Narrative:

On flight; during initial climb out; a loud bang was experienced about 2000 ft MSL. The first officer and myself noticed the #2 engine instruments was rolling back before the engine shutdown procedure could be executed we experienced a fire warning on the #2 engine. About 3 seconds after indication; the flight attendant called to inform us of smoke and fumes in the cabin; we proceeded with the emergency shutdown procedure and fired the #2 bottle; fire light extinguished. We had already declared an emergency and were on vectors back to ZZZZ. We ran the emergency and single engine operation checklist; contacted the flight attendants. I did a brief PA and contacted operations; informed them of the situation and returned to ZZZZ. After visual inspection was performed and no indication of smoke or fire was noted; we taxied aircraft to the gate. Supplemental information from acn 698355: emergency landing at ZZZZ airport. After hearing a loud bang coming from the right engine and subsequent loss of power; engine was shut down and emergency procedures followed. Also; the right engine t-handle was pulled and the fire extinguishing agent released; the fire light was extinguished. An engine change has been scheduled for this incident. But the director of maintenance wants to reuse the old components that were involved in this incident at any cost; bypassing company guidelines and FARS. The director was upset that these procedures were questioned; and this delayed the aircraft maintenance due he is under pressure by vice president of maintenance to produce aircraft at all costs. The director of maintenance indicated that this [engine failure] was nothing. He wanted parts pulled from engine. Damaged components to be installed on the new engine -- fast due to charter flts. He is under pressure by the vice president and at all cost; the gpm guidelines would not be applied in this instance. Because I questioned the procedure to ensure components follow gpm guidelines; and ensure they are svcable; I was told I would be fired; as instructed to him by the vice president; because he is here on a mission to change this; and he is the boss. My job is to ensure the company; and the passenger safety is first; regardless of any intimidation by these 2 mgrs; director of maintenance; and vice president of maintenance. The reasons for these actions are having no cancellations and economics of the company; without taking safety in consideration. I understand the pressure is on; still safety is the utmost. In order to prevent recurrence a meeting of all the minds should have taken place; immediately following this incident and specifics should have been provided to all shifts affected by this incident. The information provided should have included if the components affected by this blown engine should have been reused or placed in a quarantined environment with controls such as locks until a specific disposition for these components were decided on. But arguably; in this case the director of maintenance abused his authority/authorized and expected all affected parties to deviate from all published company manuals in order to gain an economic return for the company. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that his air carrier did in fact direct the removal of 26 of the failed engine's components and reinstalled them on other engines. A visual inspection was performed but the procedures for either an engine failure of fire were not complied with. Reporter is concerned about a reduced service life on the failed engine's removed components.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ATR72 EXPERIENCED A CATASTROPHIC ENG FAILURE AND FIRE INDICATION ON TKOF. EMER DECLARED; FIRE EXTINGUISHED; AND FLT RETURNED TO LAND. THE FAILED ENG'S COMPONENTS WERE NOT PROPERLY INSPECTED PRIOR TO REINSTALLATION.

