Narrative:

We were past our scheduled departure time when the final weight and balance was brought to the aircraft. The captain reviewed the documents and related to me the stabilizer setting for input to the FMGC. The captain input the given ZFW to the FMGC and related to me what the takeoff weight was. This number was significantly less than the planned data. I questioned the captain as to the accuracy of the ZFW. He said that the numbers were correct. I said we were going to be significantly lighter than planned. We both agreed that was the case and I adjusted the v-spds for the lighter weight. I failed to look at the weight/balance form myself to verify the numbers were correct. Because we were running late; I simply believed the data was correct after challenging the information that was originally presented. Upon leveling off at cruise a check gross weight message appeared on the FMGC scratchpad. It was at this time that we reviewed the weight and balance once again and discovered the passenger weights figures were missing on the weight and balance sheet. The total passenger number was correct but corresponding numeric figures used to calculate the total weight was omitted. We overlooked upon our preflight preparation. We went to the fuel page and calculated the correct ZFW and made the input to the FMGC. We continued without incident. Verify the documentation with each other. Significant differences between preliminary numbers and final numbers should be red flag items; and be challenged and followed up by both crewmembers despite the time or operational constraints that may exist at the time. I challenged the captain about the disparity in the data; but I should have asked to see the paperwork myself. Having flown with this captain on numerous occasions; and having personal knowledge of his competency and experience as a captain; I allowed the time crunch to get to me. I was not thorough enough to follow up on what was a red flag item in my mind. Had I said to my cohort -- something is not right here; let's stop and take a min to look at this situation before we go any further. I believe he would in fact not fault me for doing so. In this sense; I feel I let my captain; our passenger; and my company down; in not doing the right thing. Our CRM training tells us to follow up; communicate; and share information and perceptions about our work environment in and around the aircraft at all times. I failed to do this in this case. I will endeavor to be more proactive in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 CREW RECEIVES INACCURATE WT AND BAL NUMBERS AND DISCOVERS THE ERROR IN CRUISE.

Narrative: WE WERE PAST OUR SCHEDULED DEP TIME WHEN THE FINAL WT AND BAL WAS BROUGHT TO THE ACFT. THE CAPT REVIEWED THE DOCUMENTS AND RELATED TO ME THE STABILIZER SETTING FOR INPUT TO THE FMGC. THE CAPT INPUT THE GIVEN ZFW TO THE FMGC AND RELATED TO ME WHAT THE TKOF WT WAS. THIS NUMBER WAS SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN THE PLANNED DATA. I QUESTIONED THE CAPT AS TO THE ACCURACY OF THE ZFW. HE SAID THAT THE NUMBERS WERE CORRECT. I SAID WE WERE GOING TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY LIGHTER THAN PLANNED. WE BOTH AGREED THAT WAS THE CASE AND I ADJUSTED THE V-SPDS FOR THE LIGHTER WT. I FAILED TO LOOK AT THE WT/BAL FORM MYSELF TO VERIFY THE NUMBERS WERE CORRECT. BECAUSE WE WERE RUNNING LATE; I SIMPLY BELIEVED THE DATA WAS CORRECT AFTER CHALLENGING THE INFO THAT WAS ORIGINALLY PRESENTED. UPON LEVELING OFF AT CRUISE A CHK GROSS WT MESSAGE APPEARED ON THE FMGC SCRATCHPAD. IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT WE REVIEWED THE WT AND BAL ONCE AGAIN AND DISCOVERED THE PAX WTS FIGURES WERE MISSING ON THE WT AND BAL SHEET. THE TOTAL PAX NUMBER WAS CORRECT BUT CORRESPONDING NUMERIC FIGURES USED TO CALCULATE THE TOTAL WT WAS OMITTED. WE OVERLOOKED UPON OUR PREFLT PREPARATION. WE WENT TO THE FUEL PAGE AND CALCULATED THE CORRECT ZFW AND MADE THE INPUT TO THE FMGC. WE CONTINUED WITHOUT INCIDENT. VERIFY THE DOCUMENTATION WITH EACH OTHER. SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BTWN PRELIMINARY NUMBERS AND FINAL NUMBERS SHOULD BE RED FLAG ITEMS; AND BE CHALLENGED AND FOLLOWED UP BY BOTH CREWMEMBERS DESPITE THE TIME OR OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS THAT MAY EXIST AT THE TIME. I CHALLENGED THE CAPT ABOUT THE DISPARITY IN THE DATA; BUT I SHOULD HAVE ASKED TO SEE THE PAPERWORK MYSELF. HAVING FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS; AND HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF HIS COMPETENCY AND EXPERIENCE AS A CAPT; I ALLOWED THE TIME CRUNCH TO GET TO ME. I WAS NOT THOROUGH ENOUGH TO FOLLOW UP ON WHAT WAS A RED FLAG ITEM IN MY MIND. HAD I SAID TO MY COHORT -- SOMETHING IS NOT RIGHT HERE; LET'S STOP AND TAKE A MIN TO LOOK AT THIS SITUATION BEFORE WE GO ANY FURTHER. I BELIEVE HE WOULD IN FACT NOT FAULT ME FOR DOING SO. IN THIS SENSE; I FEEL I LET MY CAPT; OUR PAX; AND MY COMPANY DOWN; IN NOT DOING THE RIGHT THING. OUR CRM TRAINING TELLS US TO FOLLOW UP; COMMUNICATE; AND SHARE INFO AND PERCEPTIONS ABOUT OUR WORK ENVIRONMENT IN AND AROUND THE ACFT AT ALL TIMES. I FAILED TO DO THIS IN THIS CASE. I WILL ENDEAVOR TO BE MORE PROACTIVE IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.