Narrative:

While at FL360 for over 1 hour; the flight attendant called to say the temperature just increased quickly. As I was on the phone; the red cabin altitude light and horn came on. The cabin altitude was climbing through 10000 ft at maximum rate of climb. While looking at the overhead panel; it was determined that the standby system never automatically took over control of the pressurization. Also; the pressurization flow light never illuminated. The first officer automatically switched to manual control and quickly reversed the cabin. With ATC's permission; a descent to a lower altitude was started. Eventually; we leveled off at FL190. After reviewing the QRH; we decided to place the pressurization system to standby control. The standby system operated normally. Flight was continued at FL190 to ZZZ1. After landing; the primary pressurization system was placarded and the aircraft and us were scheduled to continue to ZZZ2. I am not sure if it is related; but while running up the engines for takeoff on the next flight; the right engine did not respond. We returned to the gate. The maintenance team lubricated the bleed valve. After running the engine at the gate; the valve and engine responded normally. One of the mechanics working on the bleed valve commented that in the past it was procedure to regularly lubricate the valves. With cost cutting; that and other preventive items have been eliminated. The cost of eliminating procedures can be measured against the labor cost savings. Maybe it should be measured against the cost of incidents described above. After an MD80 crash; the company was quick to inform us that we have a comprehensive preventive maintenance program second to none. At what point does the company again put value in preventive maintenance?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD80 CREW COMMENTS THAT AFTER A LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION; THE LACK OF A ROUTINE BLEED VALVE MAINT PROC MAY HAVE BEEN THE CAUSE.

Narrative: WHILE AT FL360 FOR OVER 1 HR; THE FLT ATTENDANT CALLED TO SAY THE TEMP JUST INCREASED QUICKLY. AS I WAS ON THE PHONE; THE RED CABIN ALT LIGHT AND HORN CAME ON. THE CABIN ALT WAS CLBING THROUGH 10000 FT AT MAX RATE OF CLB. WHILE LOOKING AT THE OVERHEAD PANEL; IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE STANDBY SYS NEVER AUTOMATICALLY TOOK OVER CTL OF THE PRESSURIZATION. ALSO; THE PRESSURIZATION FLOW LIGHT NEVER ILLUMINATED. THE FO AUTOMATICALLY SWITCHED TO MANUAL CTL AND QUICKLY REVERSED THE CABIN. WITH ATC'S PERMISSION; A DSCNT TO A LOWER ALT WAS STARTED. EVENTUALLY; WE LEVELED OFF AT FL190. AFTER REVIEWING THE QRH; WE DECIDED TO PLACE THE PRESSURIZATION SYS TO STANDBY CTL. THE STANDBY SYS OPERATED NORMALLY. FLT WAS CONTINUED AT FL190 TO ZZZ1. AFTER LNDG; THE PRIMARY PRESSURIZATION SYS WAS PLACARDED AND THE ACFT AND US WERE SCHEDULED TO CONTINUE TO ZZZ2. I AM NOT SURE IF IT IS RELATED; BUT WHILE RUNNING UP THE ENGS FOR TKOF ON THE NEXT FLT; THE R ENG DID NOT RESPOND. WE RETURNED TO THE GATE. THE MAINT TEAM LUBRICATED THE BLEED VALVE. AFTER RUNNING THE ENG AT THE GATE; THE VALVE AND ENG RESPONDED NORMALLY. ONE OF THE MECHS WORKING ON THE BLEED VALVE COMMENTED THAT IN THE PAST IT WAS PROC TO REGULARLY LUBRICATE THE VALVES. WITH COST CUTTING; THAT AND OTHER PREVENTIVE ITEMS HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED. THE COST OF ELIMINATING PROCS CAN BE MEASURED AGAINST THE LABOR COST SAVINGS. MAYBE IT SHOULD BE MEASURED AGAINST THE COST OF INCIDENTS DESCRIBED ABOVE. AFTER AN MD80 CRASH; THE COMPANY WAS QUICK TO INFORM US THAT WE HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE PREVENTIVE MAINT PROGRAM SECOND TO NONE. AT WHAT POINT DOES THE COMPANY AGAIN PUT VALUE IN PREVENTIVE MAINT?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.