Narrative:

Conducting a part 135 proficiency and competency check for a captain. After being cleared for a practice ILS approach at ZZZ; I failed the GPS radio (also used as localizer receiver). We failed to call the tower on #2 radio to receive a landing clearance -- which had; in fact; been given. Inexperienced sic/captain was making radio xmissions; monitoring copilot's actions and dealing with a simulated failed engine. I 'caused' the situation and; when the captain and/or copilot didn't see the problem; should have made sure we were in contact with the tower. On short final; I realized the problem (our communication selector was set to the #1 failed GPS/communication receiver). I got off the jumpseat and switched to #2. The local controller asked if we'd heard his previously issued landing clrncs. He was polite but concerned and I acknowledged our mistake. We discussed the need for better crew coordination and the captain acknowledged that; simulated or 'for real;' the responsibility for safe; legal operation is his. I need to be more aware of the potential consequences when simulating failures and emergencys. Human factors: heat; stress and fatigue contributed to the event. Also the inexperience of the sic. Another factor was the simulation of 2 emergencys on the approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC3 FLT CREW LAND WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: CONDUCTING A PART 135 PROFICIENCY AND COMPETENCY CHK FOR A CAPT. AFTER BEING CLRED FOR A PRACTICE ILS APCH AT ZZZ; I FAILED THE GPS RADIO (ALSO USED AS LOC RECEIVER). WE FAILED TO CALL THE TWR ON #2 RADIO TO RECEIVE A LNDG CLRNC -- WHICH HAD; IN FACT; BEEN GIVEN. INEXPERIENCED SIC/CAPT WAS MAKING RADIO XMISSIONS; MONITORING COPLT'S ACTIONS AND DEALING WITH A SIMULATED FAILED ENG. I 'CAUSED' THE SITUATION AND; WHEN THE CAPT AND/OR COPLT DIDN'T SEE THE PROB; SHOULD HAVE MADE SURE WE WERE IN CONTACT WITH THE TWR. ON SHORT FINAL; I REALIZED THE PROB (OUR COM SELECTOR WAS SET TO THE #1 FAILED GPS/COM RECEIVER). I GOT OFF THE JUMPSEAT AND SWITCHED TO #2. THE LCL CTLR ASKED IF WE'D HEARD HIS PREVIOUSLY ISSUED LNDG CLRNCS. HE WAS POLITE BUT CONCERNED AND I ACKNOWLEDGED OUR MISTAKE. WE DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR BETTER CREW COORD AND THE CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT; SIMULATED OR 'FOR REAL;' THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFE; LEGAL OP IS HIS. I NEED TO BE MORE AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES WHEN SIMULATING FAILURES AND EMERS. HUMAN FACTORS: HEAT; STRESS AND FATIGUE CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT. ALSO THE INEXPERIENCE OF THE SIC. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS THE SIMULATION OF 2 EMERS ON THE APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.