Narrative:

The following event occurred at XA03Z in jan/06. It was the alleged loss of radar separation of 2 aircraft. Monitors at ZMA detected 2; similar performance aircraft; an A319 and a B737; had less than 5 mi of separation. Controller action was taken to maintain separation; reducing the trailing aircraft's velocity and increasing that of the lead aircraft. The session had been busy throughout; and it is generally a complex sector with aircraft in transition flight 90% of the time. Aircraft enter from the northeast; swbound needing to descend; while nwbound aircraft out of san juan are on the climb. Aircraft also enter from ZMA out the northwest; sebound; needing descent into san juan. At the time of the apparent incident; I had several aircraft in each of these phases of flight. From the moment the first of the 2 aircraft involved in the incident entered the airspace and exited; over 25 aircraft were handled. At the moment I was also responsible for d-side responsibilities; non-radar separation and coordination. The sector is a handful even for the most experienced. At the time I cleared the lead aircraft to the same altitude as the trailing aircraft; I had enough spacing to accommodate both. Constant and rapid scanning was required due to all the transitioning flts. The proximity of both aircraft was observed when preparing to start the flash for handoff to ZMA. At this time; I proceeded to issue speed restrs; still having legal separation. Coordination with miami was executed and approved regarding the speed restrs. At the time of the event I had been in position for 1 hour 20 mins. There were several pushes of heavy traffic. Some aircraft required routing changes and destination changes. Still others needed to be coordination with adjacent sectors; and it all had to be done by me; as there was no d-side or coordination at the sector. Seasonal traffic has been high; and staffing has been low; which equates to longer; more difficult sessions each time on position. Fatigue sets in; as been the norm to work under these conditions for the last 4 weeks. Overtime has only been used under the most extreme situations; so staffing has continued to suffer. Some controllers have stayed to work credit viewing the combining of sectors as unsafe; and not wanting to see co-workers suffer because management is not willing to staff the facility adequately for the traffic being worked. I am exposed to the heavier wkend afternoon traffic. It is not uncommon for me to leave work mentally and physically fatigued. This is what happened; and why apparently it all occurred. Sector complexity; flow of traffic; lack of and improper staffing; as well as fatigue are factors in this event and others like it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZSU CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL360 WHEN MISJUDGING SPACING DISTANCE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN LEGAL SEPARATION.

Narrative: THE FOLLOWING EVENT OCCURRED AT XA03Z IN JAN/06. IT WAS THE ALLEGED LOSS OF RADAR SEPARATION OF 2 ACFT. MONITORS AT ZMA DETECTED 2; SIMILAR PERFORMANCE ACFT; AN A319 AND A B737; HAD LESS THAN 5 MI OF SEPARATION. CTLR ACTION WAS TAKEN TO MAINTAIN SEPARATION; REDUCING THE TRAILING ACFT'S VELOCITY AND INCREASING THAT OF THE LEAD ACFT. THE SESSION HAD BEEN BUSY THROUGHOUT; AND IT IS GENERALLY A COMPLEX SECTOR WITH ACFT IN TRANSITION FLT 90% OF THE TIME. ACFT ENTER FROM THE NE; SWBOUND NEEDING TO DSND; WHILE NWBOUND ACFT OUT OF SAN JUAN ARE ON THE CLB. ACFT ALSO ENTER FROM ZMA OUT THE NW; SEBOUND; NEEDING DSCNT INTO SAN JUAN. AT THE TIME OF THE APPARENT INCIDENT; I HAD SEVERAL ACFT IN EACH OF THESE PHASES OF FLT. FROM THE MOMENT THE FIRST OF THE 2 ACFT INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT ENTERED THE AIRSPACE AND EXITED; OVER 25 ACFT WERE HANDLED. AT THE MOMENT I WAS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR D-SIDE RESPONSIBILITIES; NON-RADAR SEPARATION AND COORD. THE SECTOR IS A HANDFUL EVEN FOR THE MOST EXPERIENCED. AT THE TIME I CLRED THE LEAD ACFT TO THE SAME ALT AS THE TRAILING ACFT; I HAD ENOUGH SPACING TO ACCOMMODATE BOTH. CONSTANT AND RAPID SCANNING WAS REQUIRED DUE TO ALL THE TRANSITIONING FLTS. THE PROX OF BOTH ACFT WAS OBSERVED WHEN PREPARING TO START THE FLASH FOR HDOF TO ZMA. AT THIS TIME; I PROCEEDED TO ISSUE SPD RESTRS; STILL HAVING LEGAL SEPARATION. COORD WITH MIAMI WAS EXECUTED AND APPROVED REGARDING THE SPD RESTRS. AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT I HAD BEEN IN POS FOR 1 HR 20 MINS. THERE WERE SEVERAL PUSHES OF HVY TFC. SOME ACFT REQUIRED ROUTING CHANGES AND DEST CHANGES. STILL OTHERS NEEDED TO BE COORD WITH ADJACENT SECTORS; AND IT ALL HAD TO BE DONE BY ME; AS THERE WAS NO D-SIDE OR COORD AT THE SECTOR. SEASONAL TFC HAS BEEN HIGH; AND STAFFING HAS BEEN LOW; WHICH EQUATES TO LONGER; MORE DIFFICULT SESSIONS EACH TIME ON POS. FATIGUE SETS IN; AS BEEN THE NORM TO WORK UNDER THESE CONDITIONS FOR THE LAST 4 WKS. OVERTIME HAS ONLY BEEN USED UNDER THE MOST EXTREME SITUATIONS; SO STAFFING HAS CONTINUED TO SUFFER. SOME CTLRS HAVE STAYED TO WORK CREDIT VIEWING THE COMBINING OF SECTORS AS UNSAFE; AND NOT WANTING TO SEE CO-WORKERS SUFFER BECAUSE MGMNT IS NOT WILLING TO STAFF THE FACILITY ADEQUATELY FOR THE TFC BEING WORKED. I AM EXPOSED TO THE HEAVIER WKEND AFTERNOON TFC. IT IS NOT UNCOMMON FOR ME TO LEAVE WORK MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY FATIGUED. THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED; AND WHY APPARENTLY IT ALL OCCURRED. SECTOR COMPLEXITY; FLOW OF TFC; LACK OF AND IMPROPER STAFFING; AS WELL AS FATIGUE ARE FACTORS IN THIS EVENT AND OTHERS LIKE IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.