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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 683753 |
Time | |
Date | 200512 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzzz.airport |
State Reference | FO |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zzzz.artcc tracon : zzzz.tracon tower : zzzz.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | ATR 72 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 683753 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | other personnel |
Qualification | other |
ASRS Report | 684594 |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
Our initial release from ZZZZ1 to ZZZZ with ZZZZ2 as alternate and 10 min hold fuel required 3874 pounds of fuel; but we had only 2580 pounds on board. There is no fuel available at ZZZZ1. I contacted dispatch to resolve the situation. He determined that we had adequate fuel if released with no alternate or hold fuel. (ZZZZ WX had unlimited ceiling and visibility.) we had a safe and legal fuel load but not much more than the requirement. (The release called for 2561 pounds so we had only 19 pounds extra.) this 19 pounds was the difference between the planned arrival fuel of 1193 pounds and the 1174 pounds reserve. Given the reduced runway availability at ZZZZ; I was aware that I would have to actively manage the progress of the flight to ensure that we were not painted into a corner. I formulated a set of backup plans in case an expeditious arrival was not in the cards for us. When we were about 100 NM from ZZZZ; approach issued a vector south to intercept the radial. Since I wanted to conserve our fuel as much as possible; I felt that it was in the interest of safety to advise minimum fuel and request direct ZZZZ. Approach granted direct. Our fuel consumption was still on track when we passed ZZZZ1; so we continued to ZZZZ. When switched to the sector controller; I requested runway 26 'traffic permitting.' at that moment I did not think we required runway 26; but it had the potential to cut out a lot of maneuvering and it never hurts to ask. She said she was unable due to multiple departures and issued a vector to the ILS 8. I sensed that we were being set up for a long downwind so I told her that we were minimum fuel in case the previous controller had not passed that along; and she noted that she had not been so informed. About 15 NM southeast of ZZZZ she said that they had worked out runway 26 for us and switched our frequency. He cleared us for the visual to runway 26. At this time we were still above our reserve fuel and we were #1 for the runway so fuel was no longer my main concern; the quick change of plans and our altitude with respect to the approach path made a successful approach my main focus. I concentrated on ensuring that the first officer (PF) made a stable approach and acceptable landing. We complied with stabilized approach criteria for a visual approach. Focused on those tasks; I did not note our exact fuel on touchdown; but based on the fuel we had when we arrived at the gate; it can be estimated with high confidence that we were above our reserve on landing. During landing; we heard tower say that there was an emergency in progress. This is the first indication we had that ATC was treating us as an emergency. I am glad that they did so; because it ensured that we did not dip into our reserves. In the bit picture; I think landing runway 26 was the best course of action and ATC helped us out a lot by giving us priority handling; but it would not have created an emergency if they had not. After landing; we were asked to contact ATC via telephone. He said that they set alert #1 as a conservative response to our minimum fuel advisory. Just as we had advised minimum fuel to ensure safety of flight; they provided priority handling to ensure flight safety. He also said that a report had been filed with the FSDO as a routine documentation of the alert condition. He said that no one was in trouble for the event; implying that the report was not a deviation report. This event is a positive example of the system working to ensure flight safety. Supplemental information from acn 684594: captain and I had a conversation about this situation. I explained to him that ZZZZ did not need an alternate airport in regards to regulations; it also did not need hold fuel. I advised him of the fuel statement and asked him if he was comfortable with this fuel load. He answered yes and asked me to do whatever I can. I was informed that captain called a minimum fuel advisory; however; I did not receive a call nor was I notified of this event by the captain on the day of the incident. The flight was dispatched according to all FAA regulations and air carrier manuals.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN ATR72 DISPATCHED WITH MINIMUM FUEL NOTIFIED ATC OF MINIMUM FUEL. EMER DECLARED BY ATC WHO THEN CLRED THE FLT DIRECT THE ARPT.
