Narrative:

Departing runway 4R; the first officer reported that it was difficult to maintain flight controls in the neutral position and that applying right aileron authority/authorized was difficult. I then took positive control of the aircraft to verify the first officer's observation. The first officer's observation was accurate and I immediately tasked the first officer with contacting tower requesting landing on runway 4R. While maneuvering to come back around to land runway 4R; I attempted to southeast right aileron trip but the aileron trim was extremely stiff and barely moved. At this point I made the decision not to continue troubleshooting and land the plane where further troubleshooting could take place. I was able to maintain positive control of the aircraft but did have to apply an unusual amount of right aileron authority/authorized to maneuver the aircraft to landing. After landing I contacted maintenance and wrote up the discrepancy. I notified all required personnel per company procedures. I contacted maintenance approximately 3 hours later to follow up and was told that a complete and thorough inspection was conducted of the flight controls and everything was found in normal condition. In addition; an fcf was conducted and the flight controls were found to be normal. The director of maintenance informed me that based on the inspection and to the best of his knowledge; maintenance did not neutralize the aileron trim following maintenance work on the flight controls and that the flight crew departed with excessive left aileron trim set. I informed him that we conducted all pre-takeoff checklist items; verifying that trim was set appropriately for takeoff. Human performance considerations: as I situation here writing this I cannot say with a 100% degree of certainty that I verified that the aileron trim was set at 0 degrees (takeoff position). I know I looked at the aileron trim but maybe I thought I saw the correct setting. Maintenance's observations definitely planted a seed of doubt in my mind so I have to go with the assumption that I probably did takeoff with excessive left aileron trim and did not verify the correct setting prior to takeoff. The fact that the aileron trim was so difficult to adjust in the air perplexes me. My explanation is that perhaps because the aileron trim is used rarely on this aircraft this resulted in the trim cables being stiff as opposed to smooth. Perhaps I should have spent more time troubleshooting in the air and applying greater force on the aileron trim. I never did get a good view of the aileron trim setting in the air because I was more concerned with flying the plane. I should have used my first officer to verify the setting in the air; but again; my primary concern was getting the plane on the ground safely; and I was with a low-time first officer. Lots of lessons to be learned.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SHORTS SD3-60 FLT CREW HAS CONTROL PROBLEMS ON DEP FROM HNL.

Narrative: DEPARTING RWY 4R; THE FO REPORTED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN FLT CTLS IN THE NEUTRAL POSITION AND THAT APPLYING RIGHT AILERON AUTH WAS DIFFICULT. I THEN TOOK POSITIVE CTL OF THE ACFT TO VERIFY THE FO'S OBSERVATION. THE FO'S OBSERVATION WAS ACCURATE AND I IMMEDIATELY TASKED THE FO WITH CONTACTING TWR REQUESTING LNDG ON RWY 4R. WHILE MANEUVERING TO COME BACK AROUND TO LAND RWY 4R; I ATTEMPTED TO SE RIGHT AILERON TRIP BUT THE AILERON TRIM WAS EXTREMELY STIFF AND BARELY MOVED. AT THIS POINT I MADE THE DECISION NOT TO CONTINUE TROUBLESHOOTING AND LAND THE PLANE WHERE FURTHER TROUBLESHOOTING COULD TAKE PLACE. I WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN POSITIVE CTL OF THE ACFT BUT DID HAVE TO APPLY AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF RIGHT AILERON AUTH TO MANEUVER THE ACFT TO LNDG. AFTER LNDG I CONTACTED MAINT AND WROTE UP THE DISCREPANCY. I NOTIFIED ALL REQUIRED PERSONNEL PER COMPANY PROCS. I CONTACTED MAINT APPROX 3 HRS LATER TO FOLLOW UP AND WAS TOLD THAT A COMPLETE AND THOROUGH INSPECTION WAS CONDUCTED OF THE FLT CTLS AND EVERYTHING WAS FOUND IN NORMAL CONDITION. IN ADDITION; AN FCF WAS CONDUCTED AND THE FLT CTLS WERE FOUND TO BE NORMAL. THE DIRECTOR OF MAINT INFORMED ME THAT BASED ON THE INSPECTION AND TO THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE; MAINT DID NOT NEUTRALIZE THE AILERON TRIM FOLLOWING MAINT WORK ON THE FLT CONTROLS AND THAT THE FLT CREW DEPARTED WITH EXCESSIVE LEFT AILERON TRIM SET. I INFORMED HIM THAT WE CONDUCTED ALL PRE-TKOF CHECKLIST ITEMS; VERIFYING THAT TRIM WAS SET APPROPRIATELY FOR TKOF. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: AS I SIT HERE WRITING THIS I CANNOT SAY WITH A 100% DEGREE OF CERTAINTY THAT I VERIFIED THAT THE AILERON TRIM WAS SET AT 0 DEGREES (TKOF POSITION). I KNOW I LOOKED AT THE AILERON TRIM BUT MAYBE I THOUGHT I SAW THE CORRECT SETTING. MAINT'S OBSERVATIONS DEFINITELY PLANTED A SEED OF DOUBT IN MY MIND SO I HAVE TO GO WITH THE ASSUMPTION THAT I PROBABLY DID TKOF WITH EXCESSIVE L AILERON TRIM AND DID NOT VERIFY THE CORRECT SETTING PRIOR TO TKOF. THE FACT THAT THE AILERON TRIM WAS SO DIFFICULT TO ADJUST IN THE AIR PERPLEXES ME. MY EXPLANATION IS THAT PERHAPS BECAUSE THE AILERON TRIM IS USED RARELY ON THIS ACFT THIS RESULTED IN THE TRIM CABLES BEING STIFF AS OPPOSED TO SMOOTH. PERHAPS I SHOULD HAVE SPENT MORE TIME TROUBLESHOOTING IN THE AIR AND APPLYING GREATER FORCE ON THE AILERON TRIM. I NEVER DID GET A GOOD VIEW OF THE AILERON TRIM SETTING IN THE AIR BECAUSE I WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH FLYING THE PLANE. I SHOULD HAVE USED MY FO TO VERIFY THE SETTING IN THE AIR; BUT AGAIN; MY PRIMARY CONCERN WAS GETTING THE PLANE ON THE GND SAFELY; AND I WAS WITH A LOW-TIME FO. LOTS OF LESSONS TO BE LEARNED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.