Narrative:

We leveled off at 9000 meters and the relief officer was preparing to take the first rest period for our 10 hour 45 min flight. When the relief officer returned to the flight deck to switch with the captain for a quick restroom break; he noted a strange smell emitting from the air conditioning system. The relief officer alerted the captain as he returned from the restroom; the captain confirmed the report. We decided to declare an emergency and land as soon as possible. We looked at distance to ZZZZ which was 225 NM and distance to ZZZZ1 which was 242 NM. Due to the extreme thunderstorms building around ZZZZ and along the entire route back to ZZZZ we decided to divert to ZZZZ1. We also discussed the possibility of communication difficulties with the foreign controllers. The captain and first officer immediately donned the O2 masks and the relief officer grabbed the MD11 non-alert smoke and fumes from an unknown origin checklist. We proceeded through the checklist led by the relief officer and the first officer was communicating with ATC; and the captain was the flying pilot. We were given a clearance to ZZZ VOR; and then nothing after that. We did not know if we were to go direct to ZZZZ1 or what from there. We asked repeatedly for routing after ZZZ and they did not understand us. The foreign controllers are difficult to understand (an understatement) and they speak their own language 98% of the time on the radio. You have absolutely no situational awareness. You have no idea what is happening around you...other clrncs (to be able to anticipate what is coming up); deviations; other emergencies; runway changes; taxiway routings; WX changes. Very discouraging to say the least. Finally; we told the controller we are proceeding direct to ZZZZ1 after ZZZ then he got the picture. Running through the smoke fumes checklist was causing major problems as we were losing the capability of normal navigation as turning the smoke switch; de-powers AC/dc busses and packs. Trying to communication in these difficult sits; let alone running a checklist that is turning off lights; navigation displays; FMC's; limiting communication to specific radios; all became very difficult to say the least. ATC then cleared us to a intersection close to ZZZZ1 and we told them we have to dump fuel. It took no less than 5 separate conversations with ATC; and we never officially received a clearance to dump fuel until we completed the fuel dump. We dumped approximately 30 thousand pounds from FL330 to approximately FL240. As we approached ZZZZ1 airspace ATC became obsessed with whether or not we were rnp-10 or rvsm capable. We told him many times; actually after every radio transmission we were emergency aircraft. On initial contact with a new ATC facility; we initiated a pan-pan-pan so they knew we were serious. At this point we figured we stopped or significantly slowed the fumes that we could try to figure out what we had and what we thought it might be. Our collective guess was that the AC system had a major part in distributing the fumes; so we attempted to think outside the box. I (the relief officer; also a captain) felt the AC system was not a player; and the fact that the emergency AC and dc busses were off now and the first officer was flying; that maybe we return the aircraft to normal; select manual on the AC system; and manually select the #1 and #2 packs off. If the fumes return; it is either AC; or had to do with the #3 pack. Returning the aircraft to normal and selecting those packs off turned out to be a very important step as it returned a bit of normalcy to the emergency. The fumes continued to dissipate; and this allowed us more freedom to assess the situation and make sure we could devote 90% of our attention to the foreign ATC. We were handed off to ZZZZ1 and were never so happy to hear how they handled us. They immediately acknowledged our emergency; asked if we needed any assistance; gave us pertinent information regarding his plan to vector us to the runway; accompanied with mileage to touchdown; status of crash fire rescue equipment. The whole time it was like ATC was right there with us adding excellent situational awareness to the event. It was a normal approach; normal landing; we cleared the runway. Crash fire rescue equipment did an inspection of the aircraft; and after given clearance we taxied to the ramp. Normal shutdown; crash fire rescue equipment onboard and checked the aircraft over. We were interviewed by the airport police and taken to the hospital for a check up. Callback conversation with reporter acn 702727 revealed the following information: the first officer reports that the fumes came from the #2 pack water separator sock. The sock had become saturated with oil and was causing the fumes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE THREE MAN FLT CREW OF AN MD11 DETECTED FUMES PASSING 29500 FT ON DEP. THEY COULD NOT ISOLATE THE SOURCE; DECLARED AN EMER; AND DIVERTED. MAINT DISCOVERED A CONTAMINATED WATER SEPARATOR BAG.

