Narrative:

As we were vectored for the ILS; we encountered a 30 KT tailwind that pushed us high on the approach. The captain was flying and was trying to slow the aircraft using speed brakes with landing gear down. At 200 KTS; he stowed the speed brakes and called for flaps 1 degree and then flaps 5 degrees. The GS was captured on the autoplt and the approach continued below 4000 ft. With the strong tailwind; the aircraft was not slowing; so the captain disengaged the autoplt and reduced the descent and called for flaps 15 degrees. We were now high on the glide path and the approach was not looking good. Passing about 2000 ft the aircraft was holding at 175 KTS as the captain called for flaps 30 degrees. I responded by saying we needed to slow further before I could do that. The captain then informed me the speed was ok and he would explain why after the approach. I had confirmed the flap speeds on the placard and knew the flaps 30 degree maximum speed was 165 KTS; but with time short; trusted the captain with the decision. I selected flaps 30 degrees with some hesitation. Soon afterward it was very apparent that this approach was not going to work and the captain initiated a go around at about 1500 ft AGL. We had held 175 KTS with flaps 30 degrees for about 30 seconds. We cleaned up according to the fom and proceeded with the go around. On downwind; I queried the captain about the flap speeds and pointed out the flap limit placard. At this point he realized his error. The following approach and landing was normal. We talked about our errors on the ground. We called maintenance control and logged the incident in the logbook. As the overspd was only 10 KTS; they said it just required a maintenance note and would be inspected down the line. Obviously; I should not have selected flaps 30 degrees above the maximum speed for that confign. My perception was that the captain had some additional guidance that I did not know about because of the confidence in his voice. He made me doubt my knowledge in that time compressed situation. In retrospect; I should have persisted with my statement that we were too fast for flaps 30 degrees. Supplemental information from acn 698888: called for flaps 30 degrees at about 175 KTS. The first officer questioned whether we were too fast and I reassured him with great confidence that we were ok and I would explain later. During radar vectors to final; I realized what I had done. Poor CRM on my part since my first officer questioned me on it and I did not address his concerns. Also (and obvious) poor system knowledge on my part. Recommended considering making flap placard speed memory item.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 FLT CREW EXCEEDS FLAP EXTENSION SPD ON APCH.

Narrative: AS WE WERE VECTORED FOR THE ILS; WE ENCOUNTERED A 30 KT TAILWIND THAT PUSHED US HIGH ON THE APCH. THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND WAS TRYING TO SLOW THE ACFT USING SPD BRAKES WITH LNDG GEAR DOWN. AT 200 KTS; HE STOWED THE SPD BRAKES AND CALLED FOR FLAPS 1 DEG AND THEN FLAPS 5 DEGS. THE GS WAS CAPTURED ON THE AUTOPLT AND THE APCH CONTINUED BELOW 4000 FT. WITH THE STRONG TAILWIND; THE ACFT WAS NOT SLOWING; SO THE CAPT DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND REDUCED THE DSCNT AND CALLED FOR FLAPS 15 DEGS. WE WERE NOW HIGH ON THE GLIDE PATH AND THE APCH WAS NOT LOOKING GOOD. PASSING ABOUT 2000 FT THE ACFT WAS HOLDING AT 175 KTS AS THE CAPT CALLED FOR FLAPS 30 DEGS. I RESPONDED BY SAYING WE NEEDED TO SLOW FURTHER BEFORE I COULD DO THAT. THE CAPT THEN INFORMED ME THE SPD WAS OK AND HE WOULD EXPLAIN WHY AFTER THE APCH. I HAD CONFIRMED THE FLAP SPDS ON THE PLACARD AND KNEW THE FLAPS 30 DEG MAX SPD WAS 165 KTS; BUT WITH TIME SHORT; TRUSTED THE CAPT WITH THE DECISION. I SELECTED FLAPS 30 DEGS WITH SOME HESITATION. SOON AFTERWARD IT WAS VERY APPARENT THAT THIS APCH WAS NOT GOING TO WORK AND THE CAPT INITIATED A GAR AT ABOUT 1500 FT AGL. WE HAD HELD 175 KTS WITH FLAPS 30 DEGS FOR ABOUT 30 SECONDS. WE CLEANED UP ACCORDING TO THE FOM AND PROCEEDED WITH THE GAR. ON DOWNWIND; I QUERIED THE CAPT ABOUT THE FLAP SPDS AND POINTED OUT THE FLAP LIMIT PLACARD. AT THIS POINT HE REALIZED HIS ERROR. THE FOLLOWING APCH AND LNDG WAS NORMAL. WE TALKED ABOUT OUR ERRORS ON THE GND. WE CALLED MAINT CTL AND LOGGED THE INCIDENT IN THE LOGBOOK. AS THE OVERSPD WAS ONLY 10 KTS; THEY SAID IT JUST REQUIRED A MAINT NOTE AND WOULD BE INSPECTED DOWN THE LINE. OBVIOUSLY; I SHOULD NOT HAVE SELECTED FLAPS 30 DEGS ABOVE THE MAX SPD FOR THAT CONFIGN. MY PERCEPTION WAS THAT THE CAPT HAD SOME ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE THAT I DID NOT KNOW ABOUT BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENCE IN HIS VOICE. HE MADE ME DOUBT MY KNOWLEDGE IN THAT TIME COMPRESSED SIT. IN RETROSPECT; I SHOULD HAVE PERSISTED WITH MY STATEMENT THAT WE WERE TOO FAST FOR FLAPS 30 DEGS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 698888: CALLED FOR FLAPS 30 DEGS AT ABOUT 175 KTS. THE FO QUESTIONED WHETHER WE WERE TOO FAST AND I REASSURED HIM WITH GREAT CONFIDENCE THAT WE WERE OK AND I WOULD EXPLAIN LATER. DURING RADAR VECTORS TO FINAL; I REALIZED WHAT I HAD DONE. POOR CRM ON MY PART SINCE MY FO QUESTIONED ME ON IT AND I DID NOT ADDRESS HIS CONCERNS. ALSO (AND OBVIOUS) POOR SYS KNOWLEDGE ON MY PART. RECOMMENDED CONSIDERING MAKING FLAP PLACARD SPD MEMORY ITEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.