my students. I had previously discussed and demonstrated VOR navigation; using it for the dual cross country to bmg. I know; however; that I now need to reinforce the use of radio navaids as well as make it a point to expose students to radar environments so they are comfortable with using them in an abnormal situation. I also need to put my students into uncomfortable situations during their training; forcing them to practice and develop good adm skills. I plan to increase the amount of time spent on covering dead reckoning with heading and time; both in the plane and on the ground; and to put more effort into reviewing contingency plans in an effort to prevent panic. This incident also gave me an opportunity to explain the 'accident chain' (incident chain in this case) to my student; showing him all the steps between departing jvy and his landing at fort knox. I also explicitly reviewed cross country navigation procedures with my student; and advised him there will need to be at least additional dual cross country flight prior to him being endorsed again for solo cross country flight. I advised him there is no 'fault' in this instance: he made a mistake during training that he will never; ever forget and that he will be able to remember if he ever finds himself in a similar situation. I was relieved that he was safely on the ground and knew his location; even if it was vastly off course and a restr military installation. I also am thankful for the professionalism; friendliness; and understanding of the civilian and military personnel I interacted with while recovering him and his airplane; making it as pleasurable an experience as humanly possible for both me and my student.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR PLT ENDORSES STUDENT PLT FOR XCOUNTRY. STUDENT GETS LOST AND LANDS AT MIL ARPT.

Narrative: I HAD ENDORSED A PVT PLT STUDENT FOR A SOLO XCOUNTRY FROM CLARK COUNTY; IN (JVY) TO BLOOMINGTON; IN (BMG) AND BACK TO JVY. I HAD PROVIDED MOST OF THE PRIMARY TRAINING TO THIS STUDENT; INCLUDING HIS INITIAL SOLO AND ALL XCOUNTRY TRAINING FLTS. HE HAD ALREADY COMPLETED 1 SOLO XCOUNTRY FLT TO COLUMBUS; IN (BAK) FROM JVY A FEW WKS EARLIER. THE DAY OF THE FLT BROUGHT CLR SKIES WITH SOME HAZE. I REVIEWED THE STUDENT'S XCOUNTRY PLANNING AND HAD DISCUSSED THE PROBS THE HAZE MIGHT POSE TO HIS NAV. WE HAD PREVIOUSLY DONE 1 DUAL OUT-AND-BACK XCOUNTRY TO BMG FROM JVY; SO HE HAD SEEN THE RTE OF FLT BEFORE (ALBEIT 50-80 DAYS PRIOR). I SUGGESTED THE USE OF THE BMG VOR AS AN ADDITIONAL MEANS OF NAV; TO COMPLIMENT HIS PILOTAGE AND DEAD RECKONING. THE STUDENT DEPARTED JVY TO BLOOMINGTON AS I WAS BEGINNING A DUAL FLT WITH ANOTHER STUDENT. WHEN I RETURNED; THE STUDENT I HAD ENDORSED FOR SOLO XCOUNTRY FLT WAS ON THE TELEPHONE WITH ANOTHER INSTRUCTOR AT MY FBO. HE WAS INFLT AT 4500 FT MSL; LOST; CALLING ON