Narrative:

The aircraft had just come from maintenance and particular attention was placed on inspecting the new main gear tires. No irregularities were noted by either pilot. Taxi out was normal and after completing our checks we took runway 25 for departure. The copilot was the PF and I was making the callouts. The takeoff run was normal until the V1 callout was made. Immediately after V1 was announced; a loud bang was heard followed by a loud slap against aluminum skin. Simultaneously; both left antiskid generator lights illuminated and a continuous strong vibration and a pronounced list to port occurred. I assumed the flying duties and countered the list with right aileron input. Decision speed had been achieved and a rejected takeoff was no longer a consideration. Right aileron input minimized the vibration and both engines were indicating in the green. Rotation was achieved and the aircraft lifted off cleanly. The landing gear was not retracted. I called the tower to report FOD on the runway and switched over to approach control. Abnormal checklists were run and I informed ZZZ that we would be changing our destination and for now wished to remain in the vicinity of ZZZ. Radar vectors were maintained and we discovered a steady decrease in hydraulic pressure. More abnormal checklists were run. I knew the engine driven hydraulic pumps would begin to pump dry and possibly start to run hot. Under the circumstances the safest course of action resulted in a decision to remain with approach control and proceed to runway 36L when a safe landing weight was obtained or circumstances worsened. We entered holding 20 mi west of the VOR and proceeded to communicate with ATC and company regarding our intentions. We then spent the next 2 hours reviewing all the checklists pertaining to our circumstances and briefing all the scenarios that could possibly occur on or prior to landing. At our predetermined weight we departed holding. We received vectors from approach to perform a low approach over runway 35L. With us to the east and the sun to the west of the control tower; a visual inspection was performed on our left main gear. A B737 at the hold short line had the best view and reported both tires missing. This was one of our worst scenarios and we proceeded to perform a wide and extended left traffic pattern for runway 36L. During that time we re-briefed a no-flap; no left tires and no hydraulic brake system landing. The auxiliary hydraulic pump was activated for the first time at 200 ft and the copilot called out 1000 pounds of pressure in the flare. Touchdown occurred at the beginning of the landing zone on the right main gear only. Right aileron input was steadily increased until full deflection was obtained. The thrust reversers were actuated. During translation; light right braking was initiated. The left main stayed off of the ground until below the 80 KT callout. With both thrust reversers deployed at idle thrust; I countered left main gear contact with right thrust reverser advancement and right brake pedal pressure. The centerline was tracked and at 60 KTS the thrust was smoothly reduced to idle and then stowed. Maximum right brake pedal pressure was applied. The engines were shut down as the unlocked lights extinguished. At 45 KTS nosewheel steering was engaged with the cwms to maintain directional control. Hydraulic pressure was lost as the right antiskid control valve dumped pressure overboard. At 40 KTS; right braking was lost and the pneumatic brake handle was actuated. By 20 KTS the left rims had been ground down to the depth of the lower brake housing assembly. The additional drag produced by this housing assembly overcame full right directional control authority/authorized and the aircraft gradually drifted 25 ft left of centerline before coming to a complete stop. As the aircraft was coming to rest; I signed off on the radio; pulled the t-handles; shut off the avionic and battery masters and commenced evacuate/evacuation. The fire department was rapidly approaching the aircraft. The fire chief used an infrared heat gun on the left main gear. It read 108 degrees F. The aircraft was observed for 30 mins and then the removal process began. The landing had used 7000 ft of runway. A post landing inspection by the pilots revealed both left tires were missing; both left rim were worn to the nub; left brake housing assembly was worn on the bottom; left brake hydraulic line was torn away; left antiskid electrical wiring harness was torn away; tire rubber was found jammed under the left spoiler; the left flap had multiple small dents and 6 black grease marks could be seen smeared down the lower left aft fuselage.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LJ55 LOSES BOTH L TIRES ON TKOF AFTER V1. LAND SAFELY AFTER EXTENSIVE HOLD TO BURN OFF GAS AND PERFORM APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS.