Narrative: ON FLT; DURING INITIAL CLBOUT; A LOUD BANG WAS EXPERIENCED ABOUT 2000 FT MSL. THE FO AND MYSELF NOTICED THE #2 ENG INSTS WAS ROLLING BACK BEFORE THE ENG SHUTDOWN PROC COULD BE EXECUTED WE EXPERIENCED A FIRE WARNING ON THE #2 ENG. ABOUT 3 SECONDS AFTER INDICATION; THE FLT ATTENDANT CALLED TO INFORM US OF SMOKE AND FUMES IN THE CABIN; WE PROCEEDED WITH THE EMER SHUTDOWN PROC AND FIRED THE #2 BOTTLE; FIRE LIGHT EXTINGUISHED. WE HAD ALREADY DECLARED AN EMER AND WERE ON VECTORS BACK TO ZZZZ. WE RAN THE EMER AND SINGLE ENG OP CHKLIST; CONTACTED THE FLT ATTENDANTS. I DID A BRIEF PA AND CONTACTED OPS; INFORMED THEM OF THE SITUATION AND RETURNED TO ZZZZ. AFTER VISUAL INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED AND NO INDICATION OF SMOKE OR FIRE WAS NOTED; WE TAXIED ACFT TO THE GATE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 698355: EMER LNDG AT ZZZZ ARPT. AFTER HEARING A LOUD BANG COMING FROM THE R ENG AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF PWR; ENG WAS SHUT DOWN AND EMER PROCS FOLLOWED. ALSO; THE R ENG T-HANDLE WAS PULLED AND THE FIRE EXTINGUISHING AGENT RELEASED; THE FIRE LIGHT WAS EXTINGUISHED. AN ENG CHANGE HAS BEEN SCHEDULED FOR THIS INCIDENT. BUT THE DIRECTOR OF MAINT WANTS TO REUSE THE OLD COMPONENTS THAT WERE INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT AT ANY COST; BYPASSING COMPANY GUIDELINES AND FARS. THE DIRECTOR WAS UPSET THAT THESE PROCS WERE QUESTIONED; AND THIS DELAYED THE ACFT MAINT DUE HE IS UNDER PRESSURE BY VICE PRESIDENT OF MAINT TO PRODUCE ACFT AT ALL COSTS. THE DIRECTOR OF MAINT INDICATED THAT THIS [ENG FAILURE] WAS NOTHING. HE WANTED PARTS PULLED FROM ENG. DAMAGED COMPONENTS TO BE INSTALLED ON THE NEW ENG -- FAST DUE TO CHARTER FLTS. HE IS UNDER PRESSURE BY THE VICE PRESIDENT AND AT ALL COST; THE GPM GUIDELINES WOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN THIS INSTANCE. BECAUSE I QUESTIONED THE PROC TO ENSURE COMPONENTS FOLLOW GPM GUIDELINES; AND ENSURE THEY ARE SVCABLE; I WAS TOLD I WOULD BE FIRED; AS INSTRUCTED TO HIM BY THE VICE PRESIDENT; BECAUSE HE IS HERE ON A MISSION TO CHANGE THIS; AND HE IS THE BOSS. MY JOB IS TO ENSURE THE COMPANY; AND THE PAX SAFETY IS FIRST; REGARDLESS OF ANY INTIMIDATION BY THESE 2 MGRS; DIRECTOR OF MAINT; AND VICE PRESIDENT OF MAINT. THE REASONS FOR THESE ACTIONS ARE HAVING NO CANCELLATIONS AND ECONOMICS OF THE COMPANY; WITHOUT TAKING SAFETY IN CONSIDERATION. I UNDERSTAND THE PRESSURE IS ON; STILL SAFETY IS THE UTMOST. IN ORDER TO PREVENT RECURRENCE A MEETING OF ALL THE MINDS SHOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE; IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS INCIDENT AND SPECIFICS SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO ALL SHIFTS AFFECTED BY THIS INCIDENT. THE INFO PROVIDED SHOULD HAVE INCLUDED IF THE COMPONENTS AFFECTED BY THIS BLOWN ENG SHOULD HAVE BEEN REUSED OR PLACED IN A QUARANTINED ENVIRONMENT WITH CTLS SUCH AS LOCKS UNTIL A SPECIFIC DISPOSITION FOR THESE COMPONENTS WERE DECIDED ON. BUT ARGUABLY; IN THIS CASE THE DIRECTOR OF MAINT ABUSED HIS AUTH AND EXPECTED ALL AFFECTED PARTIES TO DEVIATE FROM ALL PUBLISHED COMPANY MANUALS IN ORDER TO GAIN AN ECONOMIC RETURN FOR THE COMPANY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HIS ACR DID IN FACT DIRECT THE REMOVAL OF 26 OF THE FAILED ENG'S COMPONENTS AND REINSTALLED THEM ON OTHER ENGS. A VISUAL INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED BUT THE PROCS FOR EITHER AN ENG FAILURE OF FIRE WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH. RPTR IS CONCERNED ABOUT A REDUCED SERVICE LIFE ON THE FAILED ENG'S REMOVED COMPONENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.