Narrative:

We were vectored downwind for landing at lax; visibility was between 3 and 4 mi in haze. My first officer had requested runway 25L since it would be the shortest taxi to the FBO. We were told it was put on request. My first officer set up for an approach to runway 25L and we continued on the downwind vector. Soon after we were told to expect runway 24R. My first officer assumed that we would still get runway 25L and didn't change the setup. We were then asked if we could see the traffic at our 3 O'clock position and we replied in the affirmative. We were then immediately cleared for a visual approach to runway 24R and told to slow to 160 KTS and follow the traffic. As I executed the 180 degree turn required to line up behind our interval I asked my first officer to give me reference to the runway (ILS guidance and FMS reference). My first officer then told me she did not have out the plate for runway 24R and was struggling to get something up for a reference. At the time I was a bit concerned because I would normally have everything ready for whatever possible runway that might be assigned; but it was VMC and we had an aircraft to follow. As I rolled out my concern became greater because we lost our interval in the haze. I had the first officer ask the tower for a heading since I was not seeing the airport or our interval. When we finally saw the airport we were not in a position to land as we were left of course. The tower commanded a go around and we executed a missed approach to be vectored until the tower/approach could get us back into the queue for a landing interval. We were vectored into a right downwind and cleared for an ILS to runway 24R and landed without incident. On taxi in we were given a phone number to call and my first officer called while I was making sure the passenger made their connection. My first officer told me they discussed what had happened and the tower controller wanted to know if there was something they could have done differently in the interest of safety/procedure. I discussed the whole evaluate with my first officer (fairly experienced but new to the company) and told her I felt it was my fault for not making sure she had everything out we needed. She told me she had learned from this experience and we discussed how we could have set up the cockpit to be ready for the expected runway and have easily at hand the capability to switch to a last min change. We were both assuming that ATC would give us the expected runway and were perhaps a little lax due to the VFR conditions. The haze seemed to be much worse than reported. Bottom line we both learned something from this event; and I am sure we will never let ourselves get in this situation again. There was never a safety issue and there was no traffic conflicts.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LEAR60 FLT CREW EXECUTES A GAR AFTER LOSING SIGHT OF THE RWY AT LAX ON A VISUAL APCH.

Narrative: WE WERE VECTORED DOWNWIND FOR LNDG AT LAX; VISIBILITY WAS BTWN 3 AND 4 MI IN HAZE. MY FO HAD REQUESTED RWY 25L SINCE IT WOULD BE THE SHORTEST TAXI TO THE FBO. WE WERE TOLD IT WAS PUT ON REQUEST. MY FO SET UP FOR AN APCH TO RWY 25L AND WE CONTINUED ON THE DOWNWIND VECTOR. SOON AFTER WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 24R. MY FO ASSUMED THAT WE WOULD STILL GET RWY 25L AND DIDN'T CHANGE THE SETUP. WE WERE THEN ASKED IF WE COULD SEE THE TFC AT OUR 3 O'CLOCK POS AND WE REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. WE WERE THEN IMMEDIATELY CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R AND TOLD TO SLOW TO 160 KTS AND FOLLOW THE TFC. AS I EXECUTED THE 180 DEG TURN REQUIRED TO LINE UP BEHIND OUR INTERVAL I ASKED MY FO TO GIVE ME REF TO THE RWY (ILS GUIDANCE AND FMS REF). MY FO THEN TOLD ME SHE DID NOT HAVE OUT THE PLATE FOR RWY 24R AND WAS STRUGGLING TO GET SOMETHING UP FOR A REF. AT THE TIME I WAS A BIT CONCERNED BECAUSE I WOULD NORMALLY HAVE EVERYTHING READY FOR WHATEVER POSSIBLE RWY THAT MIGHT BE ASSIGNED; BUT IT WAS VMC AND WE HAD AN ACFT TO FOLLOW. AS I ROLLED OUT MY CONCERN BECAME GREATER BECAUSE WE LOST OUR INTERVAL IN THE HAZE. I HAD THE FO ASK THE TWR FOR A HDG SINCE I WAS NOT SEEING THE ARPT OR OUR INTERVAL. WHEN WE FINALLY SAW THE ARPT WE WERE NOT IN A POS TO LAND AS WE WERE L OF COURSE. THE TWR COMMANDED A GAR AND WE EXECUTED A MISSED APCH TO BE VECTORED UNTIL THE TWR/APCH COULD GET US BACK INTO THE QUEUE FOR A LNDG INTERVAL. WE WERE VECTORED INTO A R DOWNWIND AND CLRED FOR AN ILS TO RWY 24R AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. ON TAXI IN WE WERE GIVEN A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL AND MY FO CALLED WHILE I WAS MAKING SURE THE PAX MADE THEIR CONNECTION. MY FO TOLD ME THEY DISCUSSED WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND THE TWR CTLR WANTED TO KNOW IF THERE WAS SOMETHING THEY COULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY/PROC. I DISCUSSED THE WHOLE EVAL WITH MY FO (FAIRLY EXPERIENCED BUT NEW TO THE COMPANY) AND TOLD HER I FELT IT WAS MY FAULT FOR NOT MAKING SURE SHE HAD EVERYTHING OUT WE NEEDED. SHE TOLD ME SHE HAD LEARNED FROM THIS EXPERIENCE AND WE DISCUSSED HOW WE COULD HAVE SET UP THE COCKPIT TO BE READY FOR THE EXPECTED RWY AND HAVE EASILY AT HAND THE CAPABILITY TO SWITCH TO A LAST MIN CHANGE. WE WERE BOTH ASSUMING THAT ATC WOULD GIVE US THE EXPECTED RWY AND WERE PERHAPS A LITTLE LAX DUE TO THE VFR CONDITIONS. THE HAZE SEEMED TO BE MUCH WORSE THAN RPTED. BOTTOM LINE WE BOTH LEARNED SOMETHING FROM THIS EVENT; AND I AM SURE WE WILL NEVER LET OURSELVES GET IN THIS SITUATION AGAIN. THERE WAS NEVER A SAFETY ISSUE AND THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.