Narrative:

We deiced at ZZZ and taxied out to runway. Shortly after takeoff we smelled smoke. Shortly after we saw smoke. The flight attendant advised she had a smoke filled cabin. The captain executed the smoke removal procedure as I continued to fly the aircraft. The smoke started as soon as the aircraft pressurized. The smoke had dissipated when the emergency depress switch was pressed. We declared an emergency and made an immediate return to ZZZ and landed. Fire and rescue were made available and standing by. We landed overweight; 49000 pounds approximately. Tower advised on the landing roll that fire trucks saw no fire. We taxied into the gate. Upon opening the door; the fire department advised this was the second event of the same nature in less than one hour. The aircraft was soaked with deice fluid more than I have ever seen. We had found another aircraft to fly to ZZZ1 and back to ZZZ. Looking back I believe we should not have or have been asked to continue to fly after an event such as this.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter advised that this was the second of three identical events within a period of few hours at this airport; all occurring on aircraft of this same fleet. Reporter stated the source was obviously deicing fluid based on odor. The cabin went from a light fog on initial observation to total obscuration within seconds. On the flight deck the obscuration was slightly less intense; but by the time both pilots were able to don their oxygen masks and smoke goggles; visibility was quite restricted. Reporter commented that the event took place at a particularly difficult high workload phase of flight. Reporter's subsequent investigation discovered that similar events of this fleet are comparatively common and that; to the best of his/her knowledge; no action has been taken to eliminate the cause of this reoccurring and potentially hazardous problem. Reporter noted it is SOP to use the APU for air conditioning and pressurization on takeoff as to avoid the TOGW penalty which results from using engine bleed air for that purpose. Reporter further noted that suggestions to routinely use bleed air vice APU after a deicing procedure were not adopted. Reporter stressed their conviction that the pressure to immediately place the passenger and flight crews on another aircraft and continue flight was inappropriate. The flight crew felt that the mental trauma and the potential for health issues associated with inhaling the fumes combined to make their performance less than acceptable on the flight and may have placed the well being of the passenger in jeopardy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF A CL65 EXPERIENCE SMOKE FILLED COCKPIT AND CABIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF FOLLOWING DEICING. CREW PERFORMED EMER DEPRESSURIZATION AND RETURNED TO DEP ARPT.

Narrative: WE DEICED AT ZZZ AND TAXIED OUT TO RWY. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF WE SMELLED SMOKE. SHORTLY AFTER WE SAW SMOKE. THE FLT ATTENDANT ADVISED SHE HAD A SMOKE FILLED CABIN. THE CAPT EXECUTED THE SMOKE REMOVAL PROC AS I CONTINUED TO FLY THE ACFT. THE SMOKE STARTED AS SOON AS THE ACFT PRESSURIZED. THE SMOKE HAD DISSIPATED WHEN THE EMER DEPRESS SWITCH WAS PRESSED. WE DECLARED AN EMER AND MADE AN IMMEDIATE RETURN TO ZZZ AND LANDED. FIRE AND RESCUE WERE MADE AVAILABLE AND STANDING BY. WE LANDED OVERWT; 49000 LBS APPROXIMATELY. TWR ADVISED ON THE LNDG ROLL THAT FIRE TRUCKS SAW NO FIRE. WE TAXIED INTO THE GATE. UPON OPENING THE DOOR; THE FIRE DEPT ADVISED THIS WAS THE SECOND EVENT OF THE SAME NATURE IN LESS THAN ONE HOUR. THE ACFT WAS SOAKED WITH DEICE FLUID MORE THAN I HAVE EVER SEEN. WE HAD FOUND ANOTHER ACFT TO FLY TO ZZZ1 AND BACK TO ZZZ. LOOKING BACK I BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT HAVE OR HAVE BEEN ASKED TO CONTINUE TO FLY AFTER AN EVENT SUCH AS THIS.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THAT THIS WAS THE SECOND OF THREE IDENTICAL EVENTS WITHIN A PERIOD OF FEW HOURS AT THIS ARPT; ALL OCCURRING ON ACFT OF THIS SAME FLEET. RPTR STATED THE SOURCE WAS OBVIOUSLY DEICING FLUID BASED ON ODOR. THE CABIN WENT FROM A LIGHT FOG ON INITIAL OBSERVATION TO TOTAL OBSCURATION WITHIN SECONDS. ON THE FLT DECK THE OBSCURATION WAS SLIGHTLY LESS INTENSE; BUT BY THE TIME BOTH PLTS WERE ABLE TO DON THEIR OXYGEN MASKS AND SMOKE GOGGLES; VISIBILITY WAS QUITE RESTRICTED. RPTR COMMENTED THAT THE EVENT TOOK PLACE AT A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT HIGH WORKLOAD PHASE OF FLT. RPTR'S SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION DISCOVERED THAT SIMILAR EVENTS OF THIS FLEET ARE COMPARATIVELY COMMON AND THAT; TO THE BEST OF HIS/HER KNOWLEDGE; NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSE OF THIS REOCCURRING AND POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS PROBLEM. RPTR NOTED IT IS SOP TO USE THE APU FOR AIR CONDITIONING AND PRESSURIZATION ON TKOF AS TO AVOID THE TOGW PENALTY WHICH RESULTS FROM USING ENG BLEED AIR FOR THAT PURPOSE. RPTR FURTHER NOTED THAT SUGGESTIONS TO ROUTINELY USE BLEED AIR VICE APU AFTER A DEICING PROC WERE NOT ADOPTED. RPTR STRESSED THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE PRESSURE TO IMMEDIATELY PLACE THE PAX AND FLT CREWS ON ANOTHER ACFT AND CONTINUE FLT WAS INAPPROPRIATE. THE FLT CREW FELT THAT THE MENTAL TRAUMA AND THE POTENTIAL FOR HEALTH ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH INHALING THE FUMES COMBINED TO MAKE THEIR PERFORMANCE LESS THAN ACCEPTABLE ON THE FLT AND MAY HAVE PLACED THE WELL BEING OF THE PAX IN JEOPARDY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.