Narrative:

We were dispatched on a 2-LEG flight to cid with alternates of dsm and ord on jul/thu/06. Our ultimate destination was mli. In completing our preflight preparations; we noticed the WX sequence for cid was 09005 KT 6SM clear 21/20 with a taf for the time of our arrival of 00000KT 3SM br skc 3/4 SM br BKN004. We also noted in the NOTAMS that the ILS approachs to the primary runways 9 and 27 were both OTS. This left us with only the VOR runway 9 as the approach with minimums low enough (RVR 24 or 1/2 mi) to legally dispatch to cid. We confirmed this fact with flight control while in the chocks and updated the WX for our alternates of dsm and ord with no changes from what was in our dispatch release. At the time of our departure; the worst WX forecast for our trip was at cid with the visibility of 3/4 SM. The WX for dsm was forecast as 12005KT 4SM br FEW040 BKN200 and the WX at mli 09005KT 6SM clear 23/21 with a forecast of 0000KT 3SM br SCT050 1SM br BKN005. So; the WX was poorest (and forecast to be the worst) at our original destination of cid. We blocked out approximately 20 mins late and flew to cid uneventfully. On descent to cid; I obtained the ATIS which was 3SM clear 20/20 2996 VOR runway 9 approach in use. We briefed and set up for the VOR runway 9 approach. On descent; I verified with ATC that the approach lights were operating and were set to high. I also asked if any other aircraft had completed the approach. ATC indicted that 3 aircraft had done so that morning. This increased our confidence that the WX was steady and we felt that we would execute a successful approach. ATC vectored us to intercept about a 10 mi final and; once established; we were cleared for the approach. At the time of intercept we were given the following WX 004OVRCST 3 SM. We executed the approach and had no visual contact at minimums and completed the missed approach. We were given a clearance to hold at the cid VOR at 4000 ft. We discussed our alternates and we both calculated an absolute minimum divert fuel of 7600 pounds per the dispatch release. But; we discussed that we both wanted to initiate the divert much earlier than that due to the solid overcast at cid and to allow for a margin of safety. The captain directed me to establish a phone patch while he continued to maintain physical control of the aircraft and all communications with ATC. While in holding; I attempted to contact flight control via commercial radio and atlanta with no success -- our altitude was too low. The intent of the phone patch was to inform flight control of our missed approach and the fact that the WX was deteriorating at cid; get an update on WX conditions at our alternates and verify that there had been no change of plans with respect to where they wanted us to proceed. We talked about the need to climb to 10000-12000 ft if we were going to be able to get an commercial radio phone patch. The captain then directed me to attempt a phone patch with the FBO at cid. This was partially successful. Was able to contact flight control but the content of the information we determined to be unreliable due to the fact that the individual on the phone (who had the best intentions and was obviously trying very hard) was unfamiliar with aviation terms and so we terminated this line of communication. We did determine that there were 2 items of value from this communication: 1) flight control now knew that we had missed the approach and would be looking at our situation and evaluating alternatives; and 2) we were told that the visibility at dsm was 3 1/2 mi. This gave us confidence that the WX at our alternate was holding steady. At this point we determined that we had enough fuel for one more turn in holding and could attempt one more approach (since the visibility was still above minimums). We advised ATC of this and told them we would proceed to our alternate dsm in the event of a missed approach. We then flew the approach with the same results as the first approach. We climbed toward dsm and passing 10000 ft I obtained the ATIS at dsm; 100/6 3/4 SM RVR 9 4500v6000 004 overcast 23/22 29.98 (now the WX is deteriorating at dsm) briefed the captain and then started to establish a phone patch with commercial radio. Again; at this time the captain is maintaining physical control and all ATC communications. We are very busy. I contacted commercial radio and got a phone patch with flight control to give them an update that we were on the divert to dsm. I gave our position just as we were leveling off at 12000 ft. Flight control asked if we had enough fuel to divert to mli as the company wanted us to go there. Our