Narrative:

Backgnd; flight was from rdm to uao. WX: sky clear; visibility at least 20 SM. I decided to fly VFR; rather than file IFR as I usually do. I did not get a verbal; live FSS briefing for the flight; nor did I file a VFR flight plan. I planned to; and did; request ATC radar advisories en route. I did get a computerized WX briefing and consulted the seattle sectional chart curing the flight. Event: descending into uao; I was handed off to portland approach (118.1) by ZSE and was squawking an assigned code for radar advisories. On initial contact; portland gave no TA's. Soon after; portland called to terminate my radar service and advised me to squawk 1200. No TA given at that time either. Fortunately; I continued listening on portland's frequency. I heard portland advise another aircraft of my position. That aircraft; a jump plane; reported to portland that he was looking for me and that his jumpers were away. I was about to ask portland about the jump plane's position when; all about at the same time; the following happened: the jump plane reported me in sight; then told portland I was heading through the drop area; I visually acquired the jumpers; disconnected autoplt and started a left turn to avoid; and I transmitted to portland that I heard the xmissions and was turning to avoid. I estimate being at the parachutists altitude and about 2000 ft away at closest point. Contributing factors: 1) portland approachs omissions of advisory to me about the jump plane and its operation. Perhaps this was not required on the controller's part; but it would have prevented the event. Portland did not appear to be overly busy at the time; and there was time available to advise the jump plane about me (but I think it would have been more critical to advise me about the jump plane). 2) my decision to fly VFR instead of IFR. 3) lack of situational awareness on my part. Although sectional was open and being actively consulted in the cockpit; I did not see the parachute symbol for the area and was unfamiliar with the area. 4) WX briefing for uao via website did not indicate jump operation for nearby airport. (Question: would a live FSS briefing even have alerted me?) preventing factors: 1) my decision to remain listening on portland approach frequency. 2) jump plane pilot's vigilance and radio calls to portland. 3) good visual scanning and prompt reaction from me. 4) briefing to my right seat passenger to point out anything she saw; even if she thought I saw it already (her pointing enabled me to quickly acquire jumpers visually). Changes to my future flight operations: 1) always file and fly IFR when practical; even when WX is clear. 2) always have sectional out and consult when in VMC. 3) make a habit of asking ATC; when radar service is being terminated; if there is any traffic ahead I should be aware of.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE PLT OF A PA31 RPTS ENCOUNTERING SKYDIVERS OVER MOLALLA ARPT AT 4000 FT. THE PLT WAS USING VFR FLT FOLLOWING FROM PDX APCH; ALONG WITH THE SKYDIVING ACFT. THE PA31 PLT RECEIVED NO WARNINGS.

Narrative: BACKGND; FLT WAS FROM RDM TO UAO. WX: SKY CLR; VISIBILITY AT LEAST 20 SM. I DECIDED TO FLY VFR; RATHER THAN FILE IFR AS I USUALLY DO. I DID NOT GET A VERBAL; LIVE FSS BRIEFING FOR THE FLT; NOR DID I FILE A VFR FLT PLAN. I PLANNED TO; AND DID; REQUEST ATC RADAR ADVISORIES ENRTE. I DID GET A COMPUTERIZED WX BRIEFING AND CONSULTED THE SEATTLE SECTIONAL CHART CURING THE FLT. EVENT: DSNDING INTO UAO; I WAS HANDED OFF TO PORTLAND APCH (118.1) BY ZSE AND WAS SQUAWKING AN ASSIGNED CODE FOR RADAR ADVISORIES. ON INITIAL CONTACT; PORTLAND GAVE NO TA'S. SOON AFTER; PORTLAND CALLED TO TERMINATE MY RADAR SVC AND ADVISED ME TO SQUAWK 1200. NO TA GIVEN AT THAT TIME EITHER. FORTUNATELY; I CONTINUED LISTENING ON PORTLAND'S FREQ. I HEARD PORTLAND ADVISE ANOTHER ACFT OF MY POS. THAT ACFT; A JUMP PLANE; RPTED TO PORTLAND THAT HE WAS LOOKING FOR ME AND THAT HIS JUMPERS WERE AWAY. I WAS ABOUT TO ASK PORTLAND ABOUT THE JUMP PLANE'S POS WHEN; ALL ABOUT AT THE SAME TIME; THE FOLLOWING HAPPENED: THE JUMP PLANE RPTED ME IN SIGHT; THEN TOLD PORTLAND I WAS HEADING THROUGH THE DROP AREA; I VISUALLY ACQUIRED THE JUMPERS; DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND STARTED A L TURN TO AVOID; AND I XMITTED TO PORTLAND THAT I HEARD THE XMISSIONS AND WAS TURNING TO AVOID. I ESTIMATE BEING AT THE PARACHUTISTS ALT AND ABOUT 2000 FT AWAY AT CLOSEST POINT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) PORTLAND APCHS OMISSIONS OF ADVISORY TO ME ABOUT THE JUMP PLANE AND ITS OP. PERHAPS THIS WAS NOT REQUIRED ON THE CTLR'S PART; BUT IT WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE EVENT. PORTLAND DID NOT APPEAR TO BE OVERLY BUSY AT THE TIME; AND THERE WAS TIME AVAILABLE TO ADVISE THE JUMP PLANE ABOUT ME (BUT I THINK IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE CRITICAL TO ADVISE ME ABOUT THE JUMP PLANE). 2) MY DECISION TO FLY VFR INSTEAD OF IFR. 3) LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ON MY PART. ALTHOUGH SECTIONAL WAS OPEN AND BEING ACTIVELY CONSULTED IN THE COCKPIT; I DID NOT SEE THE PARACHUTE SYMBOL FOR THE AREA AND WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE AREA. 4) WX BRIEFING FOR UAO VIA WEBSITE DID NOT INDICATE JUMP OP FOR NEARBY ARPT. (QUESTION: WOULD A LIVE FSS BRIEFING EVEN HAVE ALERTED ME?) PREVENTING FACTORS: 1) MY DECISION TO REMAIN LISTENING ON PORTLAND APCH FREQ. 2) JUMP PLANE PLT'S VIGILANCE AND RADIO CALLS TO PORTLAND. 3) GOOD VISUAL SCANNING AND PROMPT REACTION FROM ME. 4) BRIEFING TO MY R SEAT PAX TO POINT OUT ANYTHING SHE SAW; EVEN IF SHE THOUGHT I SAW IT ALREADY (HER POINTING ENABLED ME TO QUICKLY ACQUIRE JUMPERS VISUALLY). CHANGES TO MY FUTURE FLT OPS: 1) ALWAYS FILE AND FLY IFR WHEN PRACTICAL; EVEN WHEN WX IS CLR. 2) ALWAYS HAVE SECTIONAL OUT AND CONSULT WHEN IN VMC. 3) MAKE A HABIT OF ASKING ATC; WHEN RADAR SVC IS BEING TERMINATED; IF THERE IS ANY TFC AHEAD I SHOULD BE AWARE OF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.