Narrative:

I briefed the approach and advised that since the WX had improved to near VFR that I would like to fly the approach on the FMS set on the left side while monitoring and backing up the data with the localizer tuned on the right side. We had descended below the overcast at 3000 ft and had the airport in sight while being vectored on downwind for the localizer back course approach. We had considered asking for the visual but I elected to continue as I had briefed so as to let the aircraft fly the approach on the FMS while monitoring the raw data on the right side. After the final vector toward the localizer we were advised to descend to 2700 ft until established and cleared for the approach. The copilot missed the call and it was at this time I realized that the copilot was preoccupied with the electronic flight bag and I had to advise him of the call and to set the altitude alerter. I then asked him to verify the altitude since he missed the first call I wanted to be sure we both heard it. We went through some scattered clouds after the vector and then had the airport in sight and good visibility for the balance of the approach. I was watching for a course capture on the FMS and realized; while xchking with the right side; that we were going to pass through the localizer without a capture. I then manually turned back to the localizer with the heading bug and xferred to the localizer on my side. As we began to recapture the localizer; I disengaged the autoplt and continued visually to the airport. Descending visually; I crossed the FAF for the approach approximately 200-300 ft below the 2300 ft listed on the approach and thought this may have brought a question from approach or tower; however; nothing was said; and I continued for landing. From the point we were given the descend to 2700 ft and cleared for the approach did the PNF make a call of any kind -- I observed him 'watching' the approach on the electronic flight bag and had to ask for distances and altitudes -- he simply was not part of the process. After landing we debriefed on my observations and I requested that in the future he would make the appropriate calls even if we were continuing visually. As for the failure to capture the course with the FMS I am still not sure -- the settings were; to the best of my knowledge; correct and the capture armed as the same as I had done on other approachs with no problems encountered. I had previously addressed his preoccupation with the electronic flight bag and had explained that it is not a priority in our cockpit procedures. We operate with paper copies of all approachs and use of the electronic flight bag is not a requirement for displaying information. As more operators shift to the use of the electronic flight bag as a means of displaying approach and en route data it is critical that the basic; fundamental procedures and higher priority operations come before the non essential method of displaying approach information. This type of distraction is similar to the shift to glass cockpit technology when the preoccupation with the features often interfered with the need to satisfy the basic fundamentals of flying the aircraft before worrying about the wizardry of the new equipment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: G-IV FLT CREW CROSSED FAF 300 FT LOW WHEN CLRED FOR AN ILS; CITING ELECTRONIC FLT BAG DISTR AS A FACTOR.

Narrative: I BRIEFED THE APCH AND ADVISED THAT SINCE THE WX HAD IMPROVED TO NEAR VFR THAT I WOULD LIKE TO FLY THE APCH ON THE FMS SET ON THE L SIDE WHILE MONITORING AND BACKING UP THE DATA WITH THE LOC TUNED ON THE R SIDE. WE HAD DSNDED BELOW THE OVCST AT 3000 FT AND HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT WHILE BEING VECTORED ON DOWNWIND FOR THE LOC BACK COURSE APCH. WE HAD CONSIDERED ASKING FOR THE VISUAL BUT I ELECTED TO CONTINUE AS I HAD BRIEFED SO AS TO LET THE ACFT FLY THE APCH ON THE FMS WHILE MONITORING THE RAW DATA ON THE R SIDE. AFTER THE FINAL VECTOR TOWARD THE LOC WE WERE ADVISED TO DSND TO 2700 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED AND CLRED FOR THE APCH. THE COPLT MISSED THE CALL AND IT WAS AT THIS TIME I REALIZED THAT THE COPLT WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE ELECTRONIC FLT BAG AND I HAD TO ADVISE HIM OF THE CALL AND TO SET THE ALT ALERTER. I THEN ASKED HIM TO VERIFY THE ALT SINCE HE MISSED THE FIRST CALL I WANTED TO BE SURE WE BOTH HEARD IT. WE WENT THROUGH SOME SCATTERED CLOUDS AFTER THE VECTOR AND THEN HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND GOOD VISIBILITY FOR THE BAL OF THE APCH. I WAS WATCHING FOR A COURSE CAPTURE ON THE FMS AND REALIZED; WHILE XCHKING WITH THE R SIDE; THAT WE WERE GOING TO PASS THROUGH THE LOC WITHOUT A CAPTURE. I THEN MANUALLY TURNED BACK TO THE LOC WITH THE HDG BUG AND XFERRED TO THE LOC ON MY SIDE. AS WE BEGAN TO RECAPTURE THE LOC; I DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND CONTINUED VISUALLY TO THE ARPT. DSNDING VISUALLY; I CROSSED THE FAF FOR THE APCH APPROX 200-300 FT BELOW THE 2300 FT LISTED ON THE APCH AND THOUGHT THIS MAY HAVE BROUGHT A QUESTION FROM APCH OR TWR; HOWEVER; NOTHING WAS SAID; AND I CONTINUED FOR LNDG. FROM THE POINT WE WERE GIVEN THE DSND TO 2700 FT AND CLRED FOR THE APCH DID THE PNF MAKE A CALL OF ANY KIND -- I OBSERVED HIM 'WATCHING' THE APCH ON THE ELECTRONIC FLT BAG AND HAD TO ASK FOR DISTANCES AND ALTS -- HE SIMPLY WAS NOT PART OF THE PROCESS. AFTER LNDG WE DEBRIEFED ON MY OBSERVATIONS AND I REQUESTED THAT IN THE FUTURE HE WOULD MAKE THE APPROPRIATE CALLS EVEN IF WE WERE CONTINUING VISUALLY. AS FOR THE FAILURE TO CAPTURE THE COURSE WITH THE FMS I AM STILL NOT SURE -- THE SETTINGS WERE; TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE; CORRECT AND THE CAPTURE ARMED AS THE SAME AS I HAD DONE ON OTHER APCHS WITH NO PROBS ENCOUNTERED. I HAD PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED HIS PREOCCUPATION WITH THE ELECTRONIC FLT BAG AND HAD EXPLAINED THAT IT IS NOT A PRIORITY IN OUR COCKPIT PROCS. WE OPERATE WITH PAPER COPIES OF ALL APCHS AND USE OF THE ELECTRONIC FLT BAG IS NOT A REQUIREMENT FOR DISPLAYING INFO. AS MORE OPERATORS SHIFT TO THE USE OF THE ELECTRONIC FLT BAG AS A MEANS OF DISPLAYING APCH AND ENRTE DATA IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE BASIC; FUNDAMENTAL PROCS AND HIGHER PRIORITY OPS COME BEFORE THE NON ESSENTIAL METHOD OF DISPLAYING APCH INFO. THIS TYPE OF DISTR IS SIMILAR TO THE SHIFT TO GLASS COCKPIT TECHNOLOGY WHEN THE PREOCCUPATION WITH THE FEATURES OFTEN INTERFERED WITH THE NEED TO SATISFY THE BASIC FUNDAMENTALS OF FLYING THE ACFT BEFORE WORRYING ABOUT THE WIZARDRY OF THE NEW EQUIP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.