initial reaction was the same; 'why are they asking us?' only flight control has the ability to generate that information once given the entering arguments of position; altitude and fuel. We did some rough mental calculations and determined that this seemed possible as we were initially dispatched with enough fuel to go to our most distant alternate of ord which was approximately 170 mi. The total mileage from missed approach at cid to a position en route to dsm and then divert to mli was calculated to be approximately 120-130 mi. I asked what the WX was at mli; was given a partial update and was told the visibility was 2 1/2 mi. At this point; the captain felt that the divert to mli was the best alternate given that the WX at dsm was dropping. The phone patch was abruptly terminated prior to our obtaining the revised fuel burn numbers from flight control; a complete WX update as well as an amendment to our release. We realized this immediately and again attempted to contact flight control through commercial radio. This was successful. I was talking to flight control and they were calculating the fuel burn numbers throughout our en route travel to mli. (We assumed they were still having the same electrical and computer problems that they were experiencing in ZZZ during the outbound departures.) at about 36 mi from mli; I heard the captain obtain the ATIS from mli and they gave him 1/4 mi with the RVR of 2400. The captain directed me to terminate the phone patch and get back in the loop to support him for the approach. It was becoming a safety of flight issue. I told flight control that I could not wait any longer and to note the amendment and have the numbers ready for us to copy upon landing. At this point we felt we had 'constructively' completed an amendment to the release. At about 26 mi we were given a clearance to maintain 2500 ft until established and were cleared for the ILS runway 9 approach at mli. We intercepted the glide path and localizer and tracked it inbound and were switched over to tower. Once established on the final approach segment; tower gave us an RVR of td 2200; right/O 2400 and asked our intentions. We replied that we would continue. Even though this was below minimums; and we had not verbally declared an emergency; in our minds we had determined that we were in an emergency situation. This was due to the deteriorating WX at a number of airports in the area and our fuel status. We broke out and touched down uneventfully. We taxied to the line; shut down and called flight control and the chief pilot's office for a debrief. It is obvious that communications were critical in the course of this flight. Low altitude communications are problematic at best in trying to contact commercial radio or atlanta radio. When below 10000 ft it is almost impossible to contact them. ACARS or another similar state of the art communications suite would alleviate these communication problems; increase safety of flight and serve to increase the reliability and timeliness of our service to our customers. Supplemental information from acn 703168: flight was holding over cid after a missed approach waiting for the WX to improve. His fuel went to decision time so he diverted to dsm; his alternate; and called. The company said to send him to mli. The WX at mli was 1 SM OVC004. He said he had enough fuel so I diverted him to mli without knowing how much fuel was on board. I could not give him new burn numbers at this time because of computer problems due to power outage earlier. As I struggled with the computer; flight started their descent into mli and we lost contact. The WX at mli had deteriorated. When the captain called after landing; I found out he landed below minimums and was almost out of fuel. The decision to divert him to mli; because that is what the company wanted; was a mistake. I should have said no andlet him proceed to dsm; which had good WX. The decision to turn him was made with partial information. Everything that happened after that was flawed because of the bad decision to turn him to mli. I felt I was rushed and pressured to go to mli. The next time; I will have the crew continue to their preplanned alternate until I have all of the facts and then make a decision. I understand the needs of the customer; but crew and plane safety will not be compromised.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC9 CREW RPTS DETERIORATING WX AT THEIR DEST AND ALTERNATE MADE ONLY THE SECOND ALTERNATE LEGAL. BECAUSE OF COM PROBS WERE UNABLE TO RECEIVE THE AMENDED ALTERNATE RELEASE FROM THE ACR BEFORE LNDG AT THE FIRST ALTERNATE WITH MINIMUM FUEL AT WX MINIMUMS.