Narrative: WE LEVELED OFF AT 9000 METERS AND THE RELIEF OFFICER WAS PREPARING TO TAKE THE FIRST REST PERIOD FOR OUR 10 HR 45 MIN FLT. WHEN THE RELIEF OFFICER RETURNED TO THE FLT DECK TO SWITCH WITH THE CAPT FOR A QUICK RESTROOM BREAK; HE NOTED A STRANGE SMELL EMITTING FROM THE AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM. THE RELIEF OFFICER ALERTED THE CAPT AS HE RETURNED FROM THE RESTROOM; THE CAPT CONFIRMED THE RPT. WE DECIDED TO DECLARE AN EMER AND LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE LOOKED AT DISTANCE TO ZZZZ WHICH WAS 225 NM AND DISTANCE TO ZZZZ1 WHICH WAS 242 NM. DUE TO THE EXTREME THUNDERSTORMS BUILDING AROUND ZZZZ AND ALONG THE ENTIRE RTE BACK TO ZZZZ WE DECIDED TO DIVERT TO ZZZZ1. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF COM DIFFICULTIES WITH THE FOREIGN CTLRS. THE CAPT AND FO IMMEDIATELY DONNED THE O2 MASKS AND THE RELIEF OFFICER GRABBED THE MD11 NON-ALERT SMOKE AND FUMES FROM AN UNKNOWN ORIGIN CHKLIST. WE PROCEEDED THROUGH THE CHKLIST LED BY THE RELIEF OFFICER AND THE FO WAS COMMUNICATING WITH ATC; AND THE CAPT WAS THE FLYING PLT. WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO ZZZ VOR; AND THEN NOTHING AFTER THAT. WE DID NOT KNOW IF WE WERE TO GO DIRECT TO ZZZZ1 OR WHAT FROM THERE. WE ASKED REPEATEDLY FOR ROUTING AFTER ZZZ AND THEY DID NOT UNDERSTAND US. THE FOREIGN CTLRS ARE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND (AN UNDERSTATEMENT) AND THEY SPEAK THEIR OWN LANGUAGE 98% OF THE TIME ON THE RADIO. YOU HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. YOU HAVE NO IDEA WHAT IS HAPPENING AROUND YOU...OTHER CLRNCS (TO BE ABLE TO ANTICIPATE WHAT IS COMING UP); DEVIATIONS; OTHER EMERGENCIES; RWY CHANGES; TXWY ROUTINGS; WX CHANGES. VERY DISCOURAGING TO SAY THE LEAST. FINALLY; WE TOLD THE CTLR WE ARE PROCEEDING DIRECT TO ZZZZ1 AFTER ZZZ THEN HE GOT THE PICTURE. RUNNING THROUGH THE SMOKE FUMES CHKLIST WAS CAUSING MAJOR PROBS AS WE WERE LOSING THE CAPABILITY OF NORMAL NAV AS TURNING THE SMOKE SWITCH; DE-POWERS AC/DC BUSSES AND PACKS. TRYING TO COM IN THESE DIFFICULT SITS; LET ALONE RUNNING A CHKLIST THAT IS TURNING OFF LIGHTS; NAV DISPLAYS; FMC'S; LIMITING COM TO SPECIFIC RADIOS; ALL BECAME VERY DIFFICULT TO SAY THE LEAST. ATC THEN CLRED US TO A INTXN CLOSE TO ZZZZ1 AND WE TOLD THEM WE HAVE TO DUMP FUEL. IT TOOK NO LESS THAN 5 SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WITH ATC; AND WE NEVER OFFICIALLY RECEIVED A CLRNC TO DUMP FUEL UNTIL WE COMPLETED THE FUEL DUMP. WE DUMPED APPROX 30 THOUSAND POUNDS FROM FL330 TO APPROX FL240. AS WE APCHED ZZZZ1 AIRSPACE ATC BECAME OBSESSED WITH WHETHER OR NOT WE WERE RNP-10 OR RVSM CAPABLE. WE TOLD HIM MANY TIMES; ACTUALLY AFTER EVERY RADIO XMISSION WE WERE EMER ACFT. ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH A NEW ATC FACILITY; WE INITIATED A PAN-PAN-PAN SO THEY KNEW WE WERE SERIOUS. AT THIS POINT WE FIGURED WE STOPPED OR SIGNIFICANTLY SLOWED THE FUMES THAT WE COULD TRY TO FIGURE OUT WHAT WE HAD AND WHAT WE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE. OUR COLLECTIVE GUESS WAS THAT THE AC SYSTEM HAD A MAJOR PART IN DISTRIBUTING THE FUMES; SO WE ATTEMPTED TO THINK OUTSIDE THE BOX. I (THE RELIEF OFFICER; ALSO A CAPT) FELT THE AC SYSTEM WAS NOT A PLAYER; AND THE FACT THAT THE EMER AC AND DC BUSSES WERE OFF NOW AND THE FO WAS FLYING; THAT MAYBE WE RETURN THE ACFT TO NORMAL; SELECT MANUAL ON THE AC SYSTEM; AND MANUALLY SELECT THE #1 AND #2 PACKS OFF. IF THE FUMES RETURN; IT IS EITHER AC; OR HAD TO DO WITH THE #3 PACK. RETURNING THE ACFT TO NORMAL AND SELECTING THOSE PACKS OFF TURNED OUT TO BE A VERY IMPORTANT STEP AS IT RETURNED A BIT OF NORMALCY TO THE EMER. THE FUMES CONTINUED TO DISSIPATE; AND THIS ALLOWED US MORE FREEDOM TO ASSESS THE SIT AND MAKE SURE WE COULD DEVOTE 90% OF OUR ATTENTION TO THE FOREIGN ATC. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO ZZZZ1 AND WERE NEVER SO HAPPY TO HEAR HOW THEY HANDLED US. THEY IMMEDIATELY ACKNOWLEDGED OUR EMER; ASKED IF WE NEEDED ANY ASSISTANCE; GAVE US PERTINENT INFO REGARDING HIS PLAN TO VECTOR US TO THE RWY; ACCOMPANIED WITH MILEAGE TO TOUCHDOWN; STATUS OF CFR. THE WHOLE TIME IT WAS LIKE ATC WAS RIGHT THERE WITH US ADDING EXCELLENT SITUATIONAL AWARENESS TO THE EVENT. IT WAS A NORMAL APCH; NORMAL LNDG; WE CLRED THE RWY. CFR DID AN INSPECTION OF THE ACFT; AND AFTER GIVEN CLRNC WE TAXIED TO THE RAMP. NORMAL SHUTDOWN; CFR ONBOARD AND CHKED THE ACFT OVER. WE WERE INTERVIEWED BY THE ARPT POLICE AND TAKEN TO THE HOSPITAL FOR A CHECK UP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 702727 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO RPTS THAT THE FUMES CAME FROM THE #2 PACK WATER SEPARATOR SOCK. THE SOCK HAD BECOME SATURATED WITH OIL AND WAS CAUSING THE FUMES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.