Narrative:

On climb out from mia we received an EICAS message 'right forward window' along with a right forward window heat inoperative light on the overhead switch. The QRH for the window heat inoperative wasn't explicit. 'Turn switch off for 10 seconds; then on. If problem reoccurs turn switch off.' this is the end of the procedure without any further comment. Reviewing the MEL it revealed that flight into known icing conditions is prohibited. I notified dispatch who advised me to return to mia for repairs. The window heat problem was a repeat item from the inbound flight that terminated the night before ours. Upon return to mia; maintenance replaced the right window heat controller. The flight was re-released and we headed to ewr. Once again now en route to ewr we experienced a repeat of the same item. EICAS message 'right forward window' along with a right forward window heat inoperative light. At this point I elected to continue to ewr as long as I was able to avoid icing conditions and was willing to divert if necessary. Upon arrival in ewr I had the impression from maintenance that with this being the third write-up for the same item that a window change was the only next option. The MEL would allow me to take the aircraft back to mia as previous planned; but I had to stay out of icing conditions. Dispatch told me that with enough fuel they could take me down 'ar rtes' at 15000-18000 ft to a certain point then up to a normal cruise altitude then back down to 18000 ft so far from mia. I felt I was being pressured (pilot pushing) to take a flight in violation of the company's operation specifications that limit operation on the 'ar rtes' to a minimum altitude of 25000 ft as specified in the flight manual. Several issues come to mind. First: the first signoff by maintenance appears to be superficial to keep aircraft in the air. Second: QRH procedure mentions nothing about avoiding icing conditions. Third: I felt that dispatch was 'pilot pushing' to get me to take the aircraft on the 'ar rtes' below minimum flight level for those rtes to avoid icing conditions. Their decision should have been to inform that they were unable to avoid icing conditions and not try to talk me into it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 CREW RECEIVES R FORWARD WINDOW HEAT INOP EICAS ON DEP AND RETURNS TO MIA.

Narrative: ON CLBOUT FROM MIA WE RECEIVED AN EICAS MESSAGE 'R FORWARD WINDOW' ALONG WITH A R FORWARD WINDOW HEAT INOP LIGHT ON THE OVERHEAD SWITCH. THE QRH FOR THE WINDOW HEAT INOP WASN'T EXPLICIT. 'TURN SWITCH OFF FOR 10 SECONDS; THEN ON. IF PROB REOCCURS TURN SWITCH OFF.' THIS IS THE END OF THE PROC WITHOUT ANY FURTHER COMMENT. REVIEWING THE MEL IT REVEALED THAT FLT INTO KNOWN ICING CONDITIONS IS PROHIBITED. I NOTIFIED DISPATCH WHO ADVISED ME TO RETURN TO MIA FOR REPAIRS. THE WINDOW HEAT PROB WAS A REPEAT ITEM FROM THE INBOUND FLT THAT TERMINATED THE NIGHT BEFORE OURS. UPON RETURN TO MIA; MAINT REPLACED THE R WINDOW HEAT CTLR. THE FLT WAS RE-RELEASED AND WE HEADED TO EWR. ONCE AGAIN NOW ENRTE TO EWR WE EXPERIENCED A REPEAT OF THE SAME ITEM. EICAS MESSAGE 'R FORWARD WINDOW' ALONG WITH A R FORWARD WINDOW HEAT INOP LIGHT. AT THIS POINT I ELECTED TO CONTINUE TO EWR AS LONG AS I WAS ABLE TO AVOID ICING CONDITIONS AND WAS WILLING TO DIVERT IF NECESSARY. UPON ARR IN EWR I HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM MAINT THAT WITH THIS BEING THE THIRD WRITE-UP FOR THE SAME ITEM THAT A WINDOW CHANGE WAS THE ONLY NEXT OPTION. THE MEL WOULD ALLOW ME TO TAKE THE ACFT BACK TO MIA AS PREVIOUS PLANNED; BUT I HAD TO STAY OUT OF ICING CONDITIONS. DISPATCH TOLD ME THAT WITH ENOUGH FUEL THEY COULD TAKE ME DOWN 'AR RTES' AT 15000-18000 FT TO A CERTAIN POINT THEN UP TO A NORMAL CRUISE ALT THEN BACK DOWN TO 18000 FT SO FAR FROM MIA. I FELT I WAS BEING PRESSURED (PLT PUSHING) TO TAKE A FLT IN VIOLATION OF THE COMPANY'S OP SPECS THAT LIMIT OP ON THE 'AR RTES' TO A MINIMUM ALT OF 25000 FT AS SPECIFIED IN THE FLT MANUAL. SEVERAL ISSUES COME TO MIND. FIRST: THE FIRST SIGNOFF BY MAINT APPEARS TO BE SUPERFICIAL TO KEEP ACFT IN THE AIR. SECOND: QRH PROC MENTIONS NOTHING ABOUT AVOIDING ICING CONDITIONS. THIRD: I FELT THAT DISPATCH WAS 'PLT PUSHING' TO GET ME TO TAKE THE ACFT ON THE 'AR RTES' BELOW MINIMUM FLT LEVEL FOR THOSE RTES TO AVOID ICING CONDITIONS. THEIR DECISION SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO INFORM THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO AVOID ICING CONDITIONS AND NOT TRY TO TALK ME INTO IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.