Narrative: WE WERE DISPATCHED ON A 2-LEG FLT TO CID WITH ALTERNATES OF DSM AND ORD ON JUL/THU/06. OUR ULTIMATE DEST WAS MLI. IN COMPLETING OUR PREFLT PREPARATIONS; WE NOTICED THE WX SEQUENCE FOR CID WAS 09005 KT 6SM CLR 21/20 WITH A TAF FOR THE TIME OF OUR ARR OF 00000KT 3SM BR SKC 3/4 SM BR BKN004. WE ALSO NOTED IN THE NOTAMS THAT THE ILS APCHS TO THE PRIMARY RWYS 9 AND 27 WERE BOTH OTS. THIS LEFT US WITH ONLY THE VOR RWY 9 AS THE APCH WITH MINIMUMS LOW ENOUGH (RVR 24 OR 1/2 MI) TO LEGALLY DISPATCH TO CID. WE CONFIRMED THIS FACT WITH FLT CTL WHILE IN THE CHOCKS AND UPDATED THE WX FOR OUR ALTERNATES OF DSM AND ORD WITH NO CHANGES FROM WHAT WAS IN OUR DISPATCH RELEASE. AT THE TIME OF OUR DEP; THE WORST WX FORECAST FOR OUR TRIP WAS AT CID WITH THE VISIBILITY OF 3/4 SM. THE WX FOR DSM WAS FORECAST AS 12005KT 4SM BR FEW040 BKN200 AND THE WX AT MLI 09005KT 6SM CLR 23/21 WITH A FORECAST OF 0000KT 3SM BR SCT050 1SM BR BKN005. SO; THE WX WAS POOREST (AND FORECAST TO BE THE WORST) AT OUR ORIGINAL DEST OF CID. WE BLOCKED OUT APPROX 20 MINS LATE AND FLEW TO CID UNEVENTFULLY. ON DSCNT TO CID; I OBTAINED THE ATIS WHICH WAS 3SM CLR 20/20 2996 VOR RWY 9 APCH IN USE. WE BRIEFED AND SET UP FOR THE VOR RWY 9 APCH. ON DSCNT; I VERIFIED WITH ATC THAT THE APCH LIGHTS WERE OPERATING AND WERE SET TO HIGH. I ALSO ASKED IF ANY OTHER ACFT HAD COMPLETED THE APCH. ATC INDICTED THAT 3 ACFT HAD DONE SO THAT MORNING. THIS INCREASED OUR CONFIDENCE THAT THE WX WAS STEADY AND WE FELT THAT WE WOULD EXECUTE A SUCCESSFUL APCH. ATC VECTORED US TO INTERCEPT ABOUT A 10 MI FINAL AND; ONCE ESTABLISHED; WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH. AT THE TIME OF INTERCEPT WE WERE GIVEN THE FOLLOWING WX 004OVRCST 3 SM. WE EXECUTED THE APCH AND HAD NO VISUAL CONTACT AT MINIMUMS AND COMPLETED THE MISSED APCH. WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO HOLD AT THE CID VOR AT 4000 FT. WE DISCUSSED OUR ALTERNATES AND WE BOTH CALCULATED AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM DIVERT FUEL OF 7600 LBS PER THE DISPATCH RELEASE. BUT; WE DISCUSSED THAT WE BOTH WANTED TO INITIATE THE DIVERT MUCH EARLIER THAN THAT DUE TO THE SOLID OVCST AT CID AND TO ALLOW FOR A MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO ESTABLISH A PHONE PATCH WHILE HE CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN PHYSICAL CTL OF THE ACFT AND ALL COMS WITH ATC. WHILE IN HOLDING; I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT FLT CTL VIA COMMERCIAL RADIO AND ATLANTA WITH NO SUCCESS -- OUR ALT WAS TOO LOW. THE INTENT OF THE PHONE PATCH WAS TO INFORM FLT CTL OF OUR MISSED APCH AND THE FACT THAT THE WX WAS DETERIORATING AT CID; GET AN UPDATE ON WX CONDITIONS AT OUR ALTERNATES AND VERIFY THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE OF PLANS WITH RESPECT TO WHERE THEY WANTED US TO PROCEED. WE TALKED ABOUT THE NEED TO CLB TO 10000-12000 FT IF WE WERE GOING TO BE ABLE TO GET AN COMMERCIAL RADIO PHONE PATCH. THE CAPT THEN DIRECTED ME TO ATTEMPT A PHONE PATCH WITH THE FBO AT CID. THIS WAS PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL. WAS