37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 700317 |
Time | |
Date | 200606 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | special use airspace : ege.othersua |
State Reference | CO |
Altitude | msl single value : 15000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dusk |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zdv.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Route In Use | approach : instrument non precision |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 9500 flight time type : 3236 |
ASRS Report | 700317 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 12000 flight time type : 2100 |
ASRS Report | 700318 |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : provided flight assist flight crew : took precautionary avoidance action |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Airspace Structure Company |
Primary Problem | Airspace Structure |
Narrative:
I was PNF on flight to ege. We started with a mechanical that caused us to be late out; therefore; late into and out of ord. Blocked out 1 hour 40 mins late; and a 67 min taxi out waiting for takeoff. Once we leveled in cruise flight out of ord; we reviewed all of the plates for ege; the NOTAMS; and even had the bulletin for the ege approach in our possession. We began building the lda localizer/DME FMS runway 25 approach into the mcdu as per the bulletin including all of the minimum altitudes. We thoroughly briefed; checked and crosschecked each step of this approach. The flight was uneventful until arriving in the ege area. On descent to the IAF (rlg) between FL200 and 15000 ft; we were told by ATC of a tfr in ege. This was the first we had heard of this! The controller did not have exact information on the tfr. We slowed to holding speed to give us more time to digest the information. We were told that it was in effect at that time and was a 3 NM radius; 3000 ft AGL and below; 14.7 NM on the 064 degree radial from sxw. We asked for help from ATC and dispatch for interpretation and definition of the effect during which time we entered holding at rlg at 15000 ft. Dispatch responded that the tfr was not in the system because the NOTAM desk said it did not apply to our air carrier. ATC said it would have little impact and initially defined the western boundary to be at the D8.5 iege on the lda and 9500 ft MSL (3000 ft afe). So we said we would start the approach from rlg. Somewhere prior to talia we were told that ATC's new interpretation was that the highest terrain that they could identify in the tfr was 9000 ft and that now he was saying that we would have to maintain 12000 ft MSL until the D8.5 iege. At this point we told him that we did not think it was going to be possible to make it down from there but that we had begun the approach and would continue and take a look at the viability but that he could expect us to be executing the missed approach and a return to den. The base of the clouds were at 15000 ft MSL and visibility was excellent -- we had visual contact with the runway just inside rlg. We could see the roads; colorado river and interstate 70; and some visibility of the terrain in the dusk. Prior to talia we had gear down; flaps 3 degrees and at the flaps 3 reference speed and 13000 ft. After talia we were cleared to 12000 ft. At D8.5 iege we were cleared down. I began the descent. We agreed that if we were not on profile and stabilized by 1000 ft afe we would execute the missed approach as published. We achieved stabilized criteria prior to D4.5 iege; 1200 ft afe. At 1000 ft afe we were on profile; gear down; flaps full; and speed at reference KTS. Landing was uneventful. One reason for the crew not being provided the tfr information was that the NOTAM desk believed that it would not affect air carrier is that the flight was scheduled to be coming in day VFR and could have made a visual approach with little to no impact; but due to our late arrival at dusk it had a significant impact and would continue to have an impact on all of our flts that go into ege on the straight-in approach to runway 25 until the NOTAM is cancelled. This was a very systemic problem in that almost all parties involved either had no timely knowledge of these tfr's; or did not have an understanding of them; or were able to make an interpretation of them and of their impact on our operation; all the way from ATC; dispatch; crew; tower; and NOTAM desk.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: THE CREW OF AN A320 LEARNED FROM ZDV WHILE DSNDING INTO EGE THAT A TFR WAS IN EFFECT AND WOULD AFFECT THEIR APCH PATH. THE TFR REQUIRED THE CREW TO MAINTAIN 1200 FT TO 8 PT 5 DME WITH AN ARPT ELEVATION OF 6500 FT.
