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Attributes | |
ACN | 686351 |
Time | |
Date | 200601 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : parked ground : maintenance |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 252 flight time total : 17500 flight time type : 2291 |
ASRS Report | 686351 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | maintenance : technician |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe non adherence : company policies |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | performance deficiency : inspection |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Maintenance Human Performance Flight Crew Human Performance Chart Or Publication |
Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance |
Narrative:
Commenced cockpit preflight at XA25. Approximately XA35; first officer stated 'appears to be evidence of a bird strike on the left flap outboard of the #1 engine.' he further stated he would 'call it in' due short time frame for departure. After he called maintenance; I asked him to send a code since I had just finished loading the 'box.' at about XA50; I saw a mechanic driving up in a lift truck; and 2 other mechanics walking a min or so behind. The mechanic checked in on the 'int' headset and asked that I run the flaps down. I told him 'no; I was unable' and he asked why. I stated that I was concerned with the safety and liability aspect of doing that before all the checklists were done. I told him that this appeared to be a 2 mechanic operation and I was uncomfortable doing this maintenance evolution. I said he could send up a mechanic to run the flaps down now. It seemed appropriate since the plane had overnighted and had been given a 'thorough inspection' for the layover. He replied; and I quote '...baby; acting like a little kid...when can you do it?' I replied 'about when the door closes' since it was just a few mins until scheduled departure; he stated he would wait. As soon as the customer service representative closed the door without notice to the cockpit; about XA57 and again the mechanic directed me to 'run the flaps down.' I told him no; he asked can the copilot do it and I replied 'not while I am here before the checklist is done.' I had purposely delayed the checklist in order to conform to our passenger policy of not tying the customers to their seat; since there was an ongoing maintenance issue. The customer service representative opened the door about this time to board additional passenger and the door remained open until the inspection was complete. The mechanic also said some words to the effect that he had been here 39 yrs and had given up a lot more than I had. I told him that he would still need another mechanic. About this time (XA59) I observed the lift truck departing and 2 other mechanics walking away from the aircraft. I went to the customer service representative podium and called maintenance control and explained the current situation to the controller and he advised that he would call. Shortly after this; I observed what appeared to be 2 supervisors (#1 and #2) (by the presence of 2-WAY radios) approaching the aircraft. Supervisor #1 appeared in the cockpit; did not introduce himself but asked numerous questions. He was not displaying an identify on the upper portion of his body; so I don't know his name. I explained the situation as I saw it to him and he appeared to have already made up his mind and came across as bullying; hostile and intimidating he advised me that 'pilots do this all the time; they even do engine runs for us without running checklists.' next; supervisor #2 advised me that I needed 'to vacate the cockpit' to which I complied and waited in the jetbridge. A fourth mechanic showed up sneered as he passed me and stated that 'we don't even have mechanics working with your seniority' after looking at my crew identify and badge expiration date. The inspection ws completed I assumed since the mechanic left without a word and supervisor #2 threatened me upon exiting the aircraft and stated 'we know your name; your name's gonna be passed around the maintenance base.' I re-entered the cockpit; the customer service representative closed the door at about XB20 and the push crew checked in and we pushed at XB24; waited for the release stamped 28/XB28 received via ACARS at XB30 and we took the salute; and taxied out. The lack of finding a bird strike on the overnight I/O inspection led up to the event. It seems with the maintenance control reaction there would be 3 things noted: 1) don't write up discrepancies (not allowed). 2) comply with maintenance control without question and do as supervisor #1 stated 'pilots do this all the time; without running checklists....' (not acceptable). 3) maintenance control send out the requisite number of mechanics to complete an inspection independent of the flight crew; without perceived coercion; intimidation and hostility towards any other employees including flight crews. The basis of #3 comes from over 20 yrs of experience in aircraft maintenance (a&P with inspection authority/authorized); safety and accident investigation over an 8 yr period; numerous seminars with the FAA; and formal university and military training in maintenance and aircraft accident investigation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN A320 CREW PRIOR TO DEP RPTED A POSSIBLE BIRD STRIKE ON AN OUTBOARD FLAP. CAPT REFUSED TO LOWER FLAPS UNTIL COCKPIT CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED.
