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B737 flight crew is cleared to xbleed start #2 on pushback. Captain cites concerns with ground crew unfamiliarity with potential hazards.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 701605 |
| Time | |
| Date | 200606 |
| Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | airport : sea.airport |
| State Reference | WA |
| Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
| Environment | |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | ground : pushback |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
| ASRS Report | 701605 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | other personnel |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure |
| Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
| Resolutory Action | none taken : unable |
| Consequence | other |
| Supplementary | |
| Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Maintenance Human Performance Aircraft Company |
| Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
Aircraft dispatched with inoperative APU. Normal engine #1 start at the gate. During pushback; push crew cleared flight crew to start #2. First officer turned of pack and was ready to observe engine start-up. I advised push crew that we 'did not do xbleed starts unless brakes were set.' briefly discussed the hazard this would present to the operation with the push crew. Discussed past similar occurrences in lax and resulting personnel injury; aircraft and tug damage resulting from tow bar breaking. Lack of experience of push crew; as evidenced by clearing us to start during pushback; set the crew up for a potentially hazardous event. Complacency coupled with inexperience is a dangerous combination.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 FLT CREW IS CLRED TO XBLEED START #2 ON PUSHBACK. CAPT CITES CONCERNS WITH GND CREW UNFAMILIARITY WITH POTENTIAL HAZARDS.
Narrative: ACFT DISPATCHED WITH INOP APU. NORMAL ENG #1 START AT THE GATE. DURING PUSHBACK; PUSH CREW CLRED FLT CREW TO START #2. FO TURNED OF PACK AND WAS READY TO OBSERVE ENG START-UP. I ADVISED PUSH CREW THAT WE 'DID NOT DO XBLEED STARTS UNLESS BRAKES WERE SET.' BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE HAZARD THIS WOULD PRESENT TO THE OP WITH THE PUSH CREW. DISCUSSED PAST SIMILAR OCCURRENCES IN LAX AND RESULTING PERSONNEL INJURY; ACFT AND TUG DAMAGE RESULTING FROM TOW BAR BREAKING. LACK OF EXPERIENCE OF PUSH CREW; AS EVIDENCED BY CLRING US TO START DURING PUSHBACK; SET THE CREW UP FOR A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS EVENT. COMPLACENCY COUPLED WITH INEXPERIENCE IS A DANGEROUS COMBINATION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.