Narrative: I WAS PNF ON FLT TO EGE. WE STARTED WITH A MECHANICAL THAT CAUSED US TO BE LATE OUT; THEREFORE; LATE INTO AND OUT OF ORD. BLOCKED OUT 1 HR 40 MINS LATE; AND A 67 MIN TAXI OUT WAITING FOR TKOF. ONCE WE LEVELED IN CRUISE FLT OUT OF ORD; WE REVIEWED ALL OF THE PLATES FOR EGE; THE NOTAMS; AND EVEN HAD THE BULLETIN FOR THE EGE APCH IN OUR POSSESSION. WE BEGAN BUILDING THE LDA LOC/DME FMS RWY 25 APCH INTO THE MCDU AS PER THE BULLETIN INCLUDING ALL OF THE MINIMUM ALTS. WE THOROUGHLY BRIEFED; CHKED AND XCHKED EACH STEP OF THIS APCH. THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL UNTIL ARRIVING IN THE EGE AREA. ON DSCNT TO THE IAF (RLG) BTWN FL200 AND 15000 FT; WE WERE TOLD BY ATC OF A TFR IN EGE. THIS WAS THE FIRST WE HAD HEARD OF THIS! THE CTLR DID NOT HAVE EXACT INFO ON THE TFR. WE SLOWED TO HOLDING SPD TO GIVE US MORE TIME TO DIGEST THE INFO. WE WERE TOLD THAT IT WAS IN EFFECT AT THAT TIME AND WAS A 3 NM RADIUS; 3000 FT AGL AND BELOW; 14.7 NM ON THE 064 DEG RADIAL FROM SXW. WE ASKED FOR HELP FROM ATC AND DISPATCH FOR INTERP AND DEFINITION OF THE EFFECT DURING WHICH TIME WE ENTERED HOLDING AT RLG AT 15000 FT. DISPATCH RESPONDED THAT THE TFR WAS NOT IN THE SYS BECAUSE THE NOTAM DESK SAID IT DID NOT APPLY TO OUR ACR. ATC SAID IT WOULD HAVE LITTLE IMPACT AND INITIALLY DEFINED THE WESTERN BOUNDARY TO BE AT THE D8.5 IEGE ON THE LDA AND 9500 FT MSL (3000 FT AFE). SO WE SAID WE WOULD START THE APCH FROM RLG. SOMEWHERE PRIOR TO TALIA WE WERE TOLD THAT ATC'S NEW INTERP WAS THAT THE HIGHEST TERRAIN THAT THEY COULD IDENT IN THE TFR WAS 9000 FT AND THAT NOW HE WAS SAYING THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO MAINTAIN 12000 FT MSL UNTIL THE D8.5 IEGE. AT THIS POINT WE TOLD HIM THAT WE DID NOT THINK IT WAS GOING TO BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE IT DOWN FROM THERE BUT THAT WE HAD BEGUN THE APCH AND WOULD CONTINUE AND TAKE A LOOK AT THE VIABILITY BUT THAT HE COULD EXPECT US TO BE EXECUTING THE MISSED APCH AND A RETURN TO DEN. THE BASE OF THE CLOUDS WERE AT 15000 FT MSL AND VISIBILITY WAS EXCELLENT -- WE HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE RWY JUST INSIDE RLG. WE COULD SEE THE ROADS; COLORADO RIVER AND INTERSTATE 70; AND SOME VISIBILITY OF THE TERRAIN IN THE DUSK. PRIOR TO TALIA WE HAD GEAR DOWN; FLAPS 3 DEGS AND AT THE FLAPS 3 REF SPD AND 13000 FT. AFTER TALIA WE WERE CLRED TO 12000 FT. AT D8.5 IEGE WE WERE CLRED DOWN. I BEGAN THE DSCNT. WE AGREED THAT IF WE WERE NOT ON PROFILE AND STABILIZED BY 1000 FT AFE WE WOULD EXECUTE THE MISSED APCH AS PUBLISHED. WE ACHIEVED STABILIZED CRITERIA PRIOR TO D4.5 IEGE; 1200 FT AFE. AT 1000 FT AFE WE WERE ON PROFILE; GEAR DOWN; FLAPS FULL; AND SPD AT REF KTS. LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. ONE REASON FOR THE CREW NOT BEING PROVIDED THE TFR INFO WAS THAT THE NOTAM DESK BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD NOT AFFECT ACR IS THAT THE FLT WAS SCHEDULED TO BE COMING IN DAY VFR AND COULD HAVE MADE A VISUAL APCH WITH LITTLE TO NO IMPACT; BUT DUE TO OUR LATE ARR AT DUSK IT HAD A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT AND WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON ALL OF OUR FLTS THAT GO INTO EGE ON THE STRAIGHT-IN APCH TO RWY 25 UNTIL THE NOTAM IS CANCELLED. THIS WAS A VERY SYSTEMIC PROB IN THAT ALMOST ALL PARTIES INVOLVED EITHER HAD NO TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF THESE TFR'S; OR DID NOT HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING OF THEM; OR WERE ABLE TO MAKE AN INTERP OF THEM AND OF THEIR IMPACT ON OUR OP; ALL THE WAY FROM ATC; DISPATCH; CREW; TWR; AND NOTAM DESK.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.