Narrative: THE ACFT HAD JUST COME FROM MAINT AND PARTICULAR ATTN WAS PLACED ON INSPECTING THE NEW MAIN GEAR TIRES. NO IRREGULARITIES WERE NOTED BY EITHER PLT. TAXI OUT WAS NORMAL AND AFTER COMPLETING OUR CHKS WE TOOK RWY 25 FOR DEP. THE COPLT WAS THE PF AND I WAS MAKING THE CALLOUTS. THE TKOF RUN WAS NORMAL UNTIL THE V1 CALLOUT WAS MADE. IMMEDIATELY AFTER V1 WAS ANNOUNCED; A LOUD BANG WAS HEARD FOLLOWED BY A LOUD SLAP AGAINST ALUMINUM SKIN. SIMULTANEOUSLY; BOTH L ANTISKID GENERATOR LIGHTS ILLUMINATED AND A CONTINUOUS STRONG VIBRATION AND A PRONOUNCED LIST TO PORT OCCURRED. I ASSUMED THE FLYING DUTIES AND COUNTERED THE LIST WITH R AILERON INPUT. DECISION SPD HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AND A REJECTED TKOF WAS NO LONGER A CONSIDERATION. R AILERON INPUT MINIMIZED THE VIBRATION AND BOTH ENGS WERE INDICATING IN THE GREEN. ROTATION WAS ACHIEVED AND THE ACFT LIFTED OFF CLEANLY. THE LNDG GEAR WAS NOT RETRACTED. I CALLED THE TWR TO RPT FOD ON THE RWY AND SWITCHED OVER TO APCH CTL. ABNORMAL CHKLISTS WERE RUN AND I INFORMED ZZZ THAT WE WOULD BE CHANGING OUR DEST AND FOR NOW WISHED TO REMAIN IN THE VICINITY OF ZZZ. RADAR VECTORS WERE MAINTAINED AND WE DISCOVERED A STEADY DECREASE IN HYD PRESSURE. MORE ABNORMAL CHKLISTS WERE RUN. I KNEW THE ENG DRIVEN HYD PUMPS WOULD BEGIN TO PUMP DRY AND POSSIBLY START TO RUN HOT. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION RESULTED IN A DECISION TO REMAIN WITH APCH CTL AND PROCEED TO RWY 36L WHEN A SAFE LNDG WT WAS OBTAINED OR CIRCUMSTANCES WORSENED. WE ENTERED HOLDING 20 MI W OF THE VOR AND PROCEEDED TO COMMUNICATE WITH ATC AND COMPANY REGARDING OUR INTENTIONS. WE THEN SPENT THE NEXT 2 HRS REVIEWING ALL THE CHKLISTS PERTAINING TO OUR CIRCUMSTANCES AND BRIEFING ALL THE SCENARIOS THAT COULD POSSIBLY OCCUR ON OR PRIOR TO LNDG. AT OUR PREDETERMINED WT WE DEPARTED HOLDING. WE RECEIVED VECTORS FROM APCH TO PERFORM A LOW APCH OVER RWY 35L. WITH US TO THE E AND THE SUN TO THE W OF THE CTL TWR; A VISUAL INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED ON OUR L MAIN GEAR. A B737 AT THE HOLD SHORT LINE HAD THE BEST VIEW AND RPTED BOTH TIRES MISSING. THIS WAS ONE OF OUR WORST SCENARIOS AND WE PROCEEDED TO PERFORM A WIDE AND EXTENDED L TFC PATTERN FOR RWY 36L. DURING THAT TIME WE RE-BRIEFED A NO-FLAP; NO L TIRES AND NO HYD BRAKE SYS LNDG. THE AUX HYD PUMP WAS ACTIVATED FOR THE FIRST TIME AT 200 FT AND THE COPLT CALLED OUT 1000 LBS OF PRESSURE IN THE FLARE. TOUCHDOWN OCCURRED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE LNDG ZONE ON THE R MAIN GEAR ONLY. R AILERON INPUT WAS STEADILY INCREASED UNTIL FULL DEFLECTION WAS OBTAINED. THE THRUST REVERSERS WERE ACTUATED. DURING TRANSLATION; LIGHT R BRAKING WAS INITIATED. THE L MAIN STAYED OFF OF THE GND UNTIL BELOW THE 80 KT CALLOUT. WITH BOTH THRUST REVERSERS DEPLOYED AT IDLE THRUST; I COUNTERED L MAIN GEAR CONTACT WITH R THRUST REVERSER ADVANCEMENT AND R BRAKE PEDAL PRESSURE. THE CTRLINE WAS TRACKED AND AT 60 KTS THE THRUST WAS SMOOTHLY REDUCED TO IDLE AND THEN STOWED. MAX R BRAKE PEDAL PRESSURE WAS APPLIED. THE ENGS WERE SHUT DOWN AS THE UNLOCKED LIGHTS EXTINGUISHED. AT 45 KTS NOSEWHEEL STEERING WAS ENGAGED WITH THE CWMS TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CTL. HYD PRESSURE WAS LOST AS THE R ANTISKID CTL VALVE DUMPED PRESSURE OVERBOARD. AT 40 KTS; R BRAKING WAS LOST AND THE PNEUMATIC BRAKE HANDLE WAS ACTUATED. BY 20 KTS THE L RIMS HAD BEEN GND DOWN TO THE DEPTH OF THE LOWER BRAKE HOUSING ASSEMBLY. THE ADDITIONAL DRAG PRODUCED BY THIS HOUSING ASSEMBLY OVERCAME FULL R DIRECTIONAL CTL AUTH AND THE ACFT GRADUALLY DRIFTED 25 FT L OF CTRLINE BEFORE COMING TO A COMPLETE STOP. AS THE ACFT WAS COMING TO REST; I SIGNED OFF ON THE RADIO; PULLED THE T-HANDLES; SHUT OFF THE AVIONIC AND BATTERY MASTERS AND COMMENCED EVAC. THE FIRE DEPT WAS RAPIDLY APCHING THE ACFT. THE FIRE CHIEF USED AN INFRARED HEAT GUN ON THE L MAIN GEAR. IT READ 108 DEGS F. THE ACFT WAS OBSERVED FOR 30 MINS AND THEN THE REMOVAL PROCESS BEGAN. THE LNDG HAD USED 7000 FT OF RWY. A POST LNDG INSPECTION BY THE PLTS REVEALED BOTH L TIRES WERE MISSING; BOTH L RIM WERE WORN TO THE NUB; L BRAKE HOUSING ASSEMBLY WAS WORN ON THE BOTTOM; L BRAKE HYD LINE WAS TORN AWAY; L ANTISKID ELECTRICAL WIRING HARNESS WAS TORN AWAY; TIRE RUBBER WAS FOUND JAMMED UNDER THE L SPOILER; THE L FLAP HAD MULTIPLE SMALL DENTS AND 6 BLACK GREASE MARKS COULD BE SEEN SMEARED DOWN THE LOWER L AFT FUSELAGE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.