Narrative:

On thurs/jun/06; a mechanic handed me an engineering authority. I look over the paperwork and did not agree with it. The production supervisor called my supervisor. The supervisor came into the ready room and asked me to stamp off the paper work or get a union steward. My supervisor went to the engineering department to tell me why the step I was to sign off was good. There is no leak check on the engineering authority or non routine card. There is no way to reject an engineering authority. Production says they did not have enough time to fix the non routine; and engineering said they can make anything they want an inspection item. I did not feel safe stamping the cards off. I was strong armed into signing this paperwork.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the airplane was a B737-300 and the engineering repair was to tighten fasteners that were loose and elongated on a panel located on the lower fuselage under the center fuel cell. The panel was not removed for the repair and only the loose and elongated fasteners were worked. The reporter; assigned as a structures inspector with 37 years aircraft maintenance experience; refused to sign off the final inspection due to not having confidence in the repair procedure. The repair procedure did not include a pressure leak check and was given a 5 year rechk; which the rprter did not feel was realistic. The reporter; at a meeting with engineering production management; and inspection management; was pressured into signing the final inspection.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 ENGINEERING REPAIR AUTHORITY WAS WORKED ON A FUSELAGE PANEL WITH LOOSE FASTENERS LOCATED UNDER THE CENTER FUEL CELL. INSPECTOR REFUSES TO SIGN FINAL INSPECTION DUE TO INCOMPLETE PAPERWORK THAT LACKED A PRESSURE LEAK CHK.

Narrative: ON THURS/JUN/06; A MECHANIC HANDED ME AN ENGINEERING AUTHORITY. I LOOK OVER THE PAPERWORK AND DID NOT AGREE WITH IT. THE PRODUCTION SUPVR CALLED MY SUPVR. THE SUPVR CAME INTO THE READY ROOM AND ASKED ME TO STAMP OFF THE PAPER WORK OR GET A UNION STEWARD. MY SUPVR WENT TO THE ENGINEERING DEPT TO TELL ME WHY THE STEP I WAS TO SIGN OFF WAS GOOD. THERE IS NO LEAK CHK ON THE ENGINEERING AUTHORITY OR NON ROUTINE CARD. THERE IS NO WAY TO REJECT AN ENGINEERING AUTHORITY. PRODUCTION SAYS THEY DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO FIX THE NON ROUTINE; AND ENGINEERING SAID THEY CAN MAKE ANYTHING THEY WANT AN INSPECTION ITEM. I DID NOT FEEL SAFE STAMPING THE CARDS OFF. I WAS STRONG ARMED INTO SIGNING THIS PAPERWORK.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE AIRPLANE WAS A B737-300 AND THE ENGINEERING REPAIR WAS TO TIGHTEN FASTENERS THAT WERE LOOSE AND ELONGATED ON A PANEL LOCATED ON THE LOWER FUSELAGE UNDER THE CENTER FUEL CELL. THE PANEL WAS NOT REMOVED FOR THE REPAIR AND ONLY THE LOOSE AND ELONGATED FASTENERS WERE WORKED. THE RPTR; ASSIGNED AS A STRUCTURES INSPECTOR WITH 37 YEARS ACFT MAINT EXPERIENCE; REFUSED TO SIGN OFF THE FINAL INSPECTION DUE TO NOT HAVING CONFIDENCE IN THE REPAIR PROC. THE REPAIR PROC DID NOT INCLUDE A PRESSURE LEAK CHK AND WAS GIVEN A 5 YEAR RECHK; WHICH THE RPRTER DID NOT FEEL WAS REALISTIC. THE RPTR; AT A MEETING WITH ENGINEERING PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT; AND INSPECTION MANAGEMENT; WAS PRESSURED INTO SIGNING THE FINAL INSPECTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.