ABLE TO CONTACT FLT CTL BUT THE CONTENT OF THE INFO WE DETERMINED TO BE UNRELIABLE DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE INDIVIDUAL ON THE PHONE (WHO HAD THE BEST INTENTIONS AND WAS OBVIOUSLY TRYING VERY HARD) WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH AVIATION TERMS AND SO WE TERMINATED THIS LINE OF COM. WE DID DETERMINE THAT THERE WERE 2 ITEMS OF VALUE FROM THIS COM: 1) FLT CTL NOW KNEW THAT WE HAD MISSED THE APCH AND WOULD BE LOOKING AT OUR SITUATION AND EVALUATING ALTERNATIVES; AND 2) WE WERE TOLD THAT THE VISIBILITY AT DSM WAS 3 1/2 MI. THIS GAVE US CONFIDENCE THAT THE WX AT OUR ALTERNATE WAS HOLDING STEADY. AT THIS POINT WE DETERMINED THAT WE HAD ENOUGH FUEL FOR ONE MORE TURN IN HOLDING AND COULD ATTEMPT ONE MORE APCH (SINCE THE VISIBILITY WAS STILL ABOVE MINIMUMS). WE ADVISED ATC OF THIS AND TOLD THEM WE WOULD PROCEED TO OUR ALTERNATE DSM IN THE EVENT OF A MISSED APCH. WE THEN FLEW THE APCH WITH THE SAME RESULTS AS THE FIRST APCH. WE CLBED TOWARD DSM AND PASSING 10000 FT I OBTAINED THE ATIS AT DSM; 100/6 3/4 SM RVR 9 4500V6000 004 OVCST 23/22 29.98 (NOW THE WX IS DETERIORATING AT DSM) BRIEFED THE CAPT AND THEN STARTED TO ESTABLISH A PHONE PATCH WITH COMMERCIAL RADIO. AGAIN; AT THIS TIME THE CAPT IS MAINTAINING PHYSICAL CTL AND ALL ATC COMS. WE ARE VERY BUSY. I CONTACTED COMMERCIAL RADIO AND GOT A PHONE PATCH WITH FLT CTL TO GIVE THEM AN UPDATE THAT WE WERE ON THE DIVERT TO DSM. I GAVE OUR POS JUST AS WE WERE LEVELING OFF AT 12000 FT. FLT CTL ASKED IF WE HAD ENOUGH FUEL TO DIVERT TO MLI AS THE COMPANY WANTED US TO GO THERE. OUR INITIAL REACTION WAS THE SAME; 'WHY ARE THEY ASKING US?' ONLY FLT CTL HAS THE ABILITY TO GENERATE THAT INFO ONCE GIVEN THE ENTERING ARGUMENTS OF POS; ALT AND FUEL. WE DID SOME ROUGH MENTAL CALCULATIONS AND DETERMINED THAT THIS SEEMED POSSIBLE AS WE WERE INITIALLY DISPATCHED WITH ENOUGH FUEL TO GO TO OUR MOST DISTANT ALTERNATE OF ORD WHICH WAS APPROX 170 MI. THE TOTAL MILEAGE FROM MISSED APCH AT CID TO A POS ENRTE TO DSM AND THEN DIVERT TO MLI WAS CALCULATED TO BE APPROX 120-130 MI. I ASKED WHAT THE WX WAS AT MLI; WAS GIVEN A PARTIAL UPDATE AND WAS TOLD THE VISIBILITY WAS 2 1/2 MI. AT THIS POINT; THE CAPT FELT THAT THE DIVERT TO MLI WAS THE BEST ALTERNATE GIVEN THAT THE WX AT DSM WAS DROPPING. THE PHONE PATCH WAS ABRUPTLY TERMINATED PRIOR TO OUR OBTAINING THE REVISED FUEL BURN NUMBERS FROM FLT CTL; A COMPLETE WX UPDATE AS WELL AS AN AMENDMENT TO OUR RELEASE. WE REALIZED THIS IMMEDIATELY AND AGAIN ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT FLT CTL THROUGH COMMERCIAL RADIO. THIS WAS SUCCESSFUL. I WAS TALKING TO FLT CTL AND THEY WERE CALCULATING THE FUEL BURN NUMBERS THROUGHOUT OUR ENRTE TRAVEL TO MLI. (WE ASSUMED THEY WERE STILL HAVING THE SAME ELECTRICAL AND COMPUTER PROBS THAT THEY WERE EXPERIENCING IN ZZZ DURING THE OUTBOUND DEPS.) AT ABOUT 36 MI FROM MLI; I HEARD THE CAPT OBTAIN THE ATIS FROM MLI AND THEY GAVE HIM 1/4 MI WITH THE RVR OF 2400. THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO TERMINATE THE PHONE PATCH AND GET BACK IN THE LOOP TO SUPPORT HIM FOR