Narrative:

At ZZZ airport I took a pleasure flight with a friend. I met him at the airport to do touch-and-goes; he had just flown the airplane in. I sat in the cockpit; verified the position and usage of all switches and knobs. I reviewed all placarded checklists (I believe that takeoff and landing were the only 2 placarded in this aircraft). After becoming acquainted with the plane; we taxied out for pattern work. My friend had me switch fuel tanks before takeoff. I completed a thorough run-up and received takeoff clearance. We completed 6 or 7 touch-and-goes. I pwred up to do another takeoff; rotated and climbed to about 300 or 400 ft AGL; when the engine sputtered and failed to produce power. I knew we were going down. I let the nose pitch down on its own accord. I verified the landing gear was down. Next; I looked out of the airplane at possible lng areas. We had taken off runway 17. I could not see any of runway 17 due to obstruction by the airplane nose cowling. I saw taxiway K to my left and to the right runway 14 and taxiway P. I chose to turn right. I did think of trying a 180 degree turn to get more usable runway; but the thought was ruled out because of the rate of descent. I made a radio call to tower. I only remember parts of it; the situation happened quite fast. I know I told them I was making an emergency landing and I think I told them I wanted runway 14. The controller cleared me to land runway 14 or runway 17. I thought we might be landing on taxiway P. I had the angle as if that was going to be the destination. Upon knowing that we would not have sufficient length on the taxiway to land I made a left turn onto runway 14 -- it was tight. Several thoughts flowed through my head don't stall; don't have a tail strike; and don't scrape the wing. I believe we made a partial taxiway/runway landing with some side load on the airplane landing gear. The plane rolled to a stop at which time; the propeller stopped wind milling. The first thing I did was check that my master; magnetos; and boost pump were all in the 'on' position. They were. I reported to tower the engine had stopped and we would need assistance to get off the runway. They called an FBO and a tug came and pulled the plane clear of the runway. The airplane was not damaged in anyway. One of the operations personnel took our names so he could file a report pertaining to the runway closure; he did not take phone numbers or certificate numbers. Upon inspection of the airplane; I determined that we had run the engine out of fuel. My friend claimed the main tanks were 1/2 full when we took off. I verified the auxiliary tanks were full. The right main which we were using at time; had very little fuel in it. I believe that the fuel I saw left in the right main was unusable. Fuel starvation caused this emergency. I was PIC and I did not even ask how much fuel was on board; nor did I look in the tanks visually. I assumed that the airplane was ready to go. My friend and I had discussed where he would get fuel earlier in the night due to pricing; but that is as far as that went. My friend is a student pilot with over 400 hours flight time. The fuel gauge did read 1/4 of a tank; but I know better than to trust the gauge. Correcting this problem is as simple as proper preflight planning. Fuel burn calculation and verification of fuel quantities. Never assume another pilot has taken care of the details of your flight. I do give credit in this situation to proper flight training and experience. Without them; the outcome of this situation could have been much worse -- even potentially fatal.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DESPITE AMPLE FUEL ON BOARD IN OTHER TANKS; A PLEASURE FLT IN A PA28-250 WITH WHICH THE PLT WAS UNFAMILIAR ENDS IN FUEL STARVATION SHORTLY AFTER A TOUCH-AND-GO. THE PLT WAS ABLE TO RETURN TO A SAFE UN-PWRED LNDG ON A DIFFERENT RWY.

