Narrative:

We were being radar vectored to an ice strip and brw 109 degree radial; 53.5. 80 NM southwest of brw; we began descent and briefed the approach to VFR conditions. The captain's brief was oversimplified -- 'we will go to the airport and land.' there was radio traffic on descent that claimed another aircraft would be on the ramp upon arrival. There were 2 strips located 5 mi from each other. Flight visibility was good; ground visibility was marginal with blowing snow. After getting the destination WX advisory; I noticed we were in a left descending turn below 2000 ft. I asked what altitude we were cleared to. The captain said 'I canceled IFR.' we had not reached our clearance limit and were at about 60 DME. The captain increased the descent; called for gear and flap extension. I said; 'the strip is 5-7 mi northeast of the drilling rig.' he said; 'no it's not. I can see it. The otter's right there.' the captain called for full flaps and propellers forward. We began to get taws; 'too low; pull up' warnings. I said 'the runway is 040 degrees; our heading is 060 degrees and that does not agree.' the captain did not respond. The captain continued the approach and landed on the wrong strip. He refused the first challenge and ignored the second challenge. My perception was the captain had 'already made the unilateral decision to cancel IFR and land visually;' that any conflicting information was going to be ignored because we were in a critical phase with aural warnings present. My inaction contributed possibly because I failed to state affirmatively 'go around' or 'do not land.' contributing factors: lack of planning; poor approach briefing; reliance on VOR navigation to a DME fix a significant distance from the NAVAID to reliably fix a position. A single VOR station in a remote environment; use of even a portable GPS system would have helped. Instead of being vectored to the trip fix; we could have established our position on the radial; then flown to the distance. In other words; flown to our clearance limit prior to canceling IFR. Failure to provide a 'missed approach briefing.' even though he canceled IFR and approached VFR unable to land; the captain had no plan to continue. This may have caused a reluctance to go around to resolve the discrepancies that were brought to his attention.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DESPITE REPEATED ADMONITIONS FROM THE FO; CAPT OF AN MDT HIGH WING TWIN TURBOPROP CONTINUES APCH AND LANDS AT THE WRONG REMOTE ICE STRIP IN ALASKA.

Narrative: WE WERE BEING RADAR VECTORED TO AN ICE STRIP AND BRW 109 DEG RADIAL; 53.5. 80 NM SW OF BRW; WE BEGAN DSCNT AND BRIEFED THE APCH TO VFR CONDITIONS. THE CAPT'S BRIEF WAS OVERSIMPLIFIED -- 'WE WILL GO TO THE ARPT AND LAND.' THERE WAS RADIO TFC ON DSCNT THAT CLAIMED ANOTHER ACFT WOULD BE ON THE RAMP UPON ARR. THERE WERE 2 STRIPS LOCATED 5 MI FROM EACH OTHER. FLT VISIBILITY WAS GOOD; GND VISIBILITY WAS MARGINAL WITH BLOWING SNOW. AFTER GETTING THE DEST WX ADVISORY; I NOTICED WE WERE IN A L DSNDING TURN BELOW 2000 FT. I ASKED WHAT ALT WE WERE CLRED TO. THE CAPT SAID 'I CANCELED IFR.' WE HAD NOT REACHED OUR CLRNC LIMIT AND WERE AT ABOUT 60 DME. THE CAPT INCREASED THE DSCNT; CALLED FOR GEAR AND FLAP EXTENSION. I SAID; 'THE STRIP IS 5-7 MI NE OF THE DRILLING RIG.' HE SAID; 'NO IT'S NOT. I CAN SEE IT. THE OTTER'S RIGHT THERE.' THE CAPT CALLED FOR FULL FLAPS AND PROPS FORWARD. WE BEGAN TO GET TAWS; 'TOO LOW; PULL UP' WARNINGS. I SAID 'THE RWY IS 040 DEGS; OUR HDG IS 060 DEGS AND THAT DOES NOT AGREE.' THE CAPT DID NOT RESPOND. THE CAPT CONTINUED THE APCH AND LANDED ON THE WRONG STRIP. HE REFUSED THE FIRST CHALLENGE AND IGNORED THE SECOND CHALLENGE. MY PERCEPTION WAS THE CAPT HAD 'ALREADY MADE THE UNILATERAL DECISION TO CANCEL IFR AND LAND VISUALLY;' THAT ANY CONFLICTING INFO WAS GOING TO BE IGNORED BECAUSE WE WERE IN A CRITICAL PHASE WITH AURAL WARNINGS PRESENT. MY INACTION CONTRIBUTED POSSIBLY BECAUSE I FAILED TO STATE AFFIRMATIVELY 'GO AROUND' OR 'DO NOT LAND.' CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: LACK OF PLANNING; POOR APCH BRIEFING; RELIANCE ON VOR NAV TO A DME FIX A SIGNIFICANT DISTANCE FROM THE NAVAID TO RELIABLY FIX A POS. A SINGLE VOR STATION IN A REMOTE ENVIRONMENT; USE OF EVEN A PORTABLE GPS SYS WOULD HAVE HELPED. INSTEAD OF BEING VECTORED TO THE TRIP FIX; WE COULD HAVE ESTABLISHED OUR POS ON THE RADIAL; THEN FLOWN TO THE DISTANCE. IN OTHER WORDS; FLOWN TO OUR CLRNC LIMIT PRIOR TO CANCELING IFR. FAILURE TO PROVIDE A 'MISSED APCH BRIEFING.' EVEN THOUGH HE CANCELED IFR AND APCHED VFR UNABLE TO LAND; THE CAPT HAD NO PLAN TO CONTINUE. THIS MAY HAVE CAUSED A RELUCTANCE TO GO AROUND TO RESOLVE THE DISCREPANCIES THAT WERE BROUGHT TO HIS ATTN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.