HIS CELL PHONE. THE OTHER INSTRUCTOR SUGGESTED HE CALL INDIANAPOLIS APCH TO ASK FOR VECTORS; BUT MY STUDENT ADVISED NO ONE RESPONDED TO THE FREQ ON THE SECTIONAL CHART. HE BELIEVED HE WAS CIRCLING OVER LAKE MONROE (ABOUT 11 NM SE OF BMG). I INSTRUCTED HIM TO CTR THE VOR NEEDLE AND FLY TOWARD THE HDG THE NEEDLE CTRED 'TO' AT; WHICH HE ADVISED WAS 330 DEGS (WHICH MADE SENSE BEING OVER LAKE MONROE). HE THEN SAID 'I SEE THE ARPT; IT'S RIGHT THERE; I'M GONNA GO LAND; I'LL CALL ONCE ON THE GND.' APPROX 10-15 MINS PASSED BEFORE HE CALLED BACK; WITH VOICES IN THE BACKGND; AND HE ADVISED ME HE HAD LANDED AT GODMAN FIELD; FORT KNOX; KY (FTK) AND WAS WITH MIL PERSONNEL. I TOLD MY STUDENT TO HAVE SOMEONE CALL THE SCHOOL ON THE LANDLINE; AS HIS CELL PHONE WAS BREAKING UP BADLY. I SHORTLY RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE CIVILIAN ARPT MGR OF GODMAN FIELD; WHO EXPLAINED TO ME MY STUDENT WAS EXTREMELY NERVOUS AND EMBARRASSED; BUT HE WAS OTHERWISE JUST FINE AND THAT THEY WOULD RELEASE HIM ON HIS WAY BACK TO JVY. I ASKED IF I COULD FLY IN WITH ANOTHER PLT IN ANOTHER AIRPLANE TO RECOVER HIM AND HE SAID THAT WOULD BE FINE; THAT HE WOULD RELAY OUR INFO TO GODMAN TWR. UPON TAKING OFF FROM JVY WITH ANOTHER INSTRUCTOR; I CALLED LOUISVILLE APCH AND REQUESTED VFR FLT FOLLOWING TO GODMAN AND THAT WE HAD PERMISSION TO LAND A CIVILIAN ACFT AT THE MIL AIRFIELD. WE LANDED AT GODMAN AND PARKED BESIDE MY STUDENT'S C172; AND WERE MET BY THE ARPT MGR AND ANOTHER EX-ARMY EMPLOYEE AT THE FIELD. THEY WERE EXTREMELY FRIENDLY; GREETED US; AND BROUGHT THE OTHER INSTRUCTOR AND MYSELF INSIDE THE DISPATCH OFFICE. I MET MY STUDENT (WHO WAS STILL VERY NERVOUS) AND WENT TO SPEAK WITH THE ARPT MGR ABOUT THE SITUATION. HE TOLD ME GODMAN GETS A FEW LOST VFR PLTS EACH YR; AND SINCE MY STUDENT CAME IN NORDO (THINKING HE WAS LNDG AT BMG NOT FTK AND NOT KNOWING OTHERWISE UNTIL SEEING APACHE HELIS) THEY TREATED IT AS AN EMER SITUATION AND AS SUCH THERE WOULD BE NO REPERCUSSIONS (MY STUDENT HAD ALSO AVOIDED THE RESTR AREA). THEY DID NEED COPIES OF HIS ACFT DOCUMENTS AND SOME INFO FROM US BEFORE THEY COULD LET US GO. THEY TOOK INFO FROM MY STUDENT PRIOR TO MY ARR; AND I PRESENTED MY MIL IDENT TO THE MIL POLICE WHO RECORDED THE INFO. THE ENTIRE PROCESS TOOK LESS THAN 5 MINS. THE ARPT MGR TRIED VERY HARD TO PUT ME AT EASE; AND SAID HE WANTED US TO FILE A VFR FLT PLAN BEFORE DEPARTING (WHICH WE DID WITH DISPATCHERS AT GODMAN). WE DEPARTED AS A FLT OF 2 FROM GODMAN; LEAVING THEIR AIRSPACE TO THE W BEFORE TURNING N; REMAINING FAR CLR OF GODMAN'S CLASS D AIRSPACE AND THE RESTR AREA OVER FORT KNOX ON OUR RETURN TRIP TO JVY; USING VFR FLT FOLLOWING FROM LOUISVILLE APCH. UPON LNDG AT JVY; I DEBRIEFED MY STUDENT ON HIS FLT; AND SPECIFICALLY WANTED TO KNOW HOW HE ENDED UP ABOUT 80 NM S OF BLOOMINGTON AT FORT KNOX. HE ADVISED HE BECAME DISORIENTED