Narrative: AT ZZZ ARPT I TOOK A PLEASURE FLT WITH A FRIEND. I MET HIM AT THE ARPT TO DO TOUCH-AND-GOES; HE HAD JUST FLOWN THE AIRPLANE IN. I SAT IN THE COCKPIT; VERIFIED THE POS AND USAGE OF ALL SWITCHES AND KNOBS. I REVIEWED ALL PLACARDED CHKLISTS (I BELIEVE THAT TKOF AND LNDG WERE THE ONLY 2 PLACARDED IN THIS ACFT). AFTER BECOMING ACQUAINTED WITH THE PLANE; WE TAXIED OUT FOR PATTERN WORK. MY FRIEND HAD ME SWITCH FUEL TANKS BEFORE TKOF. I COMPLETED A THOROUGH RUN-UP AND RECEIVED TKOF CLRNC. WE COMPLETED 6 OR 7 TOUCH-AND-GOES. I PWRED UP TO DO ANOTHER TKOF; ROTATED AND CLBED TO ABOUT 300 OR 400 FT AGL; WHEN THE ENG SPUTTERED AND FAILED TO PRODUCE PWR. I KNEW WE WERE GOING DOWN. I LET THE NOSE PITCH DOWN ON ITS OWN ACCORD. I VERIFIED THE LNDG GEAR WAS DOWN. NEXT; I LOOKED OUT OF THE AIRPLANE AT POSSIBLE LNG AREAS. WE HAD TAKEN OFF RWY 17. I COULD NOT SEE ANY OF RWY 17 DUE TO OBSTRUCTION BY THE AIRPLANE NOSE COWLING. I SAW TXWY K TO MY L AND TO THE R RWY 14 AND TXWY P. I CHOSE TO TURN R. I DID THINK OF TRYING A 180 DEG TURN TO GET MORE USABLE RWY; BUT THE THOUGHT WAS RULED OUT BECAUSE OF THE RATE OF DSCNT. I MADE A RADIO CALL TO TWR. I ONLY REMEMBER PARTS OF IT; THE SIT HAPPENED QUITE FAST. I KNOW I TOLD THEM I WAS MAKING AN EMER LNDG AND I THINK I TOLD THEM I WANTED RWY 14. THE CTLR CLRED ME TO LAND RWY 14 OR RWY 17. I THOUGHT WE MIGHT BE LNDG ON TXWY P. I HAD THE ANGLE AS IF THAT WAS GOING TO BE THE DEST. UPON KNOWING THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT LENGTH ON THE TXWY TO LAND I MADE A L TURN ONTO RWY 14 -- IT WAS TIGHT. SEVERAL THOUGHTS FLOWED THROUGH MY HEAD DON'T STALL; DON'T HAVE A TAIL STRIKE; AND DON'T SCRAPE THE WING. I BELIEVE WE MADE A PARTIAL TXWY/RWY LNDG WITH SOME SIDE LOAD ON THE AIRPLANE LNDG GEAR. THE PLANE ROLLED TO A STOP AT WHICH TIME; THE PROP STOPPED WIND MILLING. THE FIRST THING I DID WAS CHK THAT MY MASTER; MAGNETOS; AND BOOST PUMP WERE ALL IN THE 'ON' POS. THEY WERE. I RPTED TO TWR THE ENG HAD STOPPED AND WE WOULD NEED ASSISTANCE TO GET OFF THE RWY. THEY CALLED AN FBO AND A TUG CAME AND PULLED THE PLANE CLR OF THE RWY. THE AIRPLANE WAS NOT DAMAGED IN ANYWAY. ONE OF THE OPS PERSONNEL TOOK OUR NAMES SO HE COULD FILE A RPT PERTAINING TO THE RWY CLOSURE; HE DID NOT TAKE PHONE NUMBERS OR CERTIFICATE NUMBERS. UPON INSPECTION OF THE AIRPLANE; I DETERMINED THAT WE HAD RUN THE ENG OUT OF FUEL. MY FRIEND CLAIMED THE MAIN TANKS WERE 1/2 FULL WHEN WE TOOK OFF. I VERIFIED THE AUX TANKS WERE FULL. THE R MAIN WHICH WE WERE USING AT TIME; HAD VERY LITTLE FUEL IN IT. I BELIEVE THAT THE FUEL I SAW LEFT IN THE R MAIN WAS UNUSABLE. FUEL STARVATION CAUSED THIS EMER. I WAS PIC AND I DID NOT EVEN ASK HOW MUCH FUEL WAS ON BOARD; NOR DID I LOOK IN THE TANKS VISUALLY. I ASSUMED THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS READY TO GO. MY FRIEND AND I HAD DISCUSSED WHERE HE WOULD GET FUEL EARLIER IN THE NIGHT DUE TO PRICING; BUT THAT IS AS FAR AS THAT WENT. MY FRIEND IS A STUDENT PLT WITH OVER 400 HRS FLT TIME. THE FUEL GAUGE DID READ 1/4 OF A TANK; BUT I KNOW BETTER THAN TO TRUST THE GAUGE. CORRECTING THIS PROB IS AS SIMPLE AS PROPER PREFLT PLANNING. FUEL BURN CALCULATION AND VERIFICATION OF FUEL QUANTITIES. NEVER ASSUME ANOTHER PLT HAS TAKEN CARE OF THE DETAILS OF YOUR FLT. I DO GIVE CREDIT IN THIS SIT TO PROPER FLT TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE. WITHOUT THEM; THE OUTCOME OF THIS SIT COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH WORSE -- EVEN POTENTIALLY FATAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.