Narrative:

I was blessed with a typically over-qualified first officer on my trip yesterday. He noticed during his preflight that stabilizer trim calibration markings on tail did not match the presumed 7 unit setting in the cockpit. He sees these airplanes all the time; and knew where the stabilizer usually was with the trim setting as it usually is at 7 units. This one just didn't look right. When he came to the cockpit; he expected to see the trim set at some other setting. However; it was right on 7 units; as it usually is. I asked him to check it again; and when he verified that it wasn't where he always sees it; we called maintenance to have them check it out. After considerable discussion; one of the mechanics walked over and looked at another B777 airplane; and verified that the reference paint stripes on this airplane do not come close to matching the others on the field. Maintenance began a series of phone consultations to find out what to do about this problem; which resulted (3 1/2 hours later) in the plane being taken OTS and another plane assigned to the flight. Apparently; there identification no alternate procedure for determining whether the paint or cockpit indicator is correct; and they could not come up with a reference under which they could release the airplane to continue. I understand this limitation on maintenance; but why could no one; not station maintenance; and not even boeing; authorize some alternate means of determining what to do in this situation? The airplane had been given a new paint scheme recently and the paint stripes for stabilizer trim reference were improperly painted. How long has this airplane been out there flying around since the paint job? Has maintenance (who are really responsible for this comparison; according to my training missed this item since the paint job was done? Has every other flight crew member missed it on preflight? Maintenance sent us messages indicating that the last maintenance check was done at ZZZ1 followed by a flight to ZZZ2 where he assumes that the new paint job was done. But this was over a yr ago. It is hard for me to imagine how this was done so wrongly in the first place. It is even harder for me to imagine how it hasn't been caught since then. First; we need to find out how this occurred. Second; we need to find out how the quality control system missed a pretty important calibration item after the painting was done. Third; why is there no procedure in place to deal with it? Why can no one come up with one? Fourth; why is such a potentially critical measurement not marked on the airplane with something like a riveted-in-place panel; which can't be improperly painted; as it is on other airplanes? (This would have made the paint irrelevant.) callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter indicated that this situation was determined to have only occurred on this one individual aircraft. The method to check on the actual position of the stabilizer was to measure the jackscrew position. This is a time consuming procedure and was the reason given for taking the aircraft OTS.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE STABILIZER ALIGNMENT MARKING ON THE FUSELAGE OF A B777 IS NOTED TO BE PAINTED INCORRECTLY DURING A ROUTINE PREFLT INSPECTION OVER A YR AFTER THE LAST HVY MAINT AND PAINTING. NO METHOD WAS AVAILABLE TO CHK THE ALIGNMENT SO THE ACFT IS TAKEN OTS.

Narrative: I WAS BLESSED WITH A TYPICALLY OVER-QUALIFIED FO ON MY TRIP YESTERDAY. HE NOTICED DURING HIS PREFLT THAT STABILIZER TRIM CALIBRATION MARKINGS ON TAIL DID NOT MATCH THE PRESUMED 7 UNIT SETTING IN THE COCKPIT. HE SEES THESE AIRPLANES ALL THE TIME; AND KNEW WHERE THE STABILIZER USUALLY WAS WITH THE TRIM SETTING AS IT USUALLY IS AT 7 UNITS. THIS ONE JUST DIDN'T LOOK RIGHT. WHEN HE CAME TO THE COCKPIT; HE EXPECTED TO SEE THE TRIM SET AT SOME OTHER SETTING. HOWEVER; IT WAS RIGHT ON 7 UNITS; AS IT USUALLY IS. I ASKED HIM TO CHK IT AGAIN; AND WHEN HE VERIFIED THAT IT WASN'T WHERE HE ALWAYS SEES IT; WE CALLED MAINT TO HAVE THEM CHK IT OUT. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION; ONE OF THE MECHS WALKED OVER AND LOOKED AT ANOTHER B777 AIRPLANE; AND VERIFIED THAT THE REF PAINT STRIPES ON THIS AIRPLANE DO NOT COME CLOSE TO MATCHING THE OTHERS ON THE FIELD. MAINT BEGAN A SERIES OF PHONE CONSULTATIONS TO FIND OUT WHAT TO DO ABOUT THIS PROB; WHICH RESULTED (3 1/2 HRS LATER) IN THE PLANE BEING TAKEN OTS AND ANOTHER PLANE ASSIGNED TO THE FLT. APPARENTLY; THERE ID NO ALTERNATE PROC FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE PAINT OR COCKPIT INDICATOR IS CORRECT; AND THEY COULD NOT COME UP WITH A REF UNDER WHICH THEY COULD RELEASE THE AIRPLANE TO CONTINUE. I UNDERSTAND THIS LIMITATION ON MAINT; BUT WHY COULD NO ONE; NOT STATION MAINT; AND NOT EVEN BOEING; AUTHORIZE SOME ALTERNATE MEANS OF DETERMINING WHAT TO DO IN THIS SIT? THE AIRPLANE HAD BEEN GIVEN A NEW PAINT SCHEME RECENTLY AND THE PAINT STRIPES FOR STABILIZER TRIM REF WERE IMPROPERLY PAINTED. HOW LONG HAS THIS AIRPLANE BEEN OUT THERE FLYING AROUND SINCE THE PAINT JOB? HAS MAINT (WHO ARE REALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS COMPARISON; ACCORDING TO MY TRAINING MISSED THIS ITEM SINCE THE PAINT JOB WAS DONE? HAS EVERY OTHER FLT CREW MEMBER MISSED IT ON PREFLT? MAINT SENT US MESSAGES INDICATING THAT THE LAST MAINT CHK WAS DONE AT ZZZ1 FOLLOWED BY A FLT TO ZZZ2 WHERE HE ASSUMES THAT THE NEW PAINT JOB WAS DONE. BUT THIS WAS OVER A YR AGO. IT IS HARD FOR ME TO IMAGINE HOW THIS WAS DONE SO WRONGLY IN THE FIRST PLACE. IT IS EVEN HARDER FOR ME TO IMAGINE HOW IT HASN'T BEEN CAUGHT SINCE THEN. FIRST; WE NEED TO FIND OUT HOW THIS OCCURRED. SECOND; WE NEED TO FIND OUT HOW THE QUALITY CTL SYS MISSED A PRETTY IMPORTANT CALIBRATION ITEM AFTER THE PAINTING WAS DONE. THIRD; WHY IS THERE NO PROC IN PLACE TO DEAL WITH IT? WHY CAN NO ONE COME UP WITH ONE? FOURTH; WHY IS SUCH A POTENTIALLY CRITICAL MEASUREMENT NOT MARKED ON THE AIRPLANE WITH SOMETHING LIKE A RIVETED-IN-PLACE PANEL; WHICH CAN'T BE IMPROPERLY PAINTED; AS IT IS ON OTHER AIRPLANES? (THIS WOULD HAVE MADE THE PAINT IRRELEVANT.) CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR INDICATED THAT THIS SIT WAS DETERMINED TO HAVE ONLY OCCURRED ON THIS ONE INDIVIDUAL ACFT. THE METHOD TO CHK ON THE ACTUAL POS OF THE STABILIZER WAS TO MEASURE THE JACKSCREW POS. THIS IS A TIME CONSUMING PROC AND WAS THE REASON GIVEN FOR TAKING THE ACFT OTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.