Narrative:

After making a normal landing on runway 5 in dark night conditions; tower instructions were 'make left turn on runway 34; contact ground point niner.' aircraft was slowed to taxi/turnoff speed prior to 5000 ft remaining marker. Continued rollout straight ahead on runway 5; tracking runway centerline lights; runway lights were on high intensity. The runway 16/34 intersection is known to be difficult to identify at night. I noted passing the runway 16/34 sign on the west side of runway 5 and began to look for the intersection; which seemed to be a substantial distance beyond. I made the turnoff; halted the aircraft; called ground control and received 'taxi to the ramp' instruction. The PA-30 has no taxi light and the landing lights are wingtip mounted; inwardly focused; and do not provide good forward visibility when on the ground. I had no positive (ground marking) references to place me on or near the runway 34 centerline; and I believe my night vision was somewhat impaired by the intensity of the active runway lighting. Having rolled what I perceived to be a long distance beyond the runway 16/34 marker on runway 5 before the turnoff; I mistakenly believed myself on the northeast side of the runway 34 centerline where I was actually on the southwest side. With no pavement references illuminated by the landing lights; and having just exited the active runway where I rolled out tracking runway centerline lights; I momentarily mistook the west side runway 34 edge marker lights for centerline lights. I was aware of not being fully positionally aware; but continued the taxi operation gravitating toward the edge lights as if they represented the runway centerline. The position and orientation of the left wingtip landing light prevented it from illuminating the runway edge light structures even as it crossed them; and the first indication of my mistake was the sound of an impact from the left side of the aircraft. There was no stoppage or RPM decrease from the left engine; operating at approximately 1200 FPM; and I believed the noise might have been a gear or gear door strike. In retrospect; the primary factor contributing to the incident was my failure to take affirmative action in recognizing a lack of positional and suspending the taxi operation until I could remedy that by taking in additional visual cues or requesting assistance from ground control. After a 2 hour flight involving 1 hour of hand flying in IMC; I relaxed my vigilance once the landing operation was completed and trivialized the taxi to parking; possibly thinking ahead to parking; unloading; and securing the aircraft instead of devoting continued full attention to the operation being conducted. Contributing to the development of the situation was the poor forward lighting available from the aircraft landing lights; and the effect the high intensity runway lights (including centerline lights in use on the active runway) had to diminish visual acuity. Also; were centerline lights in use on runway 34; or were an illuminated turnoff from runway 5 to runway 34 available; the illusion that led to the incident would not have developed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA30 PVT PLT HAS A PROP STRIKE WHEN HE MISTAKES RWY EDGE LIGHTS FOR TXWY CTRLINE LIGHTS.

Narrative: AFTER MAKING A NORMAL LNDG ON RWY 5 IN DARK NIGHT CONDITIONS; TWR INSTRUCTIONS WERE 'MAKE L TURN ON RWY 34; CONTACT GND POINT NINER.' ACFT WAS SLOWED TO TAXI/TURNOFF SPD PRIOR TO 5000 FT REMAINING MARKER. CONTINUED ROLLOUT STRAIGHT AHEAD ON RWY 5; TRACKING RWY CTRLINE LIGHTS; RWY LIGHTS WERE ON HIGH INTENSITY. THE RWY 16/34 INTXN IS KNOWN TO BE DIFFICULT TO IDENT AT NIGHT. I NOTED PASSING THE RWY 16/34 SIGN ON THE W SIDE OF RWY 5 AND BEGAN TO LOOK FOR THE INTXN; WHICH SEEMED TO BE A SUBSTANTIAL DISTANCE BEYOND. I MADE THE TURNOFF; HALTED THE ACFT; CALLED GND CTL AND RECEIVED 'TAXI TO THE RAMP' INSTRUCTION. THE PA-30 HAS NO TAXI LIGHT AND THE LNDG LIGHTS ARE WINGTIP MOUNTED; INWARDLY FOCUSED; AND DO NOT PROVIDE GOOD FORWARD VISIBILITY WHEN ON THE GND. I HAD NO POSITIVE (GND MARKING) REFS TO PLACE ME ON OR NEAR THE RWY 34 CTRLINE; AND I BELIEVE MY NIGHT VISION WAS SOMEWHAT IMPAIRED BY THE INTENSITY OF THE ACTIVE RWY LIGHTING. HAVING ROLLED WHAT I PERCEIVED TO BE A LONG DISTANCE BEYOND THE RWY 16/34 MARKER ON RWY 5 BEFORE THE TURNOFF; I MISTAKENLY BELIEVED MYSELF ON THE NE SIDE OF THE RWY 34 CTRLINE WHERE I WAS ACTUALLY ON THE SW SIDE. WITH NO PAVEMENT REFS ILLUMINATED BY THE LNDG LIGHTS; AND HAVING JUST EXITED THE ACTIVE RWY WHERE I ROLLED OUT TRACKING RWY CTRLINE LIGHTS; I MOMENTARILY MISTOOK THE W SIDE RWY 34 EDGE MARKER LIGHTS FOR CTRLINE LIGHTS. I WAS AWARE OF NOT BEING FULLY POSITIONALLY AWARE; BUT CONTINUED THE TAXI OP GRAVITATING TOWARD THE EDGE LIGHTS AS IF THEY REPRESENTED THE RWY CTRLINE. THE POS AND ORIENTATION OF THE L WINGTIP LNDG LIGHT PREVENTED IT FROM ILLUMINATING THE RWY EDGE LIGHT STRUCTURES EVEN AS IT CROSSED THEM; AND THE FIRST INDICATION OF MY MISTAKE WAS THE SOUND OF AN IMPACT FROM THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT. THERE WAS NO STOPPAGE OR RPM DECREASE FROM THE L ENG; OPERATING AT APPROX 1200 FPM; AND I BELIEVED THE NOISE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A GEAR OR GEAR DOOR STRIKE. IN RETROSPECT; THE PRIMARY FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCIDENT WAS MY FAILURE TO TAKE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN RECOGNIZING A LACK OF POSITIONAL AND SUSPENDING THE TAXI OP UNTIL I COULD REMEDY THAT BY TAKING IN ADDITIONAL VISUAL CUES OR REQUESTING ASSISTANCE FROM GND CTL. AFTER A 2 HR FLT INVOLVING 1 HR OF HAND FLYING IN IMC; I RELAXED MY VIGILANCE ONCE THE LNDG OP WAS COMPLETED AND TRIVIALIZED THE TAXI TO PARKING; POSSIBLY THINKING AHEAD TO PARKING; UNLOADING; AND SECURING THE ACFT INSTEAD OF DEVOTING CONTINUED FULL ATTN TO THE OP BEING CONDUCTED. CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION WAS THE POOR FORWARD LIGHTING AVAILABLE FROM THE ACFT LNDG LIGHTS; AND THE EFFECT THE HIGH INTENSITY RWY LIGHTS (INCLUDING CTRLINE LIGHTS IN USE ON THE ACTIVE RWY) HAD TO DIMINISH VISUAL ACUITY. ALSO; WERE CTRLINE LIGHTS IN USE ON RWY 34; OR WERE AN ILLUMINATED TURNOFF FROM RWY 5 TO RWY 34 AVAILABLE; THE ILLUSION THAT LED TO THE INCIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE DEVELOPED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.