Narrative: OUR INITIAL RELEASE FROM ZZZZ1 TO ZZZZ WITH ZZZZ2 AS ALTERNATE AND 10 MIN HOLD FUEL REQUIRED 3874 LBS OF FUEL; BUT WE HAD ONLY 2580 LBS ON BOARD. THERE IS NO FUEL AVAILABLE AT ZZZZ1. I CONTACTED DISPATCH TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION. HE DETERMINED THAT WE HAD ADEQUATE FUEL IF RELEASED WITH NO ALTERNATE OR HOLD FUEL. (ZZZZ WX HAD UNLIMITED CEILING AND VISIBILITY.) WE HAD A SAFE AND LEGAL FUEL LOAD BUT NOT MUCH MORE THAN THE REQUIREMENT. (THE RELEASE CALLED FOR 2561 LBS SO WE HAD ONLY 19 LBS EXTRA.) THIS 19 LBS WAS THE DIFFERENCE BTWN THE PLANNED ARR FUEL OF 1193 LBS AND THE 1174 LBS RESERVE. GIVEN THE REDUCED RWY AVAILABILITY AT ZZZZ; I WAS AWARE THAT I WOULD HAVE TO ACTIVELY MANAGE THE PROGRESS OF THE FLT TO ENSURE THAT WE WERE NOT PAINTED INTO A CORNER. I FORMULATED A SET OF BACKUP PLANS IN CASE AN EXPEDITIOUS ARR WAS NOT IN THE CARDS FOR US. WHEN WE WERE ABOUT 100 NM FROM ZZZZ; APCH ISSUED A VECTOR S TO INTERCEPT THE RADIAL. SINCE I WANTED TO CONSERVE OUR FUEL AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE; I FELT THAT IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY TO ADVISE MINIMUM FUEL AND REQUEST DIRECT ZZZZ. APCH GRANTED DIRECT. OUR FUEL CONSUMPTION WAS STILL ON TRACK WHEN WE PASSED ZZZZ1; SO WE CONTINUED TO ZZZZ. WHEN SWITCHED TO THE SECTOR CTLR; I REQUESTED RWY 26 'TFC PERMITTING.' AT THAT MOMENT I DID NOT THINK WE REQUIRED RWY 26; BUT IT HAD THE POTENTIAL TO CUT OUT A LOT OF MANEUVERING AND IT NEVER HURTS TO ASK. SHE SAID SHE WAS UNABLE DUE TO MULTIPLE DEPS AND ISSUED A VECTOR TO THE ILS 8. I SENSED THAT WE WERE BEING SET UP FOR A LONG DOWNWIND SO I TOLD HER THAT WE WERE MINIMUM FUEL IN CASE THE PREVIOUS CTLR HAD NOT PASSED THAT ALONG; AND SHE NOTED THAT SHE HAD NOT BEEN SO INFORMED. ABOUT 15 NM SE OF ZZZZ SHE SAID THAT THEY HAD WORKED OUT RWY 26 FOR US AND SWITCHED OUR FREQ. HE CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL TO RWY 26. AT THIS TIME WE WERE STILL ABOVE OUR RESERVE FUEL AND WE WERE #1 FOR THE RWY SO FUEL WAS NO LONGER MY MAIN CONCERN; THE QUICK CHANGE OF PLANS AND OUR ALT WITH RESPECT TO THE APCH PATH MADE A SUCCESSFUL APCH MY MAIN FOCUS. I CONCENTRATED ON ENSURING THAT THE FO (PF) MADE A STABLE APCH AND ACCEPTABLE LNDG. WE COMPLIED WITH STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA FOR A VISUAL APCH. FOCUSED ON THOSE TASKS; I DID NOT NOTE OUR EXACT FUEL ON TOUCHDOWN; BUT BASED ON THE FUEL WE HAD WHEN WE ARRIVED AT THE GATE; IT CAN BE ESTIMATED WITH HIGH CONFIDENCE THAT WE WERE ABOVE OUR RESERVE ON LNDG. DURING LNDG; WE HEARD TWR SAY THAT THERE WAS AN EMER IN PROGRESS. THIS IS THE FIRST INDICATION WE HAD THAT ATC WAS TREATING US AS AN EMER. I AM GLAD THAT THEY DID SO; BECAUSE IT ENSURED THAT WE DID NOT DIP INTO OUR RESERVES. IN THE BIT PICTURE; I THINK LNDG RWY 26 WAS THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION AND ATC HELPED US OUT A LOT BY GIVING US PRIORITY HANDLING; BUT IT WOULD NOT HAVE CREATED AN EMER IF THEY HAD NOT. AFTER LNDG; WE WERE ASKED TO CONTACT ATC VIA TELEPHONE. HE SAID THAT THEY SET ALERT #1 AS A CONSERVATIVE RESPONSE TO OUR MINIMUM FUEL ADVISORY. JUST AS WE HAD ADVISED MINIMUM FUEL TO ENSURE SAFETY OF FLT; THEY PROVIDED PRIORITY HANDLING TO ENSURE FLT SAFETY. HE ALSO SAID THAT A RPT HAD BEEN FILED WITH THE FSDO AS A ROUTINE DOCUMENTATION OF THE ALERT CONDITION. HE SAID THAT NO ONE WAS IN TROUBLE FOR THE EVENT; IMPLYING THAT THE RPT WAS NOT A DEV RPT. THIS EVENT IS A POSITIVE EXAMPLE OF THE SYS WORKING TO ENSURE FLT SAFETY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 684594: CAPT AND I HAD A CONVERSATION ABOUT THIS SITUATION. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT ZZZZ DID NOT NEED AN ALTERNATE ARPT IN REGARDS TO REGS; IT ALSO DID NOT NEED HOLD FUEL. I ADVISED HIM OF THE FUEL STATEMENT AND ASKED HIM IF HE WAS COMFORTABLE WITH THIS FUEL LOAD. HE ANSWERED YES AND ASKED ME TO DO WHATEVER I CAN. I WAS INFORMED THAT CAPT CALLED A MINIMUM FUEL ADVISORY; HOWEVER; I DID NOT RECEIVE A CALL NOR WAS I NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE CAPT ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT. THE FLT WAS DISPATCHED ACCORDING TO ALL FAA REGS AND ACR MANUALS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.