BY THE HAZE NEAR HIS SECOND CHKPOINT; AND IN THINKING HIS HDG WAS FAR OFF; SPUN THE HDG INDICATOR OFF THE CORRECT SETTING AND TO AN INCORRECT SETTING. THIS MADE THE ATTEMPTS THEOTHER INSTRUCTOR AND I MADE OVER THE TELEPHONE USELESS; AS IT IS DIFFICULT TO TRACK TO A VOR IF YOU AREN'T ACTUALLY FLYING THE HDG YOU BELIEVE YOU ARE ON. I ALSO REVIEWED MAGNETIC COMPASS NAV WITH HIM DURING DEBRIEF; AND HOW TO PROPERLY XCHK THE MAGNETIC COMPASS WITH THE HDG INDICATOR TO CHK ACCURACY. ALSO DISCUSSED WERE LOST PROCS; USING VOR TRIANGULATION AND TRACKING; UTILIZING RADAR SVCS FOR VECTORS; AND MOST IMPORTANTLY; THE IMPORTANCE OF FOLLOWING THE PLANNED MAGNETIC HDG FOR THE TIME COMPUTED WITH THE GND SPD DURING INITIAL XCOUNTRY PLANNING. FROM MY BEST ESTIMATE; HE WAS NO MORE THAN 6 MINS FROM LAKE MONROE WHEN HE BECAME CONFUSED AND SPUN THE HDG INDICATOR; RENDERING ITS INFO UNHELPFUL. AS AN INSTRUCTOR; THIS INCIDENT GAVE ME PAUSE AS TO THE WAY I TEACH XCOUNTRY PLANNING AND NAV TO MY STUDENTS. I HAD PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED AND DEMONSTRATED VOR NAV; USING IT FOR THE DUAL XCOUNTRY TO BMG. I KNOW; HOWEVER; THAT I NOW NEED TO REINFORCE THE USE OF RADIO NAVAIDS AS WELL AS MAKE IT A POINT TO EXPOSE STUDENTS TO RADAR ENVIRONMENTS SO THEY ARE COMFORTABLE WITH USING THEM IN AN ABNORMAL SITUATION. I ALSO NEED TO PUT MY STUDENTS INTO UNCOMFORTABLE SITUATIONS DURING THEIR TRAINING; FORCING THEM TO PRACTICE AND DEVELOP GOOD ADM SKILLS. I PLAN TO INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF TIME SPENT ON COVERING DEAD RECKONING WITH HDG AND TIME; BOTH IN THE PLANE AND ON THE GND; AND TO PUT MORE EFFORT INTO REVIEWING CONTINGENCY PLANS IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT PANIC. THIS INCIDENT ALSO GAVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN THE 'ACCIDENT CHAIN' (INCIDENT CHAIN IN THIS CASE) TO MY STUDENT; SHOWING HIM ALL THE STEPS BTWN DEPARTING JVY AND HIS LNDG AT FORT KNOX. I ALSO EXPLICITLY REVIEWED XCOUNTRY NAV PROCS WITH MY STUDENT; AND ADVISED HIM THERE WILL NEED TO BE AT LEAST ADDITIONAL DUAL XCOUNTRY FLT PRIOR TO HIM BEING ENDORSED AGAIN FOR SOLO XCOUNTRY FLT. I ADVISED HIM THERE IS NO 'FAULT' IN THIS INSTANCE: HE MADE A MISTAKE DURING TRAINING THAT HE WILL NEVER; EVER FORGET AND THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO REMEMBER IF HE EVER FINDS HIMSELF IN A SIMILAR SITUATION. I WAS RELIEVED THAT HE WAS SAFELY ON THE GND AND KNEW HIS LOCATION; EVEN IF IT WAS VASTLY OFF COURSE AND A RESTR MIL INSTALLATION. I ALSO AM THANKFUL FOR THE PROFESSIONALISM; FRIENDLINESS; AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE CIVILIAN AND MIL PERSONNEL I INTERACTED WITH WHILE RECOVERING HIM AND HIS AIRPLANE; MAKING IT AS PLEASURABLE AN EXPERIENCE AS HUMANLY POSSIBLE FOR BOTH ME AND MY STUDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.