Narrative:

Aircraft #1 instructed to follow another aircraft on opposite downwind which required aircraft #1 to extend downwind. Aircraft #1 cleared for touch-and-go. Aircraft #2 cleared touch-and-go to follow us. Aircraft #2 acknowledged; but instead turned early base and was on a collision course and closing fast when aircraft #1 took evasive action by turning right to avoid collision. It is my opinion that pilot of aircraft #2 did not see aircraft #1. Had aircraft #1 not taken evasive action; a collision would have occurred. Contributing factors: tower controller was new and being trained. Aircraft #2 pilot very inexperienced and later acknowledged he thought he was following a different aircraft. Tower controller did not see aircraft #2 deviate from clearance until about the same time aircraft #1 did abrupt evasive maneuver. Aircraft #1 pilot did not see aircraft #2 until abrupt evasive action necessary. (Speculation -- had aircraft #1 been a cessna; a collision would have occurred due to obscuration by window frame and high wing). Aircraft #2 pilot told to follow 'katana' -- failed to make positive identify of 'katana.' aircraft #2 was a color which made it difficult to see on a cloudy/partly cloudy day. Corrective actions: maintain situational awareness and include scan to check for conflicting traffic in range of 8-12-4 O'clock position in traffic pattern when on final regardless if at a tower controled airport. Suggest flight instructors ensure students can identify different aircraft types. Suggest all pilots question their sequence if in doubt. Encourage development of low cost TCAS and capstone equipment. Have controllers monitor all traffic more closely. Emphasize 'see and avoid.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DA20 PLT AT MRI EXPERIENCED AN NMAC WITH A C150 PLT WHO MISIDENTED OTHER TFC INSTEAD OF THE RPTED TFC WHILE IN THE LNDG PATTERN.

Narrative: ACFT #1 INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW ANOTHER ACFT ON OPPOSITE DOWNWIND WHICH REQUIRED ACFT #1 TO EXTEND DOWNWIND. ACFT #1 CLRED FOR TOUCH-AND-GO. ACFT #2 CLRED TOUCH-AND-GO TO FOLLOW US. ACFT #2 ACKNOWLEDGED; BUT INSTEAD TURNED EARLY BASE AND WAS ON A COLLISION COURSE AND CLOSING FAST WHEN ACFT #1 TOOK EVASIVE ACTION BY TURNING R TO AVOID COLLISION. IT IS MY OPINION THAT PLT OF ACFT #2 DID NOT SEE ACFT #1. HAD ACFT #1 NOT TAKEN EVASIVE ACTION; A COLLISION WOULD HAVE OCCURRED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: TWR CTLR WAS NEW AND BEING TRAINED. ACFT #2 PLT VERY INEXPERIENCED AND LATER ACKNOWLEDGED HE THOUGHT HE WAS FOLLOWING A DIFFERENT ACFT. TWR CTLR DID NOT SEE ACFT #2 DEVIATE FROM CLRNC UNTIL ABOUT THE SAME TIME ACFT #1 DID ABRUPT EVASIVE MANEUVER. ACFT #1 PLT DID NOT SEE ACFT #2 UNTIL ABRUPT EVASIVE ACTION NECESSARY. (SPECULATION -- HAD ACFT #1 BEEN A CESSNA; A COLLISION WOULD HAVE OCCURRED DUE TO OBSCURATION BY WINDOW FRAME AND HIGH WING). ACFT #2 PLT TOLD TO FOLLOW 'KATANA' -- FAILED TO MAKE POSITIVE IDENT OF 'KATANA.' ACFT #2 WAS A COLOR WHICH MADE IT DIFFICULT TO SEE ON A CLOUDY/PARTLY CLOUDY DAY. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND INCLUDE SCAN TO CHK FOR CONFLICTING TFC IN RANGE OF 8-12-4 O'CLOCK POS IN TFC PATTERN WHEN ON FINAL REGARDLESS IF AT A TWR CTLED ARPT. SUGGEST FLT INSTRUCTORS ENSURE STUDENTS CAN IDENT DIFFERENT ACFT TYPES. SUGGEST ALL PLTS QUESTION THEIR SEQUENCE IF IN DOUBT. ENCOURAGE DEVELOPMENT OF LOW COST TCAS AND CAPSTONE EQUIP. HAVE CTLRS MONITOR ALL TFC MORE CLOSELY. EMPHASIZE 'SEE AND AVOID.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.