Narrative:

Not until jan/mon/06 have I flown with raas; but I have jump seated where I clearly saw the disruption it caused within the cockpit. It was only when I was flying; with both me and my first officer using noise-canceling headsets; that I realized further the extent of the safety hazard created by raas. After being cleared onto the runway for takeoff; I called for the takeoff checklist. Midway into the checklist; raas announced we were approaching runway 16L and turns off the intercom; causing confusion and misdirected attention on an active runway while we try to figure out why we couldn't hear each other. It wasn't just that we couldn't hear each other over the loud raas speaker; which is what many of the comments below refer to; but the intercom was actually shut off during the raas announcement. We did not have any co-mingling during the flight or tower/ground transmissions and raas to know if radio reception and transmission is also cut off electronically during a raas announcement. But since there is a problem with the intercom; it's critical to find out how else raas is interfering electronically with aircraft communications avionics. I can't imagine the FAA would knowingly approve electronic cutoff of outgoing and incoming radio transmissions and intercom by any cockpit system? Raas is fatally flawed in its philosophical approach and electronic design. It will one day cause with tragic results what it is trying to prevent; a runway incursion. It needs to be taken off our aircraft as soon as possible.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 PLT COMMENTS ON THE COMS CONFLICTS CAUSED BY RAAS ANNUNCIATION POTENTIALLY CREATING A TRAGEDY IT WAS DESIGNED TO PREVENT.

Narrative: NOT UNTIL JAN/MON/06 HAVE I FLOWN WITH RAAS; BUT I HAVE JUMP SEATED WHERE I CLEARLY SAW THE DISRUPTION IT CAUSED WITHIN THE COCKPIT. IT WAS ONLY WHEN I WAS FLYING; WITH BOTH ME AND MY FO USING NOISE-CANCELING HEADSETS; THAT I REALIZED FURTHER THE EXTENT OF THE SAFETY HAZARD CREATED BY RAAS. AFTER BEING CLRED ONTO THE RWY FOR TAKEOFF; I CALLED FOR THE TAKEOFF CHKLIST. MIDWAY INTO THE CHKLIST; RAAS ANNOUNCED WE WERE APCHING RWY 16L AND TURNS OFF THE INTERCOM; CAUSING CONFUSION AND MISDIRECTED ATTENTION ON AN ACTIVE RWY WHILE WE TRY TO FIGURE OUT WHY WE COULDN'T HEAR EACH OTHER. IT WASN'T JUST THAT WE COULDN'T HEAR EACH OTHER OVER THE LOUD RAAS SPEAKER; WHICH IS WHAT MANY OF THE COMMENTS BELOW REFER TO; BUT THE INTERCOM WAS ACTUALLY SHUT OFF DURING THE RAAS ANNOUNCEMENT. WE DID NOT HAVE ANY CO-MINGLING DURING THE FLT OR TWR/GND TRANSMISSIONS AND RAAS TO KNOW IF RADIO RECEPTION AND TRANSMISSION IS ALSO CUT OFF ELECTRONICALLY DURING A RAAS ANNOUNCEMENT. BUT SINCE THERE IS A PROB WITH THE INTERCOM; IT'S CRITICAL TO FIND OUT HOW ELSE RAAS IS INTERFERING ELECTRONICALLY WITH ACFT COMS AVIONICS. I CAN'T IMAGINE THE FAA WOULD KNOWINGLY APPROVE ELECTRONIC CUTOFF OF OUTGOING AND INCOMING RADIO TRANSMISSIONS AND INTERCOM BY ANY COCKPIT SYSTEM? RAAS IS FATALLY FLAWED IN ITS PHILOSOPHICAL APCH AND ELECTRONIC DESIGN. IT WILL ONE DAY CAUSE WITH TRAGIC RESULTS WHAT IT IS TRYING TO PREVENT; A RWY INCURSION. IT NEEDS TO BE TAKEN OFF OUR ACFT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.