THE APCH. IT WAS BECOMING A SAFETY OF FLT ISSUE. I TOLD FLT CTL THAT I COULD NOT WAIT ANY LONGER AND TO NOTE THE AMENDMENT AND HAVE THE NUMBERS READY FOR US TO COPY UPON LNDG. AT THIS POINT WE FELT WE HAD 'CONSTRUCTIVELY' COMPLETED AN AMENDMENT TO THE RELEASE. AT ABOUT 26 MI WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO MAINTAIN 2500 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED AND WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 9 APCH AT MLI. WE INTERCEPTED THE GLIDE PATH AND LOC AND TRACKED IT INBOUND AND WERE SWITCHED OVER TO TWR. ONCE ESTABLISHED ON THE FINAL APCH SEGMENT; TWR GAVE US AN RVR OF TD 2200; R/O 2400 AND ASKED OUR INTENTIONS. WE REPLIED THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE. EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS BELOW MINIMUMS; AND WE HAD NOT VERBALLY DECLARED AN EMER; IN OUR MINDS WE HAD DETERMINED THAT WE WERE IN AN EMER SITUATION. THIS WAS DUE TO THE DETERIORATING WX AT A NUMBER OF ARPTS IN THE AREA AND OUR FUEL STATUS. WE BROKE OUT AND TOUCHED DOWN UNEVENTFULLY. WE TAXIED TO THE LINE; SHUT DOWN AND CALLED FLT CTL AND THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE FOR A DEBRIEF. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT COMS WERE CRITICAL IN THE COURSE OF THIS FLT. LOW ALT COMS ARE PROBLEMATIC AT BEST IN TRYING TO CONTACT COMMERCIAL RADIO OR ATLANTA RADIO. WHEN BELOW 10000 FT IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTACT THEM. ACARS OR ANOTHER SIMILAR STATE OF THE ART COMS SUITE WOULD ALLEVIATE THESE COM PROBS; INCREASE SAFETY OF FLT AND SERVE TO INCREASE THE RELIABILITY AND TIMELINESS OF OUR SVC TO OUR CUSTOMERS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 703168: FLT WAS HOLDING OVER CID AFTER A MISSED APCH WAITING FOR THE WX TO IMPROVE. HIS FUEL WENT TO DECISION TIME SO HE DIVERTED TO DSM; HIS ALTERNATE; AND CALLED. THE COMPANY SAID TO SEND HIM TO MLI. THE WX AT MLI WAS 1 SM OVC004. HE SAID HE HAD ENOUGH FUEL SO I DIVERTED HIM TO MLI WITHOUT KNOWING HOW MUCH FUEL WAS ON BOARD. I COULD NOT GIVE HIM NEW BURN NUMBERS AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF COMPUTER PROBS DUE TO PWR OUTAGE EARLIER. AS I STRUGGLED WITH THE COMPUTER; FLT STARTED THEIR DSCNT INTO MLI AND WE LOST CONTACT. THE WX AT MLI HAD DETERIORATED. WHEN THE CAPT CALLED AFTER LNDG; I FOUND OUT HE LANDED BELOW MINIMUMS AND WAS ALMOST OUT OF FUEL. THE DECISION TO DIVERT HIM TO MLI; BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT THE COMPANY WANTED; WAS A MISTAKE. I SHOULD HAVE SAID NO ANDLET HIM PROCEED TO DSM; WHICH HAD GOOD WX. THE DECISION TO TURN HIM WAS MADE WITH PARTIAL INFO. EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENED AFTER THAT WAS FLAWED BECAUSE OF THE BAD DECISION TO TURN HIM TO MLI. I FELT I WAS RUSHED AND PRESSURED TO GO TO MLI. THE NEXT TIME; I WILL HAVE THE CREW CONTINUE TO THEIR PREPLANNED ALTERNATE UNTIL I HAVE ALL OF THE FACTS AND THEN MAKE A DECISION. I UNDERSTAND THE NEEDS OF THE CUSTOMER; BUT CREW AND PLANE SAFETY WILL NOT BE COMPROMISED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.