A B737-200 captain reports after leaving the scheduled first aircraft due to a hydraulic and engine ...

Attributes
ACN	687433
Time
Date	200602
Local Time Of Day	0001 To 0600
Place
Locale Reference	airport : zzz.airport
State Reference	US
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B737-200
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	ground : preflight
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 120
ASRS Report	687433
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper maintenance maintenance problem : improper documentation non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far
Independent Detector	other flight crewa other flight crewb
Resolutory Action	none taken : anomaly accepted
Consequence	Other
Factors
Maintenance	contributing factor : schedule pressure performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : repair performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : inspection
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Flight Crew Human Performance Maintenance Human Performance Aircraft Chart Or Publication Environmental Factor
Primary Problem	Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative:

This was the second aircraft of the morning prior to the first pushback of the day. Our first aircraft (noticed by first officer on walkaround) had a hydraulic leak on the right wing; oil leak from the #1 engine. The mechanic said it would be 1 1/2 hours; so better deplane. I then wrote up both items and left for our second aircraft. To speed things up; the first officer went right to the walkaround and I did the inside. This time the first officer noticed an oil leak on the #2 engine. I was just at the point in my preflight of looking through the logbook when a mechanic came in and asked to see the logbook. He disappeared with the logbook out the door. The first officer then returned to the cockpit to report the oil leak on the #2 engine to me. The mechanic came back in the cockpit and said that there were no replacement aircraft and that if we grounded this one; the trip would have to be canceled. In addition; he said that it would be ok to take the aircraft because the 'aircraft really doesn't need much oil.' he said he had an aircraft lose oil down to 1 gallon after takeoff due to the oil cap falling off and 'they made it the whole way on an ETOPS flight!' he said he would have the aircraft put on an oil consumption watch at the end of the day 'if' we took it now. There are so many things wrong with this conversation that it's hard to list them in the space provided: 1) I don't care how many aircraft are available for replacements. 2) I am hoping this mechanic doesn't think it's ok for a captain to lose down to 1 gallon of oil; and then continue to destination -- because someone made it there ok. (I have no idea if this is a true story.) this story is not relevant to this discussion in any case. 3) all I am looking for is if the mechanic looked for the source of the leak; and in his judgement it is ok to go. How can I trust someone's judgement with the above story as being ok? We ended up taking the aircraft; but just thought there needed to be discussions between flight operations and maintenance.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-200 CAPT RPTS AFTER LEAVING THE SCHEDULED FIRST ACFT DUE TO A HYD AND ENG OIL LEAK AND BOARDING THE SECOND ACFT HE WAS PRESSURED TO TAKE THE AIRPLANE WITH THE R ENG LEAKING OIL.

Narrative: THIS WAS THE SECOND ACFT OF THE MORNING PRIOR TO THE FIRST PUSHBACK OF THE DAY. OUR FIRST ACFT (NOTICED BY FO ON WALKAROUND) HAD A HYD LEAK ON THE R WING; OIL LEAK FROM THE #1 ENG. THE MECH SAID IT WOULD BE 1 1/2 HRS; SO BETTER DEPLANE. I THEN WROTE UP BOTH ITEMS AND LEFT FOR OUR SECOND ACFT. TO SPD THINGS UP; THE FO WENT RIGHT TO THE WALKAROUND AND I DID THE INSIDE. THIS TIME THE FO NOTICED AN OIL LEAK ON THE #2 ENG. I WAS JUST AT THE POINT IN MY PREFLT OF LOOKING THROUGH THE LOGBOOK WHEN A MECH CAME IN AND ASKED TO SEE THE LOGBOOK. HE DISAPPEARED WITH THE LOGBOOK OUT THE DOOR. THE FO THEN RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT TO RPT THE OIL LEAK ON THE #2 ENG TO ME. THE MECH CAME BACK IN THE COCKPIT AND SAID THAT THERE WERE NO REPLACEMENT ACFT AND THAT IF WE GNDED THIS ONE; THE TRIP WOULD HAVE TO BE CANCELED. IN ADDITION; HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE OK TO TAKE THE ACFT BECAUSE THE 'ACFT REALLY DOESN'T NEED MUCH OIL.' HE SAID HE HAD AN ACFT LOSE OIL DOWN TO 1 GALLON AFTER TKOF DUE TO THE OIL CAP FALLING OFF AND 'THEY MADE IT THE WHOLE WAY ON AN ETOPS FLT!' HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE THE ACFT PUT ON AN OIL CONSUMPTION WATCH AT THE END OF THE DAY 'IF' WE TOOK IT NOW. THERE ARE SO MANY THINGS WRONG WITH THIS CONVERSATION THAT IT'S HARD TO LIST THEM IN THE SPACE PROVIDED: 1) I DON'T CARE HOW MANY ACFT ARE AVAILABLE FOR REPLACEMENTS. 2) I AM HOPING THIS MECH DOESN'T THINK IT'S OK FOR A CAPT TO LOSE DOWN TO 1 GALLON OF OIL; AND THEN CONTINUE TO DEST -- BECAUSE SOMEONE MADE IT THERE OK. (I HAVE NO IDEA IF THIS IS A TRUE STORY.) THIS STORY IS NOT RELEVANT TO THIS DISCUSSION IN ANY CASE. 3) ALL I AM LOOKING FOR IS IF THE MECH LOOKED FOR THE SOURCE OF THE LEAK; AND IN HIS JUDGEMENT IT IS OK TO GO. HOW CAN I TRUST SOMEONE'S JUDGEMENT WITH THE ABOVE STORY AS BEING OK? WE ENDED UP TAKING THE ACFT; BUT JUST THOUGHT THERE NEEDED TO BE DISCUSSIONS BTWN FLT OPS AND MAINT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

A B737-200 captain reports after leaving the scheduled first aircraft due to a hydraulic and engine oil leak and boarding the second aircraft he was pressured to take the airplane with the right engine leaking oil.