Narrative: COMMENCED COCKPIT PREFLT AT XA25. APPROX XA35; FO STATED 'APPEARS TO BE EVIDENCE OF A BIRD STRIKE ON THE L FLAP OUTBOARD OF THE #1 ENG.' HE FURTHER STATED HE WOULD 'CALL IT IN' DUE SHORT TIME FRAME FOR DEP. AFTER HE CALLED MAINT; I ASKED HIM TO SEND A CODE SINCE I HAD JUST FINISHED LOADING THE 'BOX.' AT ABOUT XA50; I SAW A MECH DRIVING UP IN A LIFT TRUCK; AND 2 OTHER MECHS WALKING A MIN OR SO BEHIND. THE MECH CHKED IN ON THE 'INT' HEADSET AND ASKED THAT I RUN THE FLAPS DOWN. I TOLD HIM 'NO; I WAS UNABLE' AND HE ASKED WHY. I STATED THAT I WAS CONCERNED WITH THE SAFETY AND LIABILITY ASPECT OF DOING THAT BEFORE ALL THE CHKLISTS WERE DONE. I TOLD HIM THAT THIS APPEARED TO BE A 2 MECH OP AND I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE DOING THIS MAINT EVOLUTION. I SAID HE COULD SEND UP A MECH TO RUN THE FLAPS DOWN NOW. IT SEEMED APPROPRIATE SINCE THE PLANE HAD OVERNIGHTED AND HAD BEEN GIVEN A 'THOROUGH INSPECTION' FOR THE LAYOVER. HE REPLIED; AND I QUOTE '...BABY; ACTING LIKE A LITTLE KID...WHEN CAN YOU DO IT?' I REPLIED 'ABOUT WHEN THE DOOR CLOSES' SINCE IT WAS JUST A FEW MINS UNTIL SCHEDULED DEP; HE STATED HE WOULD WAIT. AS SOON AS THE CUSTOMER SVC REPRESENTATIVE CLOSED THE DOOR WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE COCKPIT; ABOUT XA57 AND AGAIN THE MECH DIRECTED ME TO 'RUN THE FLAPS DOWN.' I TOLD HIM NO; HE ASKED CAN THE COPLT DO IT AND I REPLIED 'NOT WHILE I AM HERE BEFORE THE CHKLIST IS DONE.' I HAD PURPOSELY DELAYED THE CHKLIST IN ORDER TO CONFORM TO OUR PAX POLICY OF NOT TYING THE CUSTOMERS TO THEIR SEAT; SINCE THERE WAS AN ONGOING MAINT ISSUE. THE CUSTOMER SVC REPRESENTATIVE OPENED THE DOOR ABOUT THIS TIME TO BOARD ADDITIONAL PAX AND THE DOOR REMAINED OPEN UNTIL THE INSPECTION WAS COMPLETE. THE MECH ALSO SAID SOME WORDS TO THE EFFECT THAT HE HAD BEEN HERE 39 YRS AND HAD GIVEN UP A LOT MORE THAN I HAD. I TOLD HIM THAT HE WOULD STILL NEED ANOTHER MECH. ABOUT THIS TIME (XA59) I OBSERVED THE LIFT TRUCK DEPARTING AND 2 OTHER MECHS WALKING AWAY FROM THE ACFT. I WENT TO THE CUSTOMER SVC REPRESENTATIVE PODIUM AND CALLED MAINT CTL AND EXPLAINED THE CURRENT SITUATION TO THE CTLR AND HE ADVISED THAT HE WOULD CALL. SHORTLY AFTER THIS; I OBSERVED WHAT APPEARED TO BE 2 SUPVRS (#1 AND #2) (BY THE PRESENCE OF 2-WAY RADIOS) APCHING THE ACFT. SUPVR #1 APPEARED IN THE COCKPIT; DID NOT INTRODUCE HIMSELF BUT ASKED NUMEROUS QUESTIONS. HE WAS NOT DISPLAYING AN IDENT ON THE UPPER PORTION OF HIS BODY; SO I DON'T KNOW HIS NAME. I EXPLAINED THE SITUATION AS I SAW IT TO HIM AND HE APPEARED TO HAVE ALREADY MADE UP HIS MIND AND CAME ACROSS AS BULLYING; HOSTILE AND INTIMIDATING HE ADVISED ME THAT 'PLTS DO THIS ALL THE TIME; THEY EVEN DO ENG RUNS FOR US WITHOUT RUNNING CHKLISTS.' NEXT; SUPVR #2 ADVISED ME THAT I NEEDED 'TO VACATE THE COCKPIT' TO WHICH I COMPLIED AND WAITED IN THE JETBRIDGE. A FOURTH MECH SHOWED UP SNEERED AS HE PASSED ME AND STATED THAT 'WE DON'T EVEN HAVE MECHS WORKING WITH YOUR SENIORITY' AFTER LOOKING AT MY CREW IDENT AND BADGE EXPIRATION DATE. THE INSPECTION WS COMPLETED I ASSUMED SINCE THE MECH LEFT WITHOUT A WORD AND SUPVR #2 THREATENED ME UPON EXITING THE ACFT AND STATED 'WE KNOW YOUR NAME; YOUR NAME'S GONNA BE PASSED AROUND THE MAINT BASE.' I RE-ENTERED THE COCKPIT; THE CUSTOMER SVC REPRESENTATIVE CLOSED THE DOOR AT ABOUT XB20 AND THE PUSH CREW CHKED IN AND WE PUSHED AT XB24; WAITED FOR THE RELEASE STAMPED 28/XB28 RECEIVED VIA ACARS AT XB30 AND WE TOOK THE SALUTE; AND TAXIED OUT. THE LACK OF FINDING A BIRD STRIKE ON THE OVERNIGHT I/O INSPECTION LED UP TO THE EVENT. IT SEEMS WITH THE MAINT CTL REACTION THERE WOULD BE 3 THINGS NOTED: 1) DON'T WRITE UP DISCREPANCIES (NOT ALLOWED). 2) COMPLY WITH MAINT CTL WITHOUT QUESTION AND DO AS SUPVR #1 STATED 'PLTS DO THIS ALL THE TIME; WITHOUT RUNNING CHKLISTS....' (NOT ACCEPTABLE). 3) MAINT CTL SEND OUT THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF MECHS TO COMPLETE AN INSPECTION INDEPENDENT OF THE FLT CREW; WITHOUT PERCEIVED COERCION; INTIMIDATION AND HOSTILITY TOWARDS ANY OTHER EMPLOYEES INCLUDING FLT CREWS. THE BASIS OF #3 COMES FROM OVER 20 YRS OF EXPERIENCE IN ACFT MAINT (A&P WITH INSPECTION AUTH); SAFETY AND ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION OVER AN 8 YR PERIOD; NUMEROUS SEMINARS WITH THE FAA; AND FORMAL UNIVERSITY AND MIL TRAINING IN MAINT AND ACFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.