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Attributes | |
ACN | 686541 |
Time | |
Date | 200602 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : zhu.artcc |
State Reference | TX |
Altitude | msl single value : 29000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Weather Elements | Rain |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zhu.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 140 ER&LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | cruise : level |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 686541 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical inflight encounter : weather other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : eicas warning other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : overcame equipment problem |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Environmental Factor Flight Crew Human Performance Aircraft Weather |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
Flight was conducted at night. WX radar and forecasts indicated heavy rain and moderate turbulence along route of flight. Elected lower cruise at FL250 (planned FL330); due to reported better rides. Initial cruise was occasional to intermittent light chop in light to moderate rain. Approximately 40 minutes into flight; turbulence and rain began to increase. Reports indicated better rides higher; so crew obtained clearance and climbed to FL290. Once established in cruise at FL290 with captain as PNF; pfd 'IAS' comparator flag came into view on both pfd's; along with EICAS 'sps advanced' caution. Using the stndby instrumentation (isis); it was evident that first officer's IAS (indicating 261) was incorrect (captain's and isis read 237 IAS). Changed airspeed several times; both increase and decrease; to determine what the nature of the problem was and determined the first officer's IAS read 261 IAS regardless of actual aircraft speed. IAS comparator and sps functions responded predictably during each change of airspeed; extinguishing when actual speed; as judged by remaining instrumentation; neared 261 IAS and illuminating when speed discrepancy again existed. Before we could begin to accomplish aom procedures; ATC directed descent; so captain assumed PF duties while first officer referred to aom. During descent; first officer's IAS indication decreased with aircraft altitude until IAS read less than 95 KIAS. Shortly thereafter; EICAS 'cas message' caution appeared; followed by autoplt disengagement and 'autoplt fail' EICAS warning and aural warning (yd reengaged successfully). First officer observed red X over IAS; altitude; and vs displays on his pfd. First officer selected reversionary mode; and successfully regained valid instrumentation from ADC1. No air data computer-related message ever appeared on the EICAS. Maintenance controller asked whether the flight had been operating in heavy rain. Upon learning that it had; the controller observed that this type of failure was known to occur in conjunction with heavy rain. It appears; pending maintenance troubleshooting; that one contributing factor may be a weakness of the aircraft in dealing with heavy rain. The weakness should be known to pilots so they can be aware of the potential for this type of failure and be prepared to take action. Also; the aom coverage of the IAS indication problems seems very sketchy. It also does not prepare the crew for potential loss of the autoplt. It is not readily evident when reversionary mode should be selected.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the flight manual was of little help in solving the equipment failure. Additionally; there is no warning that this may occur in heavy rain in the manual. He was particularly concerned that if one side failed during heavy rain; the chance of both failing was good with potential serious consequences; adding the fact that maintenance indicated it has happened before.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: EMB140 FLT CREW HAS THE LOSS OF FO'S AIRSPD AND ALT INDICATION DURING ENTRY INTO HVY RAIN. EICAS WARNINGS FOR SPD COMPARISON; AUTOPLT LOSS AND YAW DAMPER ILLUMINATED. THE FO; PF; SHOWED RED X'S (FLAGS) ON THE IAS AND ALT INDICATION.
Narrative: FLT WAS CONDUCTED AT NIGHT. WX RADAR AND FORECASTS INDICATED HVY RAIN AND MODERATE TURB ALONG RTE OF FLT. ELECTED LOWER CRUISE AT FL250 (PLANNED FL330); DUE TO RPTED BETTER RIDES. INITIAL CRUISE WAS OCCASIONAL TO INTERMITTENT LIGHT CHOP IN LIGHT TO MODERATE RAIN. APPROX 40 MINUTES INTO FLT; TURB AND RAIN BEGAN TO INCREASE. RPTS INDICATED BETTER RIDES HIGHER; SO CREW OBTAINED CLRNC AND CLBED TO FL290. ONCE ESTABLISHED IN CRUISE AT FL290 WITH CAPT AS PNF; PFD 'IAS' COMPARATOR FLAG CAME INTO VIEW ON BOTH PFD'S; ALONG WITH EICAS 'SPS ADVANCED' CAUTION. USING THE STNDBY INSTRUMENTATION (ISIS); IT WAS EVIDENT THAT FO'S IAS (INDICATING 261) WAS INCORRECT (CAPT'S AND ISIS READ 237 IAS). CHANGED AIRSPD SEVERAL TIMES; BOTH INCREASE AND DECREASE; TO DETERMINE WHAT THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM WAS AND DETERMINED THE FO'S IAS READ 261 IAS REGARDLESS OF ACTUAL ACFT SPD. IAS COMPARATOR AND SPS FUNCTIONS RESPONDED PREDICTABLY DURING EACH CHANGE OF AIRSPD; EXTINGUISHING WHEN ACTUAL SPD; AS JUDGED BY REMAINING INSTRUMENTATION; NEARED 261 IAS AND ILLUMINATING WHEN SPD DISCREPANCY AGAIN EXISTED. BEFORE WE COULD BEGIN TO ACCOMPLISH AOM PROCS; ATC DIRECTED DSCNT; SO CAPT ASSUMED PF DUTIES WHILE FO REFERRED TO AOM. DURING DSCNT; FO'S IAS INDICATION DECREASED WITH ACFT ALT UNTIL IAS READ LESS THAN 95 KIAS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; EICAS 'CAS MESSAGE' CAUTION APPEARED; FOLLOWED BY AUTOPLT DISENGAGEMENT AND 'AUTOPLT FAIL' EICAS WARNING AND AURAL WARNING (YD REENGAGED SUCCESSFULLY). FO OBSERVED RED X OVER IAS; ALT; AND VS DISPLAYS ON HIS PFD. FO SELECTED REVERSIONARY MODE; AND SUCCESSFULLY REGAINED VALID INSTRUMENTATION FROM ADC1. NO ADC-RELATED MESSAGE EVER APPEARED ON THE EICAS. MAINT CTLR ASKED WHETHER THE FLT HAD BEEN OPERATING IN HVY RAIN. UPON LEARNING THAT IT HAD; THE CTLR OBSERVED THAT THIS TYPE OF FAILURE WAS KNOWN TO OCCUR IN CONJUNCTION WITH HVY RAIN. IT APPEARS; PENDING MAINT TROUBLESHOOTING; THAT ONE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR MAY BE A WEAKNESS OF THE ACFT IN DEALING WITH HVY RAIN. THE WEAKNESS SHOULD BE KNOWN TO PLTS SO THEY CAN BE AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL FOR THIS TYPE OF FAILURE AND BE PREPARED TO TAKE ACTION. ALSO; THE AOM COVERAGE OF THE IAS INDICATION PROBLEMS SEEMS VERY SKETCHY. IT ALSO DOES NOT PREPARE THE CREW FOR POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE AUTOPLT. IT IS NOT READILY EVIDENT WHEN REVERSIONARY MODE SHOULD BE SELECTED.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FLT MANUAL WAS OF LITTLE HELP IN SOLVING THE EQUIP FAILURE. ADDITIONALLY; THERE IS NO WARNING THAT THIS MAY OCCUR IN HVY RAIN IN THE MANUAL. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT IF ONE SIDE FAILED DURING HVY RAIN; THE CHANCE OF BOTH FAILING WAS GOOD WITH POTENTIAL SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES; ADDING THE FACT THAT MAINT INDICATED IT HAS HAPPENED BEFORE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.