Narrative:

I was the captain. Dispatch comments included a 'brake torque limiter control' inoperative on the left body gear; aft inboard wheel. We were planned with no severe WX en route. The 'final weights' gave us a takeoff gross of 873.9 pounds which allowed an assumed temperature of 33 degrees C and a small reduction in takeoff EPR to 1.51 at flaps 10 degrees. It was a long taxi on a hot day which I assume was a contributing factor to our eventual problem. All checklists were accomplished in order. At approximately 120 KTS on the takeoff roll; we felt a noticeably strong vibration in the yoke -- similar to a nosewheel shimmy. Our takeoff speeds were: V1 149 KTS; vr 165 KTS; and V2 178 KTS. With no other cockpit indications to accompany the vibration; I allowed the takeoff to continue rather than risk a high speed abort; heavy weight; on a hot day. When the PF announced 'positive climb; gear up' I gave a quick consideration to leaving the gear down; however; our departure was over the city and debris from the tire could have been an issue. I also considered the performance consequences of a resultant engine failure. I raised the gear and quickly looked at the EICAS synoptic for gear. The doors had closed properly; and brake temperatures all showed zero. The hydraulic synoptic showed quantities steady. Once we received the turn eastward; we began to analyze our situation. The first officer continued to fly the aircraft; I communicated with ATC; and the relief pilot called back to the tower to ask if they had noticed any problems with our takeoff. Tower confirmed a possible blown tire with rubber on the runway. Tower advised us that they were closing the runway for the cleanup. The flight attendants called me to report 2-3 'pops' during takeoff; with noise and vibration on both sides of the aircraft. At this point it was obvious that we had lost at least 1 tire; and; at over 860.0 pounds gross weight; we were faced with dumping 230.0 pounds of fuel and returning; or continuing on to destination; or possibly diverting. We checked both the handbook and the company operations manual for any procedures that might apply to our situation -- we found none. I contacted dispatch via satcom to discuss our options. All hydraulics; electrics; and flight controls were normal; as was pressurization. The aircraft was handling properly with no vibrations; so; it was agreed that we should continue to destination as planned. I discussed with dispatch the runway preference for destination; even though the forecast was for a possible switch to another runway. We agreed that it was not necessary to declare an 'emergency;' and that a normal landing was anticipated. Although an 'emergency' was not declared; I thought it prudent to have at least 1 fire truck available to assist us as needed. I called the purser to the cockpit and after she informed the cabin crew; I made a PA announcement to the passenger explaining the problem; the status of the aircraft; and the plan. The flight progressed smoothly across the ocean. About 1 hour prior to touchdown; I again contacted dispatch to see if operations had any additional information that might help us determine how many tires were involved. To our surprise; the new guess was that we may have lost up to 3 tires; and that the debris field we left behind extended 1500 meters! That prompted my concern on landing controllability. ATC then unilaterally declared us an 'emergency' aircraft and planned to deploy the whole armada of emergency equipment associated with that status. We briefed a flaps 30 degree approach using no autobrakes. Arrival ATIS reflected a 500 ft ceiling with drizzle and wind 100 degrees at 5 KTS; a slight tailwind. We again checked landing performance with up to 10 KTS tailwind and had more than enough margin. Once again I called the purser to the cockpit to finalize approach plans with the cabin crew. She reviewed our briefing with her crew. We briefed the evacuate/evacuation procedure should it become necessary. I then made a PA announcement to reassure the passenger of our arrival plans. I elected to fly the approach and landing; and an uneventful rollout with minimal vibration was noted. We cleared the runway at taxiway as planned. Maintenance connected a headset to the aircraft and informed us that the right body gear; aft inboard tire had blown; and that we wouldbe towed to the gate. There was only 1 tire blown; but the debris had punched 2 small holes in the fuselage and there was a dent in the gear door. We conducted the 'tow in' additional procedure; and were towed to an uneventful parking at the gate.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B747-400 EXPERIENCE BODY GEAR TIRE FAILURE PRIOR TO V1 ON TKOF. OPT TO CONTINUE TKOF DUE TO HIGH SPD ABORT CONSIDERATIONS. FLY TO DEST AND LAND SAFELY UNDER EMER CONDITIONS.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT. DISPATCH COMMENTS INCLUDED A 'BRAKE TORQUE LIMITER CTL' INOP ON THE L BODY GEAR; AFT INBOARD WHEEL. WE WERE PLANNED WITH NO SEVERE WX ENRTE. THE 'FINAL WTS' GAVE US A TKOF GROSS OF 873.9 LBS WHICH ALLOWED AN ASSUMED TEMP OF 33 DEGS C AND A SMALL REDUCTION IN TKOF EPR TO 1.51 AT FLAPS 10 DEGS. IT WAS A LONG TAXI ON A HOT DAY WHICH I ASSUME WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO OUR EVENTUAL PROB. ALL CHKLISTS WERE ACCOMPLISHED IN ORDER. AT APPROX 120 KTS ON THE TKOF ROLL; WE FELT A NOTICEABLY STRONG VIBRATION IN THE YOKE -- SIMILAR TO A NOSEWHEEL SHIMMY. OUR TKOF SPDS WERE: V1 149 KTS; VR 165 KTS; AND V2 178 KTS. WITH NO OTHER COCKPIT INDICATIONS TO ACCOMPANY THE VIBRATION; I ALLOWED THE TKOF TO CONTINUE RATHER THAN RISK A HIGH SPD ABORT; HVY WT; ON A HOT DAY. WHEN THE PF ANNOUNCED 'POSITIVE CLB; GEAR UP' I GAVE A QUICK CONSIDERATION TO LEAVING THE GEAR DOWN; HOWEVER; OUR DEP WAS OVER THE CITY AND DEBRIS FROM THE TIRE COULD HAVE BEEN AN ISSUE. I ALSO CONSIDERED THE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES OF A RESULTANT ENG FAILURE. I RAISED THE GEAR AND QUICKLY LOOKED AT THE EICAS SYNOPTIC FOR GEAR. THE DOORS HAD CLOSED PROPERLY; AND BRAKE TEMPS ALL SHOWED ZERO. THE HYD SYNOPTIC SHOWED QUANTITIES STEADY. ONCE WE RECEIVED THE TURN EASTWARD; WE BEGAN TO ANALYZE OUR SIT. THE FO CONTINUED TO FLY THE ACFT; I COMMUNICATED WITH ATC; AND THE RELIEF PLT CALLED BACK TO THE TWR TO ASK IF THEY HAD NOTICED ANY PROBS WITH OUR TKOF. TWR CONFIRMED A POSSIBLE BLOWN TIRE WITH RUBBER ON THE RWY. TWR ADVISED US THAT THEY WERE CLOSING THE RWY FOR THE CLEANUP. THE FLT ATTENDANTS CALLED ME TO RPT 2-3 'POPS' DURING TKOF; WITH NOISE AND VIBRATION ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ACFT. AT THIS POINT IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WE HAD LOST AT LEAST 1 TIRE; AND; AT OVER 860.0 LBS GROSS WT; WE WERE FACED WITH DUMPING 230.0 LBS OF FUEL AND RETURNING; OR CONTINUING ON TO DEST; OR POSSIBLY DIVERTING. WE CHKED BOTH THE HANDBOOK AND THE COMPANY OPS MANUAL FOR ANY PROCS THAT MIGHT APPLY TO OUR SIT -- WE FOUND NONE. I CONTACTED DISPATCH VIA SATCOM TO DISCUSS OUR OPTIONS. ALL HYDS; ELECTRICS; AND FLT CTLS WERE NORMAL; AS WAS PRESSURIZATION. THE ACFT WAS HANDLING PROPERLY WITH NO VIBRATIONS; SO; IT WAS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO DEST AS PLANNED. I DISCUSSED WITH DISPATCH THE RWY PREFERENCE FOR DEST; EVEN THOUGH THE FORECAST WAS FOR A POSSIBLE SWITCH TO ANOTHER RWY. WE AGREED THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO DECLARE AN 'EMER;' AND THAT A NORMAL LNDG WAS ANTICIPATED. ALTHOUGH AN 'EMER' WAS NOT DECLARED; I THOUGHT IT PRUDENT TO HAVE AT LEAST 1 FIRE TRUCK AVAILABLE TO ASSIST US AS NEEDED. I CALLED THE PURSER TO THE COCKPIT AND AFTER SHE INFORMED THE CABIN CREW; I MADE A PA ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX EXPLAINING THE PROB; THE STATUS OF THE ACFT; AND THE PLAN. THE FLT PROGRESSED SMOOTHLY ACROSS THE OCEAN. ABOUT 1 HR PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN; I AGAIN CONTACTED DISPATCH TO SEE IF OPS HAD ANY ADDITIONAL INFO THAT MIGHT HELP US DETERMINE HOW MANY TIRES WERE INVOLVED. TO OUR SURPRISE; THE NEW GUESS WAS THAT WE MAY HAVE LOST UP TO 3 TIRES; AND THAT THE DEBRIS FIELD WE LEFT BEHIND EXTENDED 1500 METERS! THAT PROMPTED MY CONCERN ON LNDG CONTROLLABILITY. ATC THEN UNILATERALLY DECLARED US AN 'EMER' ACFT AND PLANNED TO DEPLOY THE WHOLE ARMADA OF EMER EQUIP ASSOCIATED WITH THAT STATUS. WE BRIEFED A FLAPS 30 DEG APCH USING NO AUTOBRAKES. ARR ATIS REFLECTED A 500 FT CEILING WITH DRIZZLE AND WIND 100 DEGS AT 5 KTS; A SLIGHT TAILWIND. WE AGAIN CHKED LNDG PERFORMANCE WITH UP TO 10 KTS TAILWIND AND HAD MORE THAN ENOUGH MARGIN. ONCE AGAIN I CALLED THE PURSER TO THE COCKPIT TO FINALIZE APCH PLANS WITH THE CABIN CREW. SHE REVIEWED OUR BRIEFING WITH HER CREW. WE BRIEFED THE EVAC PROC SHOULD IT BECOME NECESSARY. I THEN MADE A PA ANNOUNCEMENT TO REASSURE THE PAX OF OUR ARR PLANS. I ELECTED TO FLY THE APCH AND LNDG; AND AN UNEVENTFUL ROLLOUT WITH MINIMAL VIBRATION WAS NOTED. WE CLRED THE RWY AT TXWY AS PLANNED. MAINT CONNECTED A HEADSET TO THE ACFT AND INFORMED US THAT THE R BODY GEAR; AFT INBOARD TIRE HAD BLOWN; AND THAT WE WOULDBE TOWED TO THE GATE. THERE WAS ONLY 1 TIRE BLOWN; BUT THE DEBRIS HAD PUNCHED 2 SMALL HOLES IN THE FUSELAGE AND THERE WAS A DENT IN THE GEAR DOOR. WE CONDUCTED THE 'TOW IN' ADDITIONAL PROC; AND WERE TOWED TO AN UNEVENTFUL PARKING AT THE GATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.