Narrative:

The B737 assigned to the flight had an inoperative APU. The ground personnel did not have an operational air cart to provide conditioned air. In addition; the plane was late being towed over to the gate from another terminal as a result of the late departure of another carrier's plane departing from the same gate. The flight pushed back 44 mins behind schedule. During the engine start sequence; operations sent the weight and balance numbers; which were loaded into the flight management computer. On departure; the captain who was the flying pilot mentioned how sluggish the climb was. 19 mins later; dispatch sent an ACARS message to the crew which read; 'operations called with revised numbers...' there was a 1500 pound difference in ZFW and actual takeoff weight; and a shift of 1.8 percent in the center gravity. I suspect the lack of timely communication of the correct weight and balance numbers developed as a direct result of communications errors between baggage handlers on the ramp and the operations personnel. 1) some of the pressure to expedite loading of the aircraft could be alleviated if we were not sharing gates with other carriers. 2) communications between baggage loaders and operations need to be improved to get reliable information relayed accurately to operations. Operations then has an obligation to get the numbers calculated and passed on to the crew operating the flight in a timely manner.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the receipt of the final weights is often late. He stated that it appears the ramp/baggage handlers and the load planners are not getting the information to the operations center for distribution to the flight crews. The initial preflight weight and balance numbers are provided; however; he stated that these can be off by a significant sum as the passenger/baggage load can increase due to a canceled flight or unanticipated changes. This problem is increased when the aircraft is towed to the gate late and a push is on to achieve an on time departure. He stated that additional training may be required for the ramp/baggage handlers with regard to the passing of information.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLT CREW DEPS WITH INCORRECT WT AND BALANCE NUMBERS.

Narrative: THE B737 ASSIGNED TO THE FLT HAD AN INOP APU. THE GND PERSONNEL DID NOT HAVE AN OPERATIONAL AIR CART TO PROVIDE CONDITIONED AIR. IN ADDITION; THE PLANE WAS LATE BEING TOWED OVER TO THE GATE FROM ANOTHER TERMINAL AS A RESULT OF THE LATE DEP OF ANOTHER CARRIER'S PLANE DEPARTING FROM THE SAME GATE. THE FLT PUSHED BACK 44 MINS BEHIND SCHEDULE. DURING THE ENG START SEQUENCE; OPERATIONS SENT THE WT AND BALANCE NUMBERS; WHICH WERE LOADED INTO THE FLT MANAGEMENT COMPUTER. ON DEP; THE CAPT WHO WAS THE FLYING PLT MENTIONED HOW SLUGGISH THE CLB WAS. 19 MINS LATER; DISPATCH SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE TO THE CREW WHICH READ; 'OPS CALLED WITH REVISED NUMBERS...' THERE WAS A 1500 LB DIFFERENCE IN ZFW AND ACTUAL TKOF WT; AND A SHIFT OF 1.8 PERCENT IN THE CENTER GRAVITY. I SUSPECT THE LACK OF TIMELY COMMUNICATION OF THE CORRECT WT AND BALANCE NUMBERS DEVELOPED AS A DIRECT RESULT OF COMMUNICATIONS ERRORS BETWEEN BAGGAGE HANDLERS ON THE RAMP AND THE OPERATIONS PERSONNEL. 1) SOME OF THE PRESSURE TO EXPEDITE LOADING OF THE ACFT COULD BE ALLEVIATED IF WE WERE NOT SHARING GATES WITH OTHER CARRIERS. 2) COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN BAGGAGE LOADERS AND OPERATIONS NEED TO BE IMPROVED TO GET RELIABLE INFO RELAYED ACCURATELY TO OPS. OPS THEN HAS AN OBLIGATION TO GET THE NUMBERS CALCULATED AND PASSED ON TO THE CREW OPERATING THE FLT IN A TIMELY MANNER.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE RECEIPT OF THE FINAL WTS IS OFTEN LATE. HE STATED THAT IT APPEARS THE RAMP/BAGGAGE HANDLERS AND THE LOAD PLANNERS ARE NOT GETTING THE INFO TO THE OPS CENTER FOR DISTRIBUTION TO THE FLT CREWS. THE INITIAL PREFLT WT AND BALANCE NUMBERS ARE PROVIDED; HOWEVER; HE STATED THAT THESE CAN BE OFF BY A SIGNIFICANT SUM AS THE PAX/BAGGAGE LOAD CAN INCREASE DUE TO A CANCELED FLT OR UNANTICIPATED CHANGES. THIS PROB IS INCREASED WHEN THE ACFT IS TOWED TO THE GATE LATE AND A PUSH IS ON TO ACHIEVE AN ON TIME DEP. HE STATED THAT ADDITIONAL TRAINING MAY BE REQUIRED FOR THE RAMP/BAGGAGE HANDLERS WITH REGARD TO THE